The value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis:  A case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas by Frantz, Micheline
The Value of Online Citizen Journalism in 
Political Risk Analysis 
A case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas 
by  
  Micheline Frantz 
Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
Master of Arts (Political Science) 
     in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
at Stellenbosch University 
   Supervisor: Dr Derica Lambrechts  
  Co-supervisor: Barend Lutz  
March 2016
Copyright © 2016 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
ii 
Declaration 
By submitting this thesis/dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work 
contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the 
extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch 
University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety 
or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
March 2016 




The virtual sphere is quickly becoming one of the most resourceful platforms for obtaining 
information. This is due to information taking on a more dynamic role, in which it is more 
freely dispersed, debated and deconstructed by those engaging with it; whether as the 
audience or journalist. This has paved the way for citizens to distribute information as citizen 
journalists. It is within this context that this study aims to research the value of online citizen 
journalists in political risk analysis, by specifically researching the value it holds as a source 
of information in the compilation of political risk reports. This is the first study, as far as the 
researcher is aware, that attempts to research the potential value of online citizen journalism 
as a source of information for political risk reports compiled by political risk analysts.  
The rationale for this study is based on the understanding that the advancement of technology 
has greatly evolved the manner in which the world is understood in terms of communication 
and media. Furthermore, this study emphasises that the adoption of new media technologies 
during risk management and crisis management can increase problem-solving capabilities 
and facilitate rational decision making. Political risk analysis presents the opportunity to 
mitigate the risks associated with the political sphere. By exploring and understanding new 
avenues of obtaining information in relation to technological changes in news reporting, the 
study of political risk analysis can advance to the degree that data can be more readily 
accessed from a perspective of active and engaged citizens who are familiar with the scope of 
the country’s political, economic and socio-economic climate. 
This introductory study concludes that the value of online citizen journalism is feasible; 
however, this is only to a certain extent, as it is not as advanced as mainstream media. In 
order to express the extent to which online citizen journalism is feasible, this study used the 
case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014. This was demonstrated by a single 
qualitative case study observing the value of news reports by online citizen journalists, 
according to the three criteria of timeliness, accuracy and relevancy. This study found that 
there is value in online citizen journalism, although it would be better utilised alongside 
mainstream media in the form of a media partnership. This study includes an advisory 
section, presenting the potential for future studies to improve the value of online citizen 
journalism in the field of political risk analysis.  




Die virtuele sfeer is vinnig besig om een van die rykste bronne vir die opsporing van inligting 
te word. Dít is omdat inligting meer dinamies is en meer vryelik versprei, bespreek en 
gedekonstrueer word deur diegene wat daarmee omgaan – hetsy die gewone leser of die 
joernalis. Dit het onder meer die weg gebaan vir burgers om inligting as burgerlike joernaliste 
te versprei. Teen hierdie agtergrond ondersoek hierdie studie die waarde van aanlyn 
burgerlike joernalistiek vir politieke risiko-ontleding deur bepaald te konsentreer op die 
waarde wat dit as ’n inligtingsbron vir die opstel van politieke risikoverslae inhou. So ver die 
navorser weet, is dít die eerste studie oor die moontlike waarde van aanlyn burgerlike 
joernalistiek as ’n bron van inligting vir politieke risiko-ontleders se risikoverslae.  
Die beweegrede vir hierdie studie is eerstens dat tegnologiese vooruitgang ’n omwenteling 
teweeggebring het in hoe die wêreld verstaan word wat kommunikasie en media betref. 
Voorts beklemtoon die studie dat die ingebruikneming van nuwe mediategnologieë 
gedurende krisisbestuur probleemoplossingsvermoëns kan verbeter en tot rasionele 
besluitneming kan lei. Politieke risiko-ontleding bied die geleentheid om die risiko’s in die 
politieke sfeer te temper. Deur nuwe maniere van inligtingsopsporing aan die hand van 
tegnologiese veranderinge in nuusverslaggewing te verken en te verstaan, kan die vakgebied 
van politieke risiko-ontleding baat vind by meer geredelik toeganklike data uit die oogpunt 
van aktiewe en betrokke burgers wat vertroud is met die land se politieke, ekonomiese en 
sosio-ekonomiese klimaat. 
Hierdie inleidende studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek 
waardevol kan wees, dog slegs in ’n sekere mate aangesien dit nie so gevorderd soos 
hoofstroommedia is nie. Om te bepaal hoeveel waarde aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek inhou, 
maak hierdie navorsing gebruik van ’n gevallestudie van polisiewreedheid in die krotbuurte 
van Brasilië in 2014. ’n Enkele kwalitatiewe gevallestudie ondersoek die waarde van aanlyn 
burgerlike joernaliste se nuusberigte aan die hand van die drie maatstawwe van aktualiteit, 
akkuraatheid en relevansie. Die studie bevind dat aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek wél nut het, 
hoewel dit beter sou wees om dit in samehang met hoofstroommedia in die vorm van ’n 
mediavennootskap in te span. Die studie sluit ook ’n raadgewende afdeling in wat die 
moontlikhede uiteensit vir toekomstige studies om die waarde van aanlyn burgerlike 
joernalistiek op die gebied van politieke risiko-ontleding te verbeter.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
The rise and increasing prominence of online citizen journalism has been described as a force 
that has shifted the relationship between news organisations and their audiences (Bruns 
2010:1). The driving force for this rapid shift is aided by the increasing development of 
online social media and, more specifically, prominent online platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube1, as well as blogs that have greatly evolved in their ability to readily 
access and distribute information (DeMers 2013). These online tools have broadened the 
opportunity for citizens to participate politically within the public sphere2. Based on these 
developments, it has become possible for citizens to produce their own news content about 
issues that concern their respective communities through the gathering, writing, editing, 
producing and distributing of news and information (Wilson 2012: 2).  
In recent years, technology has spurred a new wave of communication during times of crisis; 
this allows for a greater awareness of what is happening on the ground. A prominent example 
of this is the 2011 Arab Spring, a wave of protests which started in Tunisia and spread to 
Egypt. Citizens took to the streets protesting against poverty, government corruption, 
unemployment and autocratic state leaders. What made these protests significant was the use 
of technology, which increased the international community’s awareness of the current state 
of affairs in these countries (Sheedy 2011:32). The impact of technology reached such an 
extent that Egypt’s government attempted to shut down such communications in an effort to 
stop the protests. However, this led to Facebook and Twitter taking action by launching 
Speak2Tweet, a service that allowed Egyptian citizens to use their mobile phones to record 
messages which could be translated into tweets (Sheedy 2011:1).  
These political events incorporated what is known as online citizen journalists which is 
citizens who play an active role in the public sphere. This makes them a useful tool in the 
field of political risk analysis, as they provide crisis-related information that can be utilised 
                                                 
 
 
1These online social media platforms differ, but are distinct in that they are used as an interactive source of 
communication via the internet. 
2The public sphere is understood as an important component of social political organisation which lies between   
state and society (Castells, 2008: 78- 79). 
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by response organisations to aid the analysis of potential political risks. This contributes to 
the formation and implementation of contingency plans to improve the awareness of the crisis 
at hand (Watson et al. 2014:294). 
A study by Catherine O’Donnell (2011) found that social media played a central role in 
shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. This was illustrated by the flow of messages 
through social media platforms, which increased expectations of success in this political 
uprising. People who shared an interest in democracy built and used social media networks to 
organise political action. Blogs were used as discussion platforms and foreshadowed a turn in 
public opinion in both Egypt and Tunisia, as presented by data compiled by the Project on 
Information Technology and Political Islam in Tunisia a month before the crisis. Special data 
on the structure of Egyptian political parties was also compiled a month prior to the crisis 
therein.  
These forums and tweets preceded the mass protests through the discussion of liberty, 
democracy and revolution. The advantage of these platforms meant that discussion was no 
longer confined to state borders, but was able to spread to neighbouring countries and allow 
for dialogue across the region. Although social media was not the direct cause of these 
revolutions, it did present a channel through which change could occur in order for citizens to 
influence domestic politics (O’Donnell 2011). The Arab Spring events represent impact 
which citizens can have through the use of technology in the form of blogging, in order to 
voice their concerns about domestic issues and ultimately alter public opinion to incite 
change.  
1.1.1 Research Problem  
The efficacy of online social media as a method of analysing political risk is a relatively new 
field of study which opens it to many concerns; the most prominent is the reliability 
surrounding the distribution of information by citizen journalists. Online citizen journalism 
allow citizens the opportunity to speak out about matters of concern within their 
communities. However, citizen journalism has been dubbed a double-edged sword, as it can 
do as much harm as good when reported information is incorrect (De Mers2013). However, 
this may only be a concern from the perspective of professional journalists.  
As mentioned before, social media provides the opportunity for freedom of expression which 
questions the point to which the information reported through online technologies by citizen 
journalists is accurate and based on fact, rather than the personal opinion of the writer. This 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 3 
 
research will take these concerns into perspective when exploring the content of the literature, 
as well as the reports conducted by online citizen journalists.  
1.1.2 Research Aim  
The purpose of this study is to research the potential value of online citizen journalism in the 
field of political risk analysis. In order to do this, the research will analyse the role of citizen 
journalists in the reporting of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas (shanty towns) in 2014. 
These reports will be compared to those conducted by the mainstream media, while taking 
into consideration the criteria of timeliness, relevance and accuracy of the information. The 
case study will observe the socio-economic concern of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. 
Reports of police brutality by both online citizen journalism and the mainstream media will 
be collected and compared in order to indicate the potential value of the former within the 
field of political risk analysis. The 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup in Brazil from 1 June to 5 
July 2013 will provide contextual background in Chapter 3. 
The aim of this descriptive study is to analyse secondary data in the form of news reports by 
both online citizen journalists and mainstream journalists. By such analysis, this study aims 
to understand the value of online citizen journalism, in order to illustrate how it can facilitate 
political risk analysis, while providing a better understanding of the nature of independent 
journalists and how they report. As far as the researcher is aware, this is the first academic 
study to theoretically integrate online citizen journalism into mainstream political risk 
analysis.   
1.1.3 Rationale and Significance of the Study   
The current age in which society functions is one of a disruptive nature, as there is a constant 
overflow of information. This has both positive and negative effects on civil society; on the 
one hand it allows the opportunity for the average person to be exposed to new sources of 
information concerning the current state of affairs at both a national and global level. 
However, it also opens the door to influence and manipulation based on the agenda of the 
source of the information distributed. This is not a new development, in the sense that it is not 
the first time that civil society is exposed to biased informational sources, as observed 
through the invention of the printing press (Shirky 2011:6).  
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Online citizen journalism aided by social media provides the opportunity for citizens to 
actively engage in politics through the reading or writing of articles. Citizens are now 
equipped with more information on which to base their decisions3. The advancement of 
technology has greatly evolved the manner in which the world is understood in terms of 
communication and media.  
Political risk analysis presents the opportunity to mitigate the risks associated with the 
political sphere. By exploring and understanding new avenues of obtaining information in 
relation to technological changes in the reporting of news, the study of political risk analysis 
is able to advance in order to broaden the scope and source of information.  
As mentioned above, the use of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis is a 
relatively new study, which leaves much room for improvement. This also presents a research 
gap in terms of discovering new insights to better assist the advancement of political risk 
analysis. The research in this study will therefore attempt to address this research gap by 
exploring the value of online citizen journalists in order to understand how the public sphere 
(in the form of online citizen journalists) may assist in the mitigation of political risk.  
The value that this new study holds is derived from its ability to provide a better 
understanding of societies and the part that online citizen journalism plays through the 
accumulation and dissemination of information. The adoption of new media technologies 
during political crisis management has been met with enthusiasm, based on the enhancement 
of information gathered by citizen journalists, as it is believed to have the ability to increase 
problem-solving capabilities (Watson et al. 2014: 294).  
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The main theories in this study stem from the field of political risk analysis and political 
participation. Political risk analysis is a field in political science derived from the theoretical 
framework of Rational Choice Theory and Problem Solving Theory. Rational Choice is 
salient to political risk analysis as it demonstrates the requirement of political risk analysts to 
be rational when identifying political risk indicators and understanding the potential impact 
which these may have on a state or investment. Problem Solving Theory takes cognisance of 
                                                 
 
 
3As in the case of voting or deciding to mobilise a group for the purpose of protesting a certain cause of 
dissatisfaction.  
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the fact that political risk factors pose a threat which evidently needs to be solved in the form 
of contingency plans (Brink 2004: 30- 31; Riker 1995:37).  
Online citizen journalism is viewed within the context of this study as a form of political 
participation which is aimed at influencing political outcomes (Brady 1999:737). This study 
also acknowledges the fact that the internet has broadened the sphere of political participation 
by changing the dynamics in the voicing and spreading of a message. However, there is no 
academic consensus on which to formalise this understanding that creates room for 
interpretation (Anduiza et al., 2007:3).  
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1 Research Design  
This study is a descriptive analysis consisting of a main methodological research question 
and a supplementary descriptive question. It will make use of qualitative data through a 
single case study in order to answer both the main and supplementary questions. The research 
will not only analyse the case study, but will provide contextual background in order to better 
understand the case study. The purpose of the case study is to compare the value of online 
citizen journalists to journalists reporting for mainstream news corporations. The purpose of 
this comparison is to research whether online citizen journalism can be of value to political 
risk analysis in terms of providing information when compiling political risk reports.  
1.3.1.1 Research Question(s) 
The main methodological question that this research aims to answer is: 
Main Research Question: What value does online citizen journalism have for political risk 
analysis in the case of police brutality in Brazil? 
This main research question is accompanied by a supplementary question in order to gain a 
greater understanding of the depth of this research as well as the purpose thereof. The main 
research question will be supplemented by the following question:  
Supplementary Question: How can online citizen journalism in the reporting of police 
brutality in Brazil 2014, be influential in the gathering of information when compiling 
political risk reports? 
The aim of the supplementary question is to provide contextual background for the 
methodology of the research, in order to gain greater insight into the role of online citizen 
journalism during this period of civil unrest. This study will use the protests at the 2013 FIFA 
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Confederations Cup as well as the case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas to better 
answer the main research question.  
1.3.2 Units of Analysis  
The main unit that will be analysed in this study is the influence of online citizen journalism 
during times of civil unrest which stem from socio-economic situations and, more 
specifically within Brazil. This study believes that by isolating the political risk factor of –
civil unrest exhibited through protests,- greater insight can be provided; this will depict the 
potential value that citizen journalism may have in the field of political risk analysis.   
1.3.3 Levels of Analysis 
In order to provide insight into the potential value of online citizen journalism to political risk 
analysis this study will make use of micro-level analysis. It will analyse the influence of 
citizen journalists during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests to provide 
contextualisation for the problem of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014. This is based 
on the Pacification Programme, which was one of the issues protested against during the 
2013/2014 protests.  
1.3.4 Time Dimension  
This descriptive study will use a retrospective approach to highlight the significance of the 
case study analysed. It will analyse the impact of online citizen journalists during the 
Confederations Cup from 1 June to 5 July 2013, as well as the protests during the 2014 World 
Cup. This time-frame provides a better understanding of the value of online citizen journalists 
during this period, by studying the value of their work during these protests from a 
retrospective stance. The case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 is viewed 
as an extension of the surge in protests during 2013 as it was one of the issues protested 
against.  
1.4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CORE TERMINOLOGY  
In addition to the theoretical framework of this study are additional concepts which need to 
be clarified in order to understand the context of the findings presented. The purpose of this 
section is to clarify these concepts and define them accordingly. However, Chapter 2 will 
provide more detail on these concepts.  
1.4.1 What is the ‘Value’ 
The main research question presented in this study is the potential value of online citizen 
journalism for political risk analysis, and thus the extent to which online citizen journalism 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 7 
 
can present value in the field of political risk. In order to determine the value, this study will 
make use of three characteristics that will form the criteria by which value can be determined. 
The three criteria of value are timeliness, accuracy and relevance. These criteria will be 
determined according to the presentation of qualitative data in the form of news reports by 
online citizen journalists and the mainstream media. Timeliness indicates that the information 
presented is reported as soon as the event occurred, together with the volume of information 
reported within a specific timeframe. The criterion of accuracy is self-explanatory, in that it 
aims to establish how accurate the data is in terms of the facts presented. Relevance observes 
the type of information reported and, within the confines of this study, will observe whether 
the information reported is relevant to the field of political risk analysis.  
1.4.2 Political Risk Analysis  
The next concept is political risk analysis, which refers to the action of analysing political 
risk factors and proceeding to take action upon the decision makers in response to such risks 
(Kobrin 1978: 121). Within the context of this study, political risk analysts undergo the 
process of determining the potential impact on non-economic factors. 
1.4.3 Political Participation  
Political participation is a key concept within this study as online citizen journalism within 
the context of this study is a form of political participation. In terms of using online 
technologies to participate politically in the influencing of political outcomes (Brady 
1999:737; Gustafsson 2012:1112), there is no formal academic consensus on the impact of 
digital technology on political participation which leaves it open to interpretation (Anduiza et 
al., 2007:3).  
1.4.4 Online Citizen Journalism/ Non-traditional Media 
Online citizen journalism is the foundation of this study and refers to a form of journalism 
which uses technology to engage with society as a medium of information (Calcutt & 
Hammond 2011; Jones & Salter 2012). Online citizen journalism takes place in what is 
referred to as the virtual sphere, which further adds to the dynamics of its contribution to 
political risk analysis. The power of the virtual sphere for online citizen journalists lies in its 
provision of a platform that is open in its communication process among citizens, thus 
furthering its reach by more rapidly disseminating information (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & 
Valenzuela: 2012: 321- 322; Papacharissi 2002:11). In addition, online citizen journalism 
bypasses journalistic organisations through the use of platforms such as blogs, social media, 
websites and various other digital platforms (Armoogum 2013; Macharashvilli 2012: 8). 
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1.4.5 Traditional Media/Mainstream Media  
The term traditional media within the context of this study refers to mainstream media, and 
examines the parameters of traditional journalism, which is the concerted activity of reporting 
and commenting on human activity (Calcutt & Hammond 2011: 169). Traditional journalists 
and mainstream media corporations report information to an uninformed public and are 
educated in the culture of working for the public, whereas online citizen journalists 
collaborate with the public in common endeavours (Waisbord 2013: 116; Jones & Salter 
2012: 29). 
1.4.6 Social Media 
Social media is the main platform on which online citizen journalists publish their reports or 
collaborate with the public. This study agrees that social media has the power to influence 
collective actions through its ability to easily mobilise information and news. In addition, 
social media has the ability to easily mobilize a group of people by disseminating a message 
across digital platforms (Valenzuela 2013: 920 – 921).  
1.4.7 The Public Sphere  
The public sphere within the context of this study refers to Jürgen Habermas’ view thereof 
(Kellner 2000:3). He perceives the public sphere as a space that emphasises communication 
among citizens through the encouragement of discursive interaction in a space that has 
traditionally held a very vertical and marginalised approach to the disseminating of 
information. Online citizen journalism is perceived to have transformed this space, as it has 
opened communication channels for the flow of information to minimise the ‘top down’ 
nature of the media, and instead encourages dialogue from all sectors of society, from the 
grass roots level (Fulya 2012:1; McQuil 2005: 150-151; Papacharissi 2002:12). 
 1.4.8 Police Brutality 
In broad terms police brutality is defined as a civil rights violation that occurs when a police 
officer acts with unlawful excessive force –that is to say- more than is necessary against a 
civilian or suspect, thereby violating the rights of the individual (US Legal 2015; Grobler 
2005:111). 
1.5 LIMITATION OF SCOPE  
The purpose of this study is to research the value of online citizen journalism in political risk 
analysis. To assist the outcome of this study it is essential to research the various facets 
surrounding political risk and the use of online technologies as a means of facilitating the 
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process of analysing potential political risk factors. This study will research the dynamics 
surrounding political participation through online citizen journalism and how it can be used 
to provide information when compiling political risk reports. This allows for the 
documentation of those changes which technological advancement has made in the manner in 
which news is distributed. 
It is evident that a limitation of this study is the relative newness of this field of research, 
which means that there will be gaps in the applicability of the methodology to the 
understanding of the theory. As such, this study can only investigate the progress that has 
been made thus far. A further limitation is that the utilised data will be sourced from 
Brazilian online journalists. This data is obtained from Portuguese sources, meaning that it 
will have to be translated in order to provide the necessary information for this research.  
1.6 STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In terms of the chapter overview of this research, Chapter 1 is the shortest chapter as it entails 
the research plan that will serve as a guiding tool as the research is conducted. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide a guideline for the research by providing the research question, research 
aim, research design, methodologies, as well as, a short overview of the concepts used and, 
lastly, the significance and scope of the research.  
Chapter 2 aims to provide a more detailed description of the literature surrounding this study. 
It will include an in-depth analysis of literature already available for this research by 
comparing different views and studies. Due to the descriptive nature of this study, this 
chapter will provide a body of work that complements the goals and objectives of this 
research topic, as well as the methodological stances and conceptualisation of terms analysed, 
in order to understand the extent to which the significance of this research can be understood 
in both a practical and theoretical sense. As this is a relatively new field of study, this chapter 
will also aim to explore the research gaps existent within the literature, with the purpose of 
filling these gaps.   
Chapter 3 will provide contextualisation for the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations 
Cup protests, as well as the protests that occurred during the 2014 World Cup. This chapter 
will enhance the purpose of the study, connecting the literature and theoretical framework to 
real political events in order to gain insight into the value of online citizen journalism in 
political risk analysis. The case study, as mentioned previously, will present reports by online 
citizen journalists and mainstream journalists on the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s 
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favelas. This case study stems from the 2013/2014 protests as it was one of the causes 
protested against.  
Chapter 4 will condense the crux of the previous chapters by describing the theoretical and 
methodological findings throughout the research in a conclusive manner. In a practical sense 
this chapter will demonstrate the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, 
using the case study of police brutality in Brazil to elaborate on the findings of the research. 
The final chapter will elaborate on the findings of Chapter 4. In terms of structure, it will 
provide an overview of the research, which will subsequently be evaluated. It will also take 
into account the findings and present recommendations for the purpose of contributing to the 
advancement and success of this field of research. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and Contextualisation 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce, discuss and conceptualise the ideas central to this 
study. This will assist in answering the above-mentioned research question. To reiterate, this 
research aims to question the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. 
There are two central points of conceptual reference in this chapter -the first is political risk 
analysis- the second is political participation. The first section of this chapter will discuss the 
two theoretical elements of political risk analysis by conceptualising ‘rational choice theory’ 
and ‘problem solving theory’. The second section will examine the different branches of 
political risk analysis by conceptualising ‘politics’, ‘risk’, ‘political risk’ and ‘political risk 
analysis’. This will be followed by a short conceptualisation of the methodology of this study. 
The fourth section will conceptualise the second central concept in this study: political 
participation. This section will discuss political participation through a Habermasian lens, by 
examining the significance of the public sphere. The fifth section will delve into the public 
and virtual spheres to understand the use of non-traditional media. The sixth section will 
provide a brief conceptualisation of media censorship in both traditional and non-traditional 
media. The next section will conceptualise online citizen journalism as a form of non-
traditional media, with the following section discussing the online factor surrounding online 
citizen journalism. The second-last section will provide a brief conceptualisation of 
traditional media and the final section will discuss the value of online citizen journalism. In 
conclusion, this section will tie these different elements together to show the value of online 
citizen journalism based on literature that is already available.  
2.2 POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS AS A STUDY 
The study of political risk is grounded on an understanding of the conceptualisation 
surrounding it as a study, as well as various theoretical underpinnings. This section will 
conceptualise rational choice theory and problem solving theory to understand the foundation 
for the process of analysing political risk.  
2.2.1 Rational Choice Theory 
The conceptualisation of rational choice theory is wrought with the challenge of defining it. 
This is due to the concept being such a common component of the vocabulary of political 
science; as such there has been no conclusive effort to clearly define it. However, in simple 
terms, this is defined as the understanding of the behaviour of political actors when making 
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decisions (Downs 1957; Patrick 1988; Riker 1995; Ghandi 2005). In an attempt to define this 
concept, Patrick identifies three core elements. Firstly, he identifies instrumentalism, which is 
understood as the methodological decision to view various socio-political relations and 
institutions as dependable variables explained by their actions whether true or not by the 
individual self. The second element complements the first as individualism, viewed as an 
independent variable, and understood as the actions of the individual. This views the 
individual as a rational thinker, albeit self-interested, whose actions are understood through 
motivational theory. This can be understood as the action based on the motivations of the 
rational self within the context of making decisions to maximise efficacy. The last element is 
subjectivism, which unites the first two elements by expressing that individuals will make 
decisions according to their own preferences and the value they instil therein (Patrick 1988: 
637- 638). 
Ghandi states that rational choice theory is more than strictly theory, as it attempts to 
understand the degree to which individuals are rational when making decisions – political 
decisions within this context which means that it cannot be bound to theory. This is because 
the crux of the matter rests on the dynamic and volatile nature of the individual, which makes 
it complex to understand in theory (2005:81). According to Downs, rationality within this 
context only refers to the rational means of achieving goals as opposed to “rational goals”. In 
this case, “the means to an end” is translated as maximising output for any given input or 
minimising input for any given output (1957:5). The difficulty in this understanding of 
rational choice theory is that individuals are not conditioned to be selfless, but rather self-
interested; this is a factor that greatly affects political behaviour which leads to the actions of 
individuals being rational based on assumption4 (1957: 22).  
When applying rational choice theory to the field of political risk analysis, a connection is 
found in the action by which analysts use their own subjective thoughts and knowledge to 
trace and track the decisions of political actors5. It is their duty to analyse the actions of an 
individual’s political behaviour in order to facilitate the process of identifying indicators of 
risk. When taking into consideration the value of risk models within political risk analysis, 
                                                 
 
 
4 By assuming that individuals are rational, their actions are able to be predicted and analysed (Down 1957: 4). 
5 Within the context of this study, rational choice theory also bridges the gap between politics and economics by 
rejecting the idea that these two fields are separable (Ghandi 2005: 82).  
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rational choice theory enables this process by recognising the relationship between goals and 
outcomes in the category of events as portrayed in the conceptualisation of political risk 
analysis (Riker 1995:37). The purpose of rational choice theory is to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level through the use of ideas by a rational agent. This allows the ideas to be 
tested, as these decisions are made under a high level of risk and uncertainty, mean that all 
potential problems have to be considered6 (Brink 2004: 31). 
Rational Choice Theory has been perceived as controversial. These controversies are based 
on the fact that it harbours issues such as the way that it is conceptualised and translated. This 
is based on the fact that when using it within the context of political science, it is defined 
more by its subject matter than any specific methodology. According to Fiorini (2000) it is 
used to claim more than what it is capable of as well as being too social scientific. This is 
based on the lack of methodology used to conclude that which is claimed to be rational within 
the context of political issues. Rational Choice Theory is perceived to be too theoretical and 
without the framework of a model to equate its outcome to. In terms of the translation of 
Rational Choice Theory, it has been criticised for its heavy jargon and lack of clarity when 
communicating information and research based on models, as these models are not explicitly 
explained (Shapiro 2000).  
2.2.2 Problem -Solving Theory 
Problem solving theory complements rational choice theory by allowing for the solution of 
potential problems in the management of political risk in a rational and effective manner.  In 
this context, the term ‘problem’ refers to a discrepancy between the current existing situation 
and the desired state of affairs, as defined by Kaufmann (1991) in Brink (2004:31). Brink 
describes this within the context of political risk analysis, where the decision maker, or 
individual conducting the analysis, will present the investor with a report that makes him or 
her aware of the problems that could infringe making a profit on the investment (2004:30). 
The identification of these problems allows the necessary steps to be taken to solve the 
identified ‘problem’. Within the context of political risk analysis, it is evident that Problem 
Solving Theory is related to Rational Choice Theory. This is based on the fact that in order to 
                                                 
 
 
6 This also emphasizes the implementation of measures taken to address the problem in question (Brink 2004: 
31).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 14 
 
solve a problem, one has to rationally observe those factors that present a problem and use it 
to formulate mitigation plans to address it.  
The study of political risk analysis is understood as the utilisation of information to manage 
and mitigate potential risk; this concept will be elaborated further in this chapter. Political 
risk analysis identifies problems and, in guiding towards the addressing thereof, provides 
ideas and mitigation. This conceptualisation proposes that it is essential to conduct problem 
solving with a thorough information base, a rational mind and a full understanding of the 
environment in which the investment takes place. This also includes the understanding of 
‘reality’ and the incorporation of risk models that allow monitoring and the revision of all 
decisions (Brink 2004: 30). The key to effective problem solving is illustrated by Schön 
(1982) as the practice of relating past experiences with new ones and thereby maintaining the 
distinctiveness of the current situation at hand. This avoids a one-size-fits-all approach to 
problem solving, by balancing the art of past experiences with the current situation (Brink 
2004:32).  
2.2.3 Risk and Political Risk  
In terms of conceptualising ‘political risk’, there are various understandings of the concept7 
but a consensual lack on the precise meaning of the term (Fitzpatrick 1983; Kobrin 1979; 
Simon 1982). Instead, political risk has been defined according to the understanding that it 
holds within different sectors, as well as the roles it plays in the business environment and the 
academic field of political science.  
In order to understand this term, the conceptualisation of political risk will be broken down 
into separate parts. Starting at the most basic element of this concept is the term ‘politics’. 
Politics is defined according to Easton (1953) and Lasswell et al. (1950) in terms of power or 
authority that is exercised within relationships in society. It is the structure that governs these 
relationships in society, known as the citizens and the government or rulers. This definition 
also differentiates between politics and economics as, according to Gilpin (1975), these two 
concepts are interrelated. In brief, politics creates and determines the framework in which 
economic activities function (Kobrin 1979: 69).  
                                                 
 
 
7 As indicated in the literature on international business (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249). 
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The conceptualisation of ‘risk’ within the term ‘political risk’ deals with the forces that 
constitute a risk to another party. Within this context, risk is defined as potential harm to a 
business operation arising from political behaviour (McKellar 2010:3). It can also be 
understood as a manifestation of doubt with regard to undesirable events. In this case, risk 
management would act as the buffer between the possibility of a risk and the strategies and 
plans implemented in order to maintain a tolerable level of risk, especially when associated 
with an investment (Brink 2004:18). Swaney defines risk analysis as the study of the 
likelihood of an agent or hazard that may produce unwelcome events or outcomes, with risk 
being the process of measuring the probability and outcome thereof. Risk analysis is not only 
the identification thereof, but also the process of identifying the outcome of the event 
(1995:575-576).  
As mentioned before, there is a lack of theoretical consensus in the understanding and 
interpretation of the concept of political risk. The most common of these definitions refer to 
actions by the government that are perceived as interference, bringing forth unwanted 
consequences (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). However, this definition is disputed by Kobrin, who 
states that an emphasis on these negative consequences of government intervention or 
changes in the status quo involve an implicit normative assumption that may not be 
universally valid (1979:69). This definition is too simplistic, which can be accredited to the 
fact that it was termed in the late 70s. The evolution of society indicates that the decisions 
and actions of different actors, such as international markets, impact on the political situation 
of a country. This presents new avenues for political risk and new problems that impact on 
the ability of governments to enforce decisions. Ian Bremmer elaborates on this definition by 
stating that political risk measures the stability of individual countries based on factors 
grounded in government, society, security and the economy. Governments are greatly 
affected by the actions of other sources; this adds to the idea that other sources such as 
society and economics can also serve as forms of interference (2005:53).  
Other authors refer to political risk within the political realm through the manifestation of 
political events or restrictions imposed on a specific industry or firm level. These political 
events are brought about by alterations that range from changes in government or heads of 
state to political bombings or protests and riots (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). This definition is 
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cause for concern, as the distinction between events occurring in the political and business 
environment is ambiguous (Fitzpatrick 1983:251). Challenges arise from this definition when 
decision makers are unable to identify ‘uncertainty’ in relation to the risk itself8, and thus 
whether it is objective or subjective to the identified risk. Kobrin follows up by providing an 
understanding of the relationship between political risk and the political event. He states that 
if the uncertainty is objective, the contribution of the particular event to the business risk is a 
function of only the event in itself. However, if uncertainty is subjective, the contribution to 
the business risk is a function of both the event and the decision maker’s perceptions 
(1979:71). This illustrates that the perception of the decision maker concerning the political 
event plays a major part in the understanding of the point to which it poses a risk or non-risk. 
This is a challenge in itself, as the field of politics is determined by political behaviour, 
something that is subjective in nature.  
Authors have noted that it is essential to clearly distinguish between risk and uncertainty 
(Kobrin 1979; Root 1972; Haendel and West; 1975). Adding to Kobrin’s definition, Root 
defines these two concepts by separating the political form of risk from economic risk by 
affirming that uncertainty is political if it relates to a potential act by the government or 
general instability in the political or social system (1976:4). Haendel a nd West, on the other 
hand, distinguish these two terms by surveying the probability of an undesired political event 
coupled with uncertainty manifested by inadequate information regarding the occurrence of 
such an event. Their definition is different to those of other authors, as they place a greater 
amount of emphasis on the accumulation of information which, in this regard, is perceived as 
a means of bridging the gap in converting uncertainty to risk with the potential to measure, 
insure and avoid it (1975:44-46).  
Also included in the distinction between uncertainty and risk is the difference between 
political uncertainty and political instability, where the latter refers to unforeseen and 
unexpected changes within a country in the form of changes in leadership through succession 
or government policy. The differentiation of these concepts means that there should be an 
understanding of the impact of the risk in both an internal and external capacity (Brink 
2004:19). An example includes surveying the impact of internal sources of risk occurring 
                                                 
 
 
8 It should be noted that the terms political uncertainty and political instability are distinct from political risk 
analysis (Brink 2002:26).  
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domestically that may impact on businesses and investors in the host country itself, such as 
riots, protests and dissatisfaction with the government. External sources of risks are those 
risks that do not occur within the host state but nevertheless impact on investments made in 
other countries; in other words, the actions and consequences of occurrences that happen 
outside of the state but which have the ability to affect investments in other states.  
A practical example of political uncertainty was demonstrated by the uncertainty surrounding 
the United Kingdom (UK) May 2015 elections polls. In the past, elections were contested 
between the two major parties namely the Conservative and Labour parties. However, there 
was a fragmentation of British politics which made the May 2015 election the most 
unpredictable general election to date. Other players rose to the mark, greatly impacting on 
the dominance of the Conservative and Labour parties. These parties included Nigel Farage's 
populist anti-Brussels and anti-immigration UK Independence Party, as well as the Scottish 
National Party, which had the potential to erode the support of the Conservatives and Labour 
Party (Parker 2015). 
The uncertainty of the election stemmed from the expectation that neither of the two main 
parties would win an outright majority vote, resulting in the potential prospect of a multi-
party coalition government that included the Scottish National Party, the Greens and the UK 
Independence party. According to the Financial Time's Annual Survey of predictions for the 
year, the outcome of the political uncertainty surrounding the May 2015 election would have 
the potential to impact on not only the country's political landscape as a whole, but also the 
confidence of businesses and consumers, greatly affecting the real economy. The issue of 
uncertainty in this regard is not so much about which majority party wins, but more about the 
potential for harm in an untidy coalition. Thus, according to Steve Hughes, the head of 
economic and social policy at the Policy Exchange, a minority government in this instance 
would have the potential to lead to months of wrangling and a lack of a clear legislative 
agenda (Cadman & Giles 2015).  
Furthermore, political instability was demonstrated in Venezuela. The country faced political 
instability and needed international financing due to the sharp fall of oil prices, which heavily 
impacted its economy, as its oil sector provided over 96 percent of Venezuela's export 
revenues and half of its fiscal revenues. In addition, support for President Nicolás Maduro 
was wavering; this declined from 50.4 percent to 24.5 percent in the span of a year. This was 
further coupled with an increase in protests against power blackouts, gas and water shortages, 
as well as basic product scarcities. Despite Maduro’s wavering support, the opposition 
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remained weak and was unlikely to make a difference in the near term. The decline of 
international oil prices and the underlying political instability had the potential to deteriorate 
the country’s economy further, as well as negatively affect Venezuela's business 
environment, with companies potentially facing increased tax, auditing, non-payment 
sanctions and contract frustration risks (IHS Jane's Intelligence Review 2014). 
Political risk is also defined as the act of observing actions or possibilities that may occur as a 
result of decisions made within different environments – be it political or economic – and 
how they subsequently affect other environments. Robock states that political risk should not 
be studied as an isolated concept, but rather as part of an integrated system where actions 
have the ability to affect more than just one environment. This definition illustrates that 
political risk in businesses exists when discontinuities, which are hard to anticipate, exist in 
the business environment as an outcome of political change (1971:7). However, this only 
poses a risk in the event that it should affect the profit or goals of an enterprise9 (Fitzpatrick 
1983:250). This definition requires a thorough assessment of the political environment and 
how the environment is initiated by the political event. Nonetheless, this process has the 
distinct problem of being more reactive than active, as well as systematic, with actions being 
the exception rather than the rule. The problem with this definition lies in the lack of a clear 
and established relationship between environmental processes and decision maker’s 
perceptions. Environmental processes here refer to continuous versus discontinuous change, 
as well as decision maker’s perceptions when alluding to the issue of uncertainty versus 
risk10. This is further emphasized by countries being classified as either safe or unsafe 
without complete understanding of the implications of the political environment, leading to 
decision makers’ perceptions being founded on internal sources that lean towards general 
conclusions based on subjective opinions (Fitzpatrick 1983:251-252; Bremmer 2005:58).  
In order for this definition to promote more validity, it requires a greater evaluation of the 
political environment in relation to the international business firm. As a whole, the literature 
does not provide sufficient information in explaining the impact of the political environment 
                                                 
 
 
9 Therefore, changes in the political environment that do not change the business environment are not 
considered political risks and, as such, not a part of this definition (Fitzpatrick 1983:250). 
10 These aspects are a concern when attempting to incorporate them into an investment decision model 
(Fitzpatrick 1983: 251).  
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on the firm, or existing models that are able to provide empirical evaluation11. This leads to a 
redundant inability to present credible arguments for the process of political risk assessment 
in the decision making process (Fitzpatrick 193:253). Adding to this, Robock illustrates that 
the political environment is a dynamic space with changes that are both gradual and 
progressive, which do not necessarily constitute a political risk. He further elaborates that it is 
necessary to be able to distinguish between political instability and political risk12 (Kobrin 
1979: 68).  
When examining the theory accumulated over time retrospectively, Sethi and Luther (1986) 
and Oseghale (1993) remark rather bluntly that, in the past, the scope of political risk was too 
narrow, leading to inappropriate conceptualisations, wrong selection of data, improper choice 
of analytical tools, as well as misinterpretation of the results. Alternatively, newer 
understanding of the conceptualisation of political risk praises Fitzpatrick (1983) for his 
definition of political risk, which suggests that it should be viewed as a process that changes 
over time rather than placing emphasis only on the actions of government and political 
events. According to Alon and Martin, this distracts the analyst from other causes of political 
risk which, as mentioned before, may be internal, external, social, or governmental (pp. 10-
11). 
Recent studies of political risk have been brought into the spotlight by a wave of new 
international concerns. Jarvis and Griffiths (2007) elaborate by using the example of the five-
fold increase in private foreign capital flows from developed to developing countries between 
1990 and 1997. An example thereof was the exposure of private investors to the global 
unpredictability of managed hedge funds and currency instabilities that were experienced in 
the Asian financial crisis. Risk in the 1990s therefore centred on the problems of exposure to 
countries whose institutional capacity and regulatory structures proved to be unclear and 
unstable. This meant that it became clear for investors that the absence of transparency and 
lack of governance structures created obstacles for market participants to measure the risk 
environment in which they operated (p. 9).  
                                                 
 
 
11 Most models only describe functional relationships that are accepted on the basis of intuition (Fitzpatrick 
1983: 253).   
12 Political instability within this instance is viewed as a separate phenomenon to political risk (Kobrin 
1979:68).  
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The most recent significant interest in political risk is demonstrated by Nigeria’s Islamist 
group, Boko Haram, pledging to join the Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This pledge was made on 7 March 2015 by Boko Haram’s leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, in an audio message. Therein, the organisation expressed its support for 
ISIS. Although the thought of this action is daunting, it is believed that not much will come 
of it. Boko Haram praises ISIS’ actions, although these two organisations have their own 
respective localities. It is also unlikely that ISIS will arm Boko Haram with fighters or 
weaponry, as Boko Haram has been critical of ‘Arab’ involvement in its activities in Nigeria. 
Boko Haram is also specific is its history, ethnic participatory and geographical confinement 
to northeast Nigeria. These two groups are invested in their own wills and this is not to say 
that Boko Haram will submit to the will of ISIS, follow orders from Bagdadi or view itself as 
a brand of ISIS. Only time will tell if any true action comes from this pledge; however, it is 
currently viewed as a public relations stunt (Ostebo 2015). 
In political risk analysis, there is currently an amplification of risk through global 
communications and international media which, as Jarvis and Griffiths (2007) explain, is a 
by-product of globalisation. This is due to the political-strategic-commercial interdependence 
of national economies, thereby providing a medium in which isolated risk events are 
experienced in different geographic localities, but which have global consequences. This is a 
factor that makes the emerging risk environment so different and unique from that which was 
previously experienced (pp. 9-10). The international community is now understood to be a 
sphere where the actions of one party may affect the interests of another. Political risk is 
ubiquitous within today’s society, as it can be viewed as a useful mechanism to anticipate 
how changes in the world may affect one’s state or investment.  
2.2.4 Political Risk Analysis: Theory and Practice  
Political risk analysis (also referred to as political risk assessment) has become a fast-growing 
sector within international business studies. The functions exercised by such analysts include 
the identification, analysis, management and reduction of socio-political risks on foreign 
investments (Simon 1984:123). Whereas the initial writings on political risk appeared in the 
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1960s13 (Simon 1982:62), it was only in the 1970s towards the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis 
that political risk analysis became a recognised field of interest and practice. However, it 
recognisably lost its drive towards the end of the Cold War. The multidisciplinary structure of 
this field has led it to become more complex, requiring a more thoroughly defined theoretical 
base, which is presently lacking. This is not to say that change has not been a driving force 
within this field, as demonstrated by the shift from conceptually oriented studies to 
quantitative studies in the 1970s; this will be further elaborated below (Simon 1982:65; Brink 
2004:3).  
It is clear that there has been an evolution of the various frameworks of political risk analysis 
over time. The Catalogue School was the dominant praxis application of political risk 
analysis. This framework views political risk as a consequence of the actions from host 
governments, governement agencies and political actors within the host country that impact 
on the operations, value or profiability of multinational enterprises (Jarvis 2008:19). The 
System-Event School differed from The Catalogue School by understanding the constitutive 
nature of political systems and markets by taking into consideration that economic growth 
and political modernization are interdependent. This recognizes that an an impact or absence 
of one will affect the other (Jarvis 2008: 25). What followed this framework was the 
questioning of method versus theory. This indicates a greater emphasis on the method of 
political risk analysis as opposed to the theory thereof. The Dephi Method demonstates the 
forecasting of political risk through the use of scenarios which relate to country risk as well 
as political risks that are attributed to specific problems found within the host country (Jarvis 
2008: 49- 50).  
The evolution of political risk through the various frameworks has allowed for a greater 
scope on how to approach political risk. The move from a theoretical approach, to a practical 
one has allowed for a far greater scope within the field of political risk analysis as it provides 
context for risk factors and how they can potentially be mitigated within a practical sense. 
The aim of this study is an example of exploring how information –and more specifically the 
source- can faciliate this process. The accumulation of data and information now presents a 
more practical approach through the method of construcing contingency plans in the event 
                                                 
 
 
13 At the time, political risk was associated with the United States’ disengagement from the Vietnam War as 
opposed to the observation of political risks associated with overseas investment (Simon, 1982:62).   
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that political risk should affect an investment within the host country. The importance of the 
accumulation of information -whether qualitative or quantative- forms the basis of this study 
as it seems to understand how different sources of information impact and influence political 
risk assessments and the analysis thereof.  
Political risk analysis is the action that comes from the understanding of political risks, as 
well as the course of actions taken by the decision makers in response. It is evident that 
within political risk analysis, there is a tendency to lean towards subjective understanding 
rather than objective processes. In order to address this, there is a need to acquire a better 
understanding of the differences within the political process and to explicitly identify the 
effect that political events might have on a firm’s operations (Kobrin 1978:121).  
Within this study, the aim of political risk analysis is viewed as the process which the analyst 
will undergo to determine the potential impact that non-economic factors may have on 
foreign investment. Although this is not the only aim of the field in general, this study will 
narrow the conceptualisation of political risk analysis to the understanding it holds with 
regard to foreign direct investment. This brings into perspective the effect that the political 
and social climate or condition of the country will have on the foreign market. This is 
surveyed through the implementation of government or societal actions and policies that may 
stem either from within the host country or outside of it (Simon 1984:134; Simon 1982:68). 
Robock agrees with this definition, stating that “The decision maker’s task is to recognise the 
evolutionary path along which change is occurring, identify the principal motivating forces 
behind the change and make judgments as to timing” (1971:8).  
The concern surrounding the task of analysing political risk is presented, according to Brink, 
through the measurement and observation of the risk. This is based on the fact that 
demonstrating the analysis of political risk relies on human judgment. This presents a 
conundrum, as it may include a great level of subjectivity portrayed by the opinions of the 
analyst. For this reason, political risk models are presented with the aim of balancing user 
subjectivity by reflecting research information that attempts to respond in a more objective 
manner, with the result of a more probable estimation of risk. Brink therefore calls for a 
model that better represents reality, with the addition of incorporating factors such as socio-
cultural, political and economic phenomena, as they affect causal relationships and analytical 
procedures and may serve as a form of reference by which to assess political risk (2004:2- 3).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23 
 
There is still a lack in a universal approach to political risk analysis, which has led to 
scepticism concerning the operationalisation and quantification of non-economic variables, in 
addition to analysts’ preferences for in-depth single-country analysis (Brink 2004:5). The 
problem is not so much the manner in which soft data is quantified, but rather in the 
effectiveness of incorporating political and social indicators such as people’s attitudes, roles, 
assumptions and environmental factors to be empirically observed and measured into 
numerical terms and equations. In the past, soft data was considered indicators that could not 
be measured, for example, attitudes and the actions that stem from protests and riots. The 
advancement of political risk models has made it easier to measure indicators that were 
previously deemed immeasurable. This has changed the dynamic of soft data and has shifted 
the focus to the analysis of these indicators as opposed to the measuring thereof. In practise, 
this would involve analysing the trends of soft data in order to understand the point to which 
they project risk within the environment studied (Brink 2004:6).  
Political risk analysis is a dynamic field that is fast becoming a relevant and necessary 
condition for businesses to utilise in order to control the possibility of risks from both internal 
and external sources. It places emphasis on the relevancy of political science within the 
economic world, as businesses have to be cognisant of the landscape in which their 
businesses operate. However, political risk analysis should not only be viewed in a negative 
sense as the observing of political risk, but as a method that presents new investment 
opportunities (Brink 2004:7). The relevancy of political risk analysis is portrayed by 
McKellar, who contends that “nowhere are we unaffected by the laws of the state, and indeed 
business occurs in the framework ultimately set by political authority and social consensus” 
(2010:7). Furthermore, McKellar elaborates on the fact that businesses need to adapt to a 
dynamic and volatile political landscape, especially in developing countries, where the 
political realm is still finding a sense of consistency (McKellar 2010:7). This is where 
political risk analysis plays a key role, as it can equip businesses with the necessary 
information to calculate risk and, in the result thereof, prepare contingency plans to avoid or 
lesson the risks that may be imposed on business operations.  
2.2.5 Political Risk Analysis: Qualitative Data  
Qualitative data, as in this study, makes use of a naturalistic and interpretive approach, with 
the point of understanding the meanings attached to the phenomena of the social world which 
are recognised as beliefs, values, decisions and actions. When these meanings are observed, 
they can be used to represent the social world by locating the observer in the world, 
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according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000:3). Bryman defines qualitative data by its central 
motive, identified as the interpreting of people’s social reality (1988:8). Strauss and Corbin, 
however, define qualitative research according to what it is not which, in this case, means that 
it does not make use of statistical procedures, and therefore is not based on quantifying 
empirical findings (1998:11).  
The analysis of qualitative data focuses on the complexities surrounding both the detail and 
context of the data collected. Furthermore, it has the characteristic of identifying existing and 
emerging categories and theories derived from the data as it is being research. This is an 
ongoing process of research, as opposed to following the recipe of ideas and categories made 
prior to the researching of the data. Due to the fact that qualitative research observes the 
social world, it has the distinct feature of respecting the exclusivity of each case as well as 
conducting cross-case research analysis with the development of explanations achieved by 
understanding the meaning of the data rather than the cause of the research (Snape & Spencer 
2003:4).  
The method of obtaining data in this instance is done through the accumulation of 
information based on interviews, conversations, photographs, field notes, memos to self, and 
recordings (Snape & Spencer 2003:3). As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study will 
use a case study to enable multiple perspectives that are grounded within a particular context, 
with data ranging from multiple accounts or a collection of methods (Lewis 2003:52). By 
using a case study, Neuman adds that the researcher can view the social context in a manner 
that allows for those aspects which came before the event or which surround the focus of the 
study. This implies that the researcher will understand that the same events or behaviours can 
have different meanings within different cultures or historical eras. The researcher will also 
be able to view the manner in which an issue within a case(s) evolves  over a period of time, 
thereby detecting the various process that have occurred within the case, as well as the causal 
relationships which are present (2006:158).  
2.3.1 Political Participation and Habermas’ Theory of the Public Sphere 
This section will conceptualise political participation by delving into Jürgen Habermas’ 
theory of the public sphere. Whereas the previous section demonstrated the methodology of 
political risk analysis, this section aims to better understand online citizen journalism as a 
form of political participation within the framework of this study.  
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Political participation is defined by Brady as actions by ordinary citizens that are directed 
towards influencing political outcomes (1999:737). What makes this term specific is that it 
does not refer to political attitudes, but rather an active participation where the goal is to 
influence decisions made by government bodies or officials (Gustafsson 2012:1112). A more 
open definition by Conge explains this as actions directed by private bodies that also view 
public opinions as an act of political participation (1988:344). This definition differs in that it 
shows an understanding of the complex nature of politics and how political issues are not 
explicitly under state control (Gustafsson 2012:1113).  
The problem with the definition of political participation is the use of the concept ‘action’ 
when participating for a cause. This view is introduced by new forms of participation created 
through the internet, which has now broadened the framework of defining political 
participation. There is no formal academic consensus on this matter, meaning that it is 
currently open to interpretation (Anduiza et al. 2007:3). Therefore, within the context of this 
research, the act of politically participating through the dissemination of information and 
news through non-traditional media such as blogs14 is viewed as an act of political 
participation.  
The conceptualisation of political participation within this study draws on the theory of 
Jürgen Habermas and the emphasis he placed on the public sphere. Habermas believed that 
the core of a democratic society through the bourgeois public sphere was political 
participation, not only to sustain democracy but to bolster self-development through civic 
engagement in communicative processes of opinion and the formation of will (Kellner 
2000:3; Susen 2011:45). The purpose of this sphere, as demonstrated in this research, is set 
within an environment where the aim is to mediate between the private concerns of the 
people within their respective familial, economic and social lives; this differs from that of the 
demands and concerns of social and public life (Kellner 2000:4).  
It is essential for citizens in the public sphere to be provided with the necessary civil and 
political rights through democratic institutions, in order to shape their private and public lives 
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and give them the opportunity to practise self-expression in society15 (Welzel & Inglehart 
2008:130). Habermas believed the public sphere to be an area that aims to foster avenues of 
information and political debate in the form of newspapers and journals. Debate in the public 
sphere bridges the gap between the private interests of individuals in their everyday life in 
civil society, and the domain of the state where power is exercised; this power controls the 
foundation of everyday life. Habermas sought to understand the point at which these two 
areas could meet, in order to provide a public sphere where the needs of the individual are 
taken into account at the hands of those who are in power (Kellner 2000:3-4; Bolton 2005).  
Habermas further elaborates on the role of the media within the public sphere. He believes 
that the function of the media has been fractured, as it has gone from facilitating rational 
public discourse and debate in the public sphere to limiting these debates according to the 
themes validated by media corporations. In this regard, the citizen is not an engager of public 
debate but a spectator of presentations brought forth by the media. Habermas does not 
propose any concrete strategies to address this matter, rather proposing to reinstate the role of 
the public by encouraging public communication through those organisations that mediatise 
such communication (Kellner 2000:6). The crux of his ideas regarding the public sphere 
mirrors the public sphere today, which has greatly transformed on the account of technology 
and new spaces of public interaction (Kellner 2000:7-8). Habermas’ theory, although written 
in a different time, mirrors many truths found today with regard to the need for citizens to 
engage in political debate and courses of action.  
Political participation within the framework of this study emphasizes the role of citizens in 
the public sphere of democratic society through social media. Social media in this sense is a 
mechanism through which citizens can enhance the manner in which they express their 
views. It has the ability to empower ordinary citizens; a view believed to be the essence of 
democracy according to Welzel and Inglehart (2008:128).  
2.3.2 Political Participation and the Virtual Sphere 
This section will conceptualise the virtual sphere in relation to political participation. This 
study questions the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. It is pertinent 
                                                 
 
 
15 Within this context, self-expression is seen as a positive indicator of an effective democracy (Welzel & 
Inglehart 2008:130). 
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to understand how political participation is exercised within the virtual sphere and how the 
virtual sphere has added to the dynamics of political participation.  
The argument against the impact of social media as a form of political participation is 
founded on the idea that social media is based on weak ties, meaning that the act of 
participation does not last long or hold a sustainable impact. This is further emphasized by 
Malcolm Gladwell (2010), who states that conversations on social networking sites are not 
enough to create successful mobilisation. Instead, it is only through strong ties, as seen in 
person-to-person relationships, that citizens are able to truly mobilise and actively participate 
(Gustafsson, 2012:1114).  
Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2012) question whether social media has the ability to promote 
democratically desirable attitudes and behaviours when individuals specifically use such sites 
as a means of keeping up to date with the latest news concerning public affairs and their 
respective communities. By studying the variables of social capital and participation, they 
discovered that informational use of non-traditional media had a positive impact on the 
activities of individuals who aimed for increased civic engagement in the realm of politics. 
Social capital is viewed as a symptom of behaviour that focuses on activities for the public 
good, at the public and community level (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela: 2012:320-329). 
Non-traditional media has the opportunity to communicate public affairs and provide 
opportunities to engage and discuss information concerning political topics; however, only 
individuals who engage in these informational sources are receptive to their messages. The 
power in non-traditional media lies in its ability to open communication processes among 
citizens which, in turn, influences people’s civic attitudes and behaviours and allows for the 
exchange of information to gain knowledge concerning opportunities to participate in civic 
attitudes. This enables the activation of mental reasoning and elaboration of news events, 
which subsequently has the ability to promote participation in public affairs and civic-
orientated behaviour (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela: 2012:321-322; Papacharissi 
2002:11). 
Valenzuela (2013) examines the role of social media in sparking disagreements, protests and 
other forms of argumentative politics. He argues that there is much evidence to suggest that 
individuals who engage in civic and political activities in both developing and developed 
countries are frequent users of social media or non-traditional media. He continues to 
question how and under what conditions these digital platforms relate to citizen activism and 
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protest politics. It has been suggested that social media has the power to influence collective 
actions through its provision of mobilising information and news which is not always 
available in other forms of media. It also has the ability to facilitate the coordination of 
demonstrations, which allows users to join political causes and create opportunities in which 
the exchange of opinions can take place (Valenzuela 2013:920-921). 
When bringing the Habermasian view of the public sphere into perspective with the virtual 
sphere, the emphasis on communication among citizens through discursive interaction was 
encouraged but not always effectively executed, as the information was largely vertical and 
commercialised. However, the introduction of non-traditional media has transformed the 
public sphere, as the flow of information is no longer one that is ‘top-down’ in nature; 
instead, it now encourages dialogue from all areas of society, starting at the grassroots level. 
Internet and social media are avenues that allow for unlimited access to information and the 
echoes of different voices to give feedback about different situations and decisions, from the 
perspective of the leader and the follower (Fulya 2012:1; McQuil 2005:150-151; Papacharissi 
2002:12). 
According to Ubayasiri, in the context of the public sphere as put forth by Habermas, while 
free access has never forced every citizen of society to participate, nor has the internet-based 
public sphere. Although it provides a platform for discussion among those interested in 
engaging, one cannot expect all users of the internet to engage in dialogue that is meaningful 
(2006:8-9).  
Social media can also be perceived as a means of surveillance, identity construction and 
building social relationships connected to political activities. The informational aspect of 
politics and social media indicates that there is an in-depth reasoning that takes place when 
people use social media to engage in opinions regarding political news. Opinion expression is 
stated to be conducive to protest behaviour, as well as other forms of political activity 
through discussion which is viewed as political participation. This is especially illustrated by 
Bimber et al. (2005), who claim that social media provides an ideal set of communication 
processes involving the crossing of boundaries between private and public life; a view shared 
by Habermas.  
Shirky (2011:6) states that it is not strictly the access to information that is significant in the 
role of social media in civil society, but also the access to conversation. She argues that a 
public sphere is more likely to emerge in society as a result of people’s dissatisfaction 
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concerning economic day-to-day governance than the embracing of abstract political ideals. 
She further states that social media should be viewed as a tool to coordinate real-world action 
rather than a replacement thereof. 
2.3.3 Non-Traditional Media, Traditional Media and Media Censorship 
This section will examine media control, as this is essential in understanding the degree to 
which journalistic and internet freedoms are curbed. This presents an issue that affects both 
branches of journalism. 
In terms of media control, Naím and Bennet (2015) state that the evidence is somewhat 
obscured, as governments are successful in controlling and even disrupting independent 
media when it comes to determining what information reaches society. This is also the case in 
countries that are poor or have autocratic regimes in which the government is more powerful 
and important than the internet. These governments have a greater deciding role in how 
information is produced, as well as who produces and consumes it.  
It has been noted that journalists and media centres face risks during the spread of 
information, especially in countries that do not follow a democratic regime. Karr (2014) 
reported on a more extreme example of media censorship, demonstrated by several dozen 
masked gunmen, believed to be Russian militia, who stormed and seized control of the 
Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism. Journalists were subsequently told to start 
reporting ‘true information’. In Ukraine, approximately 200 journalists and press workers 
were beaten, harassed and intimidated by the government since Russia overtook the Crimean 
parliament on 23 February 201416. It is evident in the realm of professional journalism that 
journalistic freedom and internet freedom are becoming a scarce resource due to the blocking 
of websites or the adoption of laws that limit freedom of expression and instead adopt 
methods of propaganda.  
According to Naím and Bennet (2015), governments are also adopting other methods of 
limiting media freedom, by gaining influence over independent media through using shell 
companies to purchase the newspaper and sue the reporters. Violent measures have been 
witnessed, as seen in Venezuela. A group of independent United Nations (UN) human rights 
experts prompted the Venezuelan government for clarification on allegations of arbitrary 
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detentions and violence against journalists during the protests on 12 February 2014 (un.org 
2014). Journalists covering the protests and the related violence reported that there were 17 
instances in which security forces and pro-government demonstrators physically assaulted 
and detained journalists between 12 February and 16 February 2014 (Human Rights Watch 
2014).  
This section demonstrated that journalistic freedom and internet freedom are concerns that 
are found in both traditional and non-traditional media. The following sections will separate 
these two strands of journalism, by conceptualising them and isolating their differences, as 
well as discussing how they can merge to form a broader field of journalism.   
2.3.4 Non-Traditional Media: Online Citizen Journalism  
This section will conceptualise the term ‘online citizen journalism’ as a form of non-
traditional media. The purpose of this is to observe the efficiency of technology through non-
traditional media in the form of blogs, and how this can serve as a valuable source of 
information in political risk analysis; a field that relies on the availability of information in a 
timely manner.  
According to Calcutt and Hammond, the term journalism in a traditional sense is defined as 
the concerted activity of reporting and commenting on recent human activity, disseminated in 
a well-crafted form for the benefit of others more often engaged in other activities 
(2011:169). With the aid of technology and the willingness of citizens to become engaged 
within the field, there has been a surge in what is now referred to as online citizen journalism, 
public journalism, digital journalism or user-generated content17 (Calcutt & Hammond 2011; 
Jones & Salter 2012).  
Online citizen journalism is a display of the technological innovation that provides the 
opportunity for citizens with internet access to produce news and information (Macharashvilli 
2012:8). This has allowed citizens to bypass journalistic organisations by providing a source 
of information through blogs, social media and various other digital platforms. Due to the 
content of this type of news being written by citizens who are not professional journalists, 
they are able to relay information that does not require strict professional norms (Armoogum 
2013). In conjunction with the associated freedom of the internet, this means that these 
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alternative forms of news distribution are not tightly controlled18 (Waisbord 2013:204; 
Dahlberg 2001:3). 
The traditional order of society has given way to a new modern media order. This means that 
where, in the past, journalism had limited citizen access, media scarcity and a long-term 
stability, technological innovation has greatly disrupted this order. In the past, citizens had 
greater difficulty expressing their opinions and views to journalists. Added to this, news 
organisations were not very receptive to the views of the audience (Waisbord 2013:204). 
There was much less interaction between the audience and news organisations, with the 
exception of letters to the editors. It is still believed that the news disseminated by traditional 
news organisations has an agenda (DeMers 2013; Revis 2011).  
The heightened role of online citizen journalism in society questions whether everyone can 
be journalists, or what will happen to the traditional makeup of legacy news organisations, as 
barriers to this practice have been removed. It is believed that citizen journalism is not 
enough to credibly take over the dominant role of journalists. In the name of political 
participation, the informational needs of society cannot be provided by individuals who lack 
the proper knowledge and training (Waisbord 2013:205; Armoogum 2013; Macharashvilli 
2012:28; Revis 2011). 
Citizen journalism has been praised for the potential it holds for citizens, as it is believed to 
promote an increased interest in public life by boosting civic conversation and political 
participation (Paulussen et al. 2007:1). This view is contrasted by the view that professional 
journalism is believed to smother public expression, as the emphasis is placed on the views of 
the elite and commercialism, which has manifested into an apathetic spirit of public life. 
Citizen journalism is thus believed to be a solution to this concern, as it provides open 
dialogue for the opinions of the wider populace, by placing the citizen in control of the news 
to a certain extent (Bruns 2010; Waisbord 2013:206).  
At present, more people are turning to online news, especially when it is breaking news. This 
is not to say that mainstream news no longer holds any ground, but rather that mainstream 
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democratic framework, it should be noted that there are citizen journalists in other regimes, for example, 
autocratic regimes.  
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media now faces the option of working with online citizen journalists and online 
communities, along with their amateur footage, and the use of online platforms such as 
Facebook (Maras 2013:192). These online platforms will be discussed in the following 
section. 
2.3.5 Online Citizen Journalism and the Online Factor 
The online factor in online citizen journalism examines the digital methods used by citizen 
journalists as channels through which they are able to broadcast their news. In addition to the 
technological gadgets depicted, such as cell phones with built-in cameras and video cameras, 
are digital platforms, of which the most prominent is the method of blogging. Blogging is a 
method by which content can be published on an online platform. The technical manner of 
defining it refers to a content-management system rather than a certain kind of writing style 
(Briggs 2010:42). According to Briggs, a blog is classified as a frequently updated website, 
organised by entries that follow a reverse chronological order. The entry is called a ‘post’, 
and has a headline and a body. Entries are also used to provide links to other news and 
information available on the Web, as well as photos and other graphics. In addition, a link is 
provided for reader comments, allowing them to share their views on the blogger’s entry; 
however, not all blogs have comment links (2010:42).  
Blogs are viewed as an effective means of publishing journalist’s articles as they are simple, 
immediate and accredited by their interactivity, which is believed to actually improve 
journalism by bringing the audience closer to the writer. This eliminates the constraints of 
time and space, which limit the journalist’s ability to engage with the audience while 
reporting on a story (Briggs 2010:43).    
Bruns states that today’s journalism is disillusioned by commercial journalism. He explains 
that journalists do not cover news events in an accurate and objective manner, but instead in a 
way that is governed by their own agendas (2005:15). This does not assume that blogging 
prevents subjectivism. Instead, in the realm of blogging, objectivity is not always promoted 
as a clear standard and embraces opinion and subjectivity (Allan 2006:85). One would ask 
what role the ‘truth’ plays in the realm of blogging. The answer is rooted in Bernhard 
Debatin’s statement that the truth arises from the discursive process in the interaction of ideas 
among bloggers. This contrasts significantly with professional journalism, in the sense that 
the latter relies on the standard of objectivity, whereas blogging follows a combination of 
transparency, accuracy and advocacy (2011: 838). 
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2.3.6 Traditional Media 
Professional journalists are knowledgeable reporters who convey information to an 
uninformed public. They are educated in the culture of working for the public as opposed to 
collaborating with the public in common endeavours (Waisbord 2013:116; Jones & Salter 
2012:29). Journalists are often perceived as individuals who lack compassion, opting for 
neutrality. They are also believed to be ‘dictated to’ by the trusted model of professional 
journalism, which aims to be apolitical. In reality, this model is meant to defend public 
interest over subjectivism and partisanism. The notion of bringing citizens into the newsroom 
in the form of citizen journalism is said to have the power to greatly disrupt these ideals 
(Waisbord 2013:116).  
Concurrently, a positive light is shed on the subject of online citizen journalism, through 
introducing the belief that citizens should be at the centre of democratic communication and 
that there does not have to be an ‘either-or’ situation. Instead, there is a belief that 
professional journalists can collaborate with citizen journalists by incorporating them into the 
newsroom. This is based on the analysis that professional journalists are insensitive to the 
needs of the public and are believed to be disconnected from citizens who are, in this context, 
viewed as the true heroes of civic life, according to Waisbord (2013:110).  
2.3.7 The Value of Online Citizen Journalism  
Online citizen journalism has the potential to play a prevailing role within the news domain, 
its advantage being ‘eyes on the ground’. It has the ability to present news at the moment that 
it occurs through the use of easily accessible footage. This not only adds to the term 
‘breaking news’ through its immediacy, but allows for the monitoring of democracy through 
the transformation of the idea of ‘truth seeking’ in journalism. This is due to the nature of 
online citizen journalism, which approaches the truth in a manner that includes involvement 
and participation rather than distance and detachment (Maras 2013:195). It also means having 
the voices of the public heard through journalism by moderating and monitoring the sources 
of information that shape and affect the life of the citizen (Jones & Salter 2012:10).  
Rosen introduces citizen journalism in a context that promotes political participation, as it 
challenges journalists to address people as citizens who politically participate in public affairs 
as opposed to being viewed as victims or spectators. Furthermore, it assists the community to 
act upon matters rather than learning or knowing about problems, it improves the 
environment of public discussion instead of having to watch it worsen, and it aids in the 
bettering of public life by paying attention to it (Quoted in Iggers 1998:143). It may sound 
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oversimplified to suggest that journalism can implement changes, although in the crux of the 
message, the point is to allow citizens to become part of the public life that they inhibit 
through the disseminating of information (Richards 2005:116).  
Richard Sambrook (2005), former director of the BBC’s Global News, stated that in the case 
of the occurrence of major events, the public is able to offer much more information than 
mainstream news broadcasts and, for this reason, there should be a partnership between these 
two branches of journalism (Calcutt & Hammond 2011:116). He further stated that citizens 
promote a participatory culture and are thus able to supplement opinions and information 
through the participation of reporter-initiated crowd sourcing that curates news through social 
media. Citizen journalists also have the distinct advantage of not being constrained by 
logistical challenges or a lack of access, which means that they are able to report at a faster 
rate than mainstream journalists (Waisbord 2013:208; Jones & Salter 2012:28).  
In the context of this study, the focus is to illustrate the point at which online citizen 
journalism can be of value to political risk analysis. This is determined by questioning the 
manner in which citizen journalists, through the use of non-traditional media in the form of 
blogs, can serve as an open means of information and data concerning political risks and 
events. As mentioned previously, mainstream news corporations are incorporating citizen 
journalists into their news teams. Citizen journalists are viewed as valuable (to a certain 
extent), which makes the potential for their role within political risk analysis worth 
examining.  
Journalists – both traditional and non-traditional – as well as political risk analysts have one 
thing in common, which is the collection of news as it happens. The contributing factor of 
citizen journalism in these two cases is that citizen journalists are able to provide real-time 
news as it happens through the use of non-traditional media (Lewis et al. 2010).  
In some cases, citizen journalism has a positive track record in terms of documenting real-
time events, which may prove valuable to political risk analysts. Citizen journalists have 
played a role in documentation of events such as the New York terrorist attacks in 2001, the 
tsunami in South East Asia in 2004, the Arab Spring in 2011, as well as the death of former 
Libyan president, Colonel M. Gadaffi, and the severe earthquakes in Haiti, Japan, India and 
Pakistan (Armoogum 2013). This proves that, although citizen journalism is questionable in 
the sense of being accountable to a professional code of conduct, the ability to provide media 
coverage of events is not questionable. This is the key role that citizen journalists can provide 
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to political risk analysis, as they can fill the gaps that journalists miss during the coverage of 
events (Mythen 2010:47).   
When compiling a risk report, political risk analysts generally utilise many sources from 
different perspectives in order to have a broad understanding of the case. It is within this 
process that citizen journalists can play a part, by providing information that contributes to a 
better and more hands-on understanding of political events. The following chapter will 
contextualise the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests, with Chapter 4 
elaborating on the roles played by citizen journalists in order to understand the value of 
online citizen journalism in political risk analysis.  
2.3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a sound conceptual basis to understand the various concepts 
surrounding the research question, by dividing political risk analysis and political 
participation into two branches that can be examined from the sum of its different parts. It has 
also conceptualised traditional and non-traditional media by looking at various elements such 
as the Habermasian public sphere and the virtual sphere. By contrasting the differences 
between traditional and non-traditional media, this chapter has succeeded in explaining these 
differences, in addition to discussing the value of political risk analysis; the most important 
factor comprising the research question of this study.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that online citizen journalists provide value to the field of 
political risk analysis, based on their ability to present news within the moment, the 
dissemination of information that takes into perspective the views of the public in political 
events (which proves valuable when setting up risk reports), as well as their ability to obtain 
more information in different forms, as they are present when events occur and are equipped 
with mobile devices that can show and report more information without logistical issues.  
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Chapter 3: Overview of the protests in Brazil 2013 - 2014       
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this thesis is to study the value of online citizen journalism in political risk 
analysis. This study will use the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup in Brazil 
and the subsequent protests that followed at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. This chapter will be 
divided into five sections. The first section will serve as an overview of civil unrest trends in 
Brazil between 2013 and 2014. The second section will observe the protests that took place 
post-2010, with subsections looking at the 2014 World Cup bid and the bid for the 2016 
Olympics. The second section will also observe the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup 
by examining the clampdown on cities and the Brazilian government’s increased spending 
and economic policies. The third section will discuss the widespread protests during the FIFA 
Confederations Cup, while the fourth section will look at global social protest trends. The 
final section will describe the post-FIFA Confederations Cup situation, which will include the 
World Cup, Olympics and the 2014 elections that took place in Brazil. This case study serves 
the purpose of constructing a contextual background to research the value of online citizen 
journalism during times of crisis. The following chapter will provide more detail on the role 
that online journalists played during the above-mentioned protests.  
3.2 CIVIL UNREST IN BRAZIL  
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the underlying socio-economic issues 
that led to the protests in Brazil in 2013 and 2014. The socio-economic reality of Brazil does 
not inspire optimism in terms of the responsibility the country had undertaken to host the 
2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and 2014 World Cup. High levels of crime were a 
particularly concerning factor. Almost all host cities demonstrated elevated levels of crime 
before the World Cup, with incidents of petty crime common in urban centres. Violent crimes 
in lower-income areas, referred to as favelas, were also cause for concern, with most crimes 
occurring in the favelas surrounding the major cities, particularly in Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro (red24 2014; Rapoza 2014). Crimes in these areas are driven by gang activity, with 
rivalry between gangs as well as disputes between gangs and the police. Narcotics trafficking 
also occurs at the borders of Argentina and Paraguay, alongside other forms of criminal 
activity (red24 2015).  
The nature of the violence in Brazil poses a real threat to public safety and is growing in 
scale, as there is a lack of punishment for crimes and corruption. Goldblatt (2013) states that 
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disorder and criminality is left to fester if they do not affect the elite. He also mentions that 
when the state does intervene, it is often with a high degree of maximum force, as 
demonstrated by the violence associated with the pacification of the favelas. This will be 
discussed further in this chapter, in addition to cases of police brutality (Goldblatt 2013).  
Brazil has high levels of corruption, as indicated by the 2014 Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), in which it was given a score of 43 and a ranking of 69 
out of 175 countries and territories assessed. The CPI rates countries according to their 
perceived levels of corruption in the public sector. The scale measures a range of 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt) (red24 2015; Transparency International 2015). Corruption 
comes to the fore in the allocation of money. This is demonstrated in the difference in 
amounts allocated to pensions and infrastructure. The average Brazilian is provided with 70 
percent of their final pay at age 54, billed from the national income. This amount is the same 
as those allocated in southern Europe; however, Brazil’s proportion of elderly people is three 
times that of southern Europe. Alternatively, infrastructure has a much smaller spend, only 
taking 1.5 percent from its GDP (gross domestic profit) in 2013, compared to the global 
average of 3.8 percent, despite Brazil’s stock of infrastructure valued at just 16 percent of 
GDP. The consequences of low-quality infrastructure weigh heavily on businesses, causing 
unnecessary costs. According to the World Economic Forum, Brazil is ranked 120 out of 144 
countries for overall quality of infrastructure (The Economist 2013; Soto & Boadle). 
Rousseff’s approval ratings have dropped since she first took office in January 2011, despite 
her re-election to office in 2014; this will be further discussed in this chapter. In an article 
written on 22 June 2013, it was recorded that Rousseff’s ratings dropped by 8 percentage 
points to 71 percent in June from March 201319, with other accounts by think-tank Datafolha 
reporting a plummet from 65 percent in May 2013 to 30 percent in June 2013 (Panja et al. 
2013; Barchfield 2013; France-Presse 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). The main causes for 
the decline were the fast increase of inflation and inadequate public services. The 
accumulation of these different elements has resulted in a great amount of uncertainty for 
Brazil’s economic future. It is necessary to address these concerns, as a wave of uncertainty 
                                                 
 
 
19According to a poll commissioned by the National Confederations, published on 19 June 2013. The survey 
was conducted by 2,002 people from June 8 to11 and had a margin of error of two percentage (Panja et al. 
2013). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 38 
 
in both the economic and political environments coupled with high levels of social unrest 
poses a very real threat to Brazil’s investment climate (Montenegro et al. 2013). In terms of 
the protests, which will be discussed in the following sections, these became more rampant 
during the hosting of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and in the build up to the 2014 
World Cup, as these times were seen as an opportunity to bring attention to issues that have 
long been neglected by the government, but from which the public still suffered. Socio-
economic and labour concerns have been affecting Brazil since June 2013 (red24 2014; Von 
et al. 2014). 
3.3 PROTESTS IN BRAZIL POST-2010  
3.3.1. The 2014 World Cup Bid and the 2016 Olympics  
The bid for the 2014 FIFA World Cup was a moment of success in Brazil, with the 
tournament scheduled to run from 12 June to 13 July 2014, including contests that spanned 
between 32 national teams, with a total of 64 matches played in 12 host cities in the country 
(2013 FIFA Confederations Cup).  
Brazil managed to reach an impressive amount of economic stability by 2009. The economy 
stabilised under Fernando Henrique Cardosa in the mid-1990s, which was further accelerated 
under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the early 2000s. By 2010, the economy had grown by 7.5 
percent per year, which served to be its strongest performance in a quarter of a century (The 
Economist 2013). Brazil had bidden for the World Cup while its economy was growing 
rapidly, following the discovery of oil at the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Despite an increase in 
hope and optimism, it became apparent that there would be an increase in costs to host the 
event (Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014). Another concern was the decision to host the event 
in 12 cities, as opposed to the initial 8, in addition to having to rebuild 9 stadiums entirely 
instead of making minor changes. The rush to complete these tasks led to the questioning of 
the safety of the stadiums (Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014).  
At the time of the World Cup bid, Brazil was under the government of then-president, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, who ensured that there would be transparency on public spending (De 
Souza Faria 2013). With much optimism, it seemed a perfect opportunity to host the 2014 
World Cup as well as the summer 2016 Olympics. This assurance has since been confronted 
with a hard dose of reality (The Economist 2013). According to sport ministry’s executive 
secretary, Luiz Fernandes, Brazil’s World Cup spending exceeded Germany’s 2006 World 
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Cup costs almost three-fold, when it rose to R$28 billion20; this will be further explained in 
this chapter (De Souza Faria 2013). 
Brazil has been crowned a five-time world champion in football, which seemed a pleasant 
enough reason to host the FIFA World Cup. This notion was quickly challenged when the 
reality of Brazil’s civil unrest situation became a very real concern to the world. It is believed 
that Brazil’s title as a world champion and the country’s love of the game have been a means 
of distracting the population from the reality of their social problems. It is almost uncanny 
that in preparing for the World Cup, an opportunity was presented for the mobilisation of 
Brazilians to address dormant issues by the government. The civil unrest trends in Brazil, as 
demonstrated by the protests, have centred on the issues of corruption and the waste of public 
money, as mentioned in the previous section (De Souza Faria 2013; Hill 2014). 
Romário De Souza Faria, former football star and current congressman of the Brazilian 
Socialist Party (PSB), stated that the protests would be a means of strengthening the 
democratic culture of Brazil, by raising the voice of the man on the street and ultimately 
leading to the strengthening of the judiciary. According to De Souza Faria, corruption in 
Brazil has led to a weak legislation, with those committing corruption not being held 
accountable (De Souza Faria 2013; Kadiyah 2013). He stated that when Brazil won the bid 
for the World Cup, it was believed that this would generate employment as well as promote 
tourism and strengthen the image of the country in the international community (Bermingham 
2014). In terms of generating employment, it was estimated in June 2014 that 380,000 jobs 
were created as a result of the World Cup (Hill 2014). 
Brazil’s bid for the World Cup, although seemingly positive, had a few underlying issues. 
One such concern was quality control, as Brazil had a reputation for building overpriced and 
low-quality infrastructure. This was especially evident in May 2013, when the Maracanã 
stadium, a venue for both the World Cup and the Olympics, had to undergo an expensive 
renovation as it was ruled unsafe for play21 (Lundy 2013). 
                                                 
 
 
20The initial budget was R$25.5 billion (US$11.4 billion) and included costs for stadiums, improvements in 
ports and airports and urban transportation (De Souza Faria 2013). 
21 This decision was later overturned when the required documents were provided (Lundy 2013).  
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This is not the first time that such issues have come to the fore, as demonstrated in 2007 
when Rio de Janeiro hosted the Pan American Games, an event accompanied by promises of 
new subway lines and the cleaning of Guanabara Bay’s pollution. However, these promises 
did not come to fruition. Instead, according to a Time Magazine article, despite the initial 
estimated amount to be spent for the Pan American Games being set at R$177 million, the 
final amount was 10 times this figure. As in the case of the suspected low quality of 
Maracanã stadium, the athletes’ village, which later became residential property, started 
caving in a few years after the event (Lundy 2013). Also in 2012, the economy only grew by 
0.9 percent, leading to hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets in June to 
protest dissatisfaction of high living costs, poor public services and the corruption and greed 
associated with politicians. One thus has to ask what problems caused a deceleration in the 
economy’s growth. 
Despite this, it was predicted that Brazil’s economy would slow down in this period, due to 
the pay-off from ending runaway inflation, the opening up of trade, as well as the rise in 
commodity prices, large increases in consumer credit and consumption (The Economist 2013; 
Panja & Biller 2013). Brazil’s financial woes also stem from the fact that it had done little to 
reform its government when it obtained financial success. A lack of reform in the public 
sector has led to a heavy burden in the private sector, with companies facing a heavy tax code 
and payroll taxes (The Economist 2013). 
In light of what transpired during the FIFA Confederations Cup and the World Cup in terms 
of protests, Brazil cannot afford another wave of protests during the 2016 Olympics. During 
the bid for the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro to the International Olympic Committee, an 
R$14.4 billion budget was indicated. This amount was slightly higher than the combined 
budgets of the other three finalists. The concern herein lies in the fact that in modern history, 
every Olympics has overshot its budget by a wide boundary. A working paper compiled in 
2012 by Oxford University stated that every Olympics since 1960 has exceeded its budget, 
with an average overrun of 179 percent in real terms (Flyvbjerg & Stewart 2012). It is 
therefore a grave risk to Brazil to host this event, as the Olympics is viewed as one of the 
most financially risky megaprojects, with many cities and nations having learned from this 
associated hazard of overspending. This was demonstrated in the 2012 London Games where, 
in the bidding process, the country presented the organisers with a £2.4 billion budget which, 
after winning the hosting rights, increased to £9.3 billion; critics believe the costs to be even 
higher than this (Lundy 2013; Mayer 2014). 
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Protests occurred in the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup, as well as before the World 
Cup, as protests occurred in 12 cities a month before the tournament started. These 
demonstrations were smaller than those that took place preceding the Confederations Cup. 
They centred on the message of “Na Copa vaiterluta” (The Cup will have protests), as 
protesters stated that the cost of refurbishing the Maracanã stadium could have paid for 200 
schools (Watts 2014).  
Protesters argued against the meaning of the World Cup, which they believed did not 
represent them as a nation, despite the fact that Brazil is a football-loving country. The 
negativity of the World Cup within this context refers to forced relocations and the limits on 
rights to protest and strike (Watts 2014; BBC News 2014). With the incredible hype 
surrounding the protests during the FIFA Confederations Cup, it is unlikely that the criticism 
of Brazil’s sporting events will subside in the run up to the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.  
3.3.2 Run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup 
The run up to the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup was meant to be a ceremonial build up to 
the 2014 FIFA World Cup and an opportunity to showcase Brazil’s readiness for that event. 
Instead, this period became a platform for mass protests against the cost of the World Cup. 
The largest public dissent in decades occurred for the duration of the tournament, between 15 
and 30 June 2013, in 175 major cities countrywide (Panja et al. 2013; Lundy 2013; De Souza 
Faria 2013; red24 2014; Levy 2013; Barchfield 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Within the 
theoretical context of this study, this introduced political risk in terms of security at the World 
Cup and Brazil’s inability to contain large protest movements in an effective manner.  
As a result of these protests, two people had died and hundreds were injured by 22 June 2014, 
as over 1 million Brazilians took to the streets to demand cheaper bus fares, better schools 
and the construction of more hospitals (Panja et al. 2013). These protests focused on the topic 
of the expenses associated with the hosting of the World Cup, as mentioned above. It was 
estimated that 30 billion reais (US$13 billion) would be allocated for preparation of the 
stadiums and cities; this amount was three times greater than the initial estimated figure when 
planning the hosting of the event, which also made it one of the most expensive World Cups 
recorded in history  (Panja et al. 2013; Lundy 2013; Bermingham 2014). 
President Rousseff was heckled at the opening of the Confederations event, during which the 
assumed festive spirit thereof was overshadowed by the reality of the violence that took place 
in Brazilian cities. In an attempt the address the protests, Rousseff pledged in a televised 
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address to the nation to meet with the protest leaders and, in doing so, also addressed the 
issue of improving public services while speaking out against the violence in the streets 
(Panja et al. 2013). The protests in Brazil were fuelled by various reasons, the most 
prominent of which was dissatisfaction with the government in terms of inadequate public 
services such as education and health care. However, other protests were more specific, with 
teachers marching for better wages and gay rights activists opposing a bill to let psychologists 
recommend medical treatment for homosexuality (Panja et al. 2013; Bermingham 2014). 
The run up to the Confederations Cup sparked the formation of various social movements and 
is pertinent to this study as it provides context in its overlap with the launch of the 
pacification programme. The Movimento Passe Livre (Free Fare Movement) was a prominent 
group which protested for free public transportation. The group gained significant attention 
on 13 June 2013, when a peaceful protest turned violent during police intervention. Police 
fired rubber bullets and grenades at fleeing protesters and bystanders. Thereafter, the 
movement spread rapidly to other state capitals and more protests occurred simultaneously 
with the Confederations Cup matches. It was reported by the BBC’s Ben Smith that, in a 
match between Uruguay and Nigeria, “the deep rumblings, loud bangs and the crackle of 
police weapons could be heard in the streets nearby”. Strikes also took place at subways near 
the opening ceremony of the Confederations Cup in Sao Paulo. The aims of these strikes 
were to call for increased wages and improved working conditions; however, the Sao Paulo 
court ruled that striking over pay was illegal (Hill 2014).  
Trends in 2013 (Levy 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013) showed an impressive reduction in 
poverty and inequality; however, these were initially quite high. Despite the promises made 
previously, Brazil has a long way to go before its socio-economic issues can be fully 
addressed. Despite the growth spurt of the middle class in Brazil, referred to as Class C, and 
the ability to increase the purchasing power of this class, these citizens found it difficult to 
get into elite schools, hospitals and universities (both private and public). Having risen to the 
status of middle class, this group of citizens felt empowered to demand access to quality 
services (Levy 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013; Garffer 2013). Although the Brazilian 
government has allocated more resources to these areas, with increased expenditure in 
education from 3.9 percent to 5.6 percent, and from 3 percent to 4 percent in healthcare 
according to World Bank Estimates in 2013, there remains a deficit in the quality of these 
services, which begs for better management to reduce inefficiency, waste and corruption 
(Levy 2013).  
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3.3.2.1 Clampdown on Cities: The Favela Pacification Programme  
The Brazilian government introduced what is referred to as the ‘pacification’ of favelas 
through the use of paramilitary forces in order to drive out drug-trafficking gangs and replace 
them with so-called resident-friendly police units, also called Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). 
This pacification programme was one of the key elements in an attempt to improve public 
security. Residents of favelas have complained and later protested against these measures, as 
methods used by the police were excessively forceful (Wattsin 2013). 
The pacification programme began in 2008, with the aim of building UPPs tasked with 
stationing policemen to reclaim territories controlled by drug gangs. Although assumed to be 
positive reform, the programme instigated a dangerous environment filled with corrupt and 
violent police forces. The claims of Rio de Janeiro being in a better standing with the 
programme in place have been starkly contradicted by reports which, according to the 
Brazilian Institute of Public Security, illustrate that the number of deaths in police conflicts 
rose countrywide by 69 percent between 2013 and 2014 (Froio 2014).  
The reality and seriousness of these killings are swiftly quashed in the Brazilian media, which 
has regularly regarded the UPPs as having a positive presence (Froio 2014). In reality, 
accounts by those inhabiting favelas, claimed that UPPs hardly patrolled at night, allowing 
crime to occur in the many dark alleys and streets which were left empty. Froio (2014) claims 
that it is becoming clear that the formation of UPPs is a public relations stunt and not a public 
security policy. Instead, these forces are meant to hide the high levels of violence and drive 
away drug gangs from places that are popular during major events such as the World Cup 
which followed the pacification programme.  
By October 2013, 10 police officers in Rio de Janeiro had been charged with the torture and 
killing of a resident of the city’s biggest favela, Rocinha, which brought to the fore the issue 
of extrajudicial killings. One of the most prominent cases of such killings is that of a builder, 
Amarildo de Souza, who was classified ‘missing’ for over two months. This was soon 
questioned, as his disappearance was met with suspicion, due to the circumstances thereof 
together with the suspicion of the police’s notorious record in the favelas. This led to 
demonstrations which forced the authorities to act (Wattsin 2013). Eventually, 10 officers 
were detained on charges of torture and concealing a corpse. The local newspapers reported 
that the officers had killed de Souza (who suffered from epilepsy) during an interrogation 
which included electric shocks and the placing of a plastic bag over his head (Wattsin 2013; 
Froio 2014). 
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In May 2014 a study by Amnesty International showed that 80 percent of Brazilians feared 
torture from their own police when being arrested. In a survey conducted among 21 countries, 
Brazil was named as the one country where citizens felt most unsafe in the hands of 
authorities (Froio 2014). In addition, residents of Rocinha, Complexo do Alemao, Complexo 
da Maré and other favelas still lack basic services. A group called Rocinha Without Borders 
has had several attempts at establishing a dialogue between the residents and the UPP, 
although this was greeted with no success and reflects the problem of communication 
between authorities and residents in the mainstream Brazilian press. This is perceived as a 
reflection of the same concerns on a greater scale, illustrating a lack of communication 
between the government and citizens, which the protests are trying to tackle (Froio 2014).  
Marcos Barreira, writer and researcher for Favela News Agency, wrote that UPPs are a form 
of ‘urban marketing’ aimed at uplifting public opinion instead of addressing public security 
reform. He further stated that peaceful favelas are located around points of tourist interest 
when, in reality, the cause of peace is the movement of drug gangs to other areas (Froio 
2014). Instead of addressing the issue of the favelas, according to Steel (2014), the media is 
used as a marketing ploy to show that football is the sport of the common people, as depicted 
by clips of children with no shoes playing in the street with makeshift goal posts. The actual 
reality could not be further from this imagery. To put this into perspective, in some areas of 
the favelas, a wall was built between the stadiums and the favelas, so that favelas could not 
be seen. Furthermore, in the Favela de Metro, near Maracaña, the first hundred families were 
forced out at gunpoint and were moved two hours away. 
Brazilians have claimed that the government used the World Cup to destroy their homes, in 
order for property dealers to develop the cleared land. These claims changed public 
perception, which was a contributory factor to the protests, as the favelas occupied prime 
plots of land, especially in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The protests that occurred in Brazil did 
not end with the FIFA Confederations Cup, as renewed violence in Sao Paulo led to the 
detainment of 90 people while 3 trucks and 6 buses were set alight. Police statements added 
that some protesters used firearms. The chaos caused by these protests, which took place on 
27 October, led to a policeman fatally shooting a 17-year-old boy, labelling the incident an 
accidental discharge when police were called to check a disturbance in the northern Villa 
Medeiros. Protests occurring on the following day were led by youths who forced the 
temporary closure of a local highway along with other actions, including forcing a truck’s 
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motorist to turn back while other vehicles were set ablaze. These actions were attributed to a 
violent social movement called the Black Bloc anarchist group (France-Presse 2013). 
The Black Bloc was a disruptive factor in these protests and has increased its actions since 
June 2013. The group is known for members dressing in black, wearing masks and having 
their heads covered with a handkerchief or T-shirt (France-Presse 2013). The Black Bloc has 
challenged the authority on the streets of Brazil’s major cities by inflicting violence and 
damaging public and private property, as well as by exploiting an already overworked and 
understaffed police force (Garffer 2013). 
3.3.2.2 Increased spending and economic changes  
Brazil’s financial sector has faced several challenges, with its stocks, bonds and currency 
being hit by emerging markets’ sell-offs after economic growth missed the estimate made by 
analysts. In 2012, Brazil was the world’s second-largest emerging market, but reached its 
second-worst economic performance in 13 years when inflation in June breached the 6.5 
percent upper limit of the government target range (Panja et al. 2013; France-Presse 2013). 
According to Garffer, some of the underlying causes of Brazil’s financial problems stem from 
the country’s heavy reliance on commodity prices which were initially propelled by a 
demanding China. Unfortunately, this demand has diminished in addition to the credit-driven 
consumerism of Class C, which has made the country’s economy stagnant. Another source of 
discontent in the country lies in the fact that it has fallen short of modernising and upgrading 
its infrastructure (Garffer 2013). 
Rousseff, a former Marxist guerrilla once imprisoned by the country’s 1964-1985 military 
dictatorship, vowed in June 2013 to allocate 75 percent of oil royalties to education and 25 
percent to improving healthcare services. In addition, she suggested another initiative titled 
Mais Médicos (More Doctors), with the aim of recruiting foreign doctors to work in remote 
areas, in order to address the lack of medical care. Although Rousseff introduced a promise 
of change through implementing government policies to address these social issues, she 
continued to defend World Cup spending, which she believed would improve public 
infrastructure and allow for an investment that would stimulate economic growth (Panja et al. 
2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Brazil’s economic realities in terms of health care are a 
serious matter, as demonstrated by the average of 1.8 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. In 
terms of education, 80 percent of public schools have inadequate facilities, with one of the 
most prominent issues being leaking roofs (Panja et al. 2013). 
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Although Brazil was not the only country to be affected by the turbulence of the world 
economy, the government made the grave mistake of prioritising the investments in those 
cities hosting the World Cup over the needs of the public. In the wake of the crisis, 
government plans were redrafted and public investment was cut, while holding on to the 
commitments made to FIFA. This meant that money was being allocated towards sports 
projects at the expense of health, safety and education. These decisions had the distinct 
feature of setting off a chain of repercussions, as evidenced by a lack of investment in 
education, leading to an increase of citizens with no occupation which, in turn, leads to 
unemployment and a lack of basic security (De Souza Faria 2013). 
Education and, more specifically, the condition of schools in Brazil are cause for concern. 
Teachers are poorly paid, and demoralised, as reported in Pearson’s education quality index 
which ranks Brazil second last out of 40 countries. According to the UN Development 
Programme’s 2012 report, one in four students starting in basic education in Brazil leave 
school before they have completed their last grade. In terms of public health, citizens who 
rely on public hospitals suffer aggravated levels of illness due to a lack of professional 
treatment. However, these social issues are not new; they are symptoms believed to be 
inherited from previous governments (De Souza Faria 2013). 
The much-protested stadiums were forecast to cost R$14,300 per seat which, when contrasted 
with Cape Town’s costliest arena of R$10,000 per seat, raised many questions. This number 
is particularly high when taking into account the fact that the costs more than tripled since 
Brazil’s proposal to FIFA in 2007. It is believed that the high costs of the event tell a 
deceiving story, in which the Brazilian government aims to sell an image to the world of a 
modern country with new stadiums, while ignoring the needs of its own people, including 
those dying in inadequate hospitals. The stadiums have become a symbol of the Brazilian 
government’s wasteful spending and the perception that the government does not have its 
priorities in order (Panja et al. 2013). Despite this, this amount was not forecast to be the 
highest, as Brasilia’s Estadio Nacional houses 71,000 seats costing R$1.5 billion 
(approximately US$680 million). The problem with this stadium was that, when taking its 
price into consideration and comparing it with the poor attendance, it was rendered useless 
after the events and thus a white elephant. As such, it is now an empty building that has taken 
a chunk out of the pockets of taxpayers, for which they continued to pay after the event 
ended. This incident was not limited to this stadium, but was a result of a majority of the 
stadiums built in preparation for the World Cup (Lundy 2013). Another example included the 
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Manaus Stadium22, a 39,000-seat stadium at which local games hardly attracted 1,500 
spectators, partly due to the city lacking a notable soccer team, which has rendered the 
stadium useless after the World Cup. This was also perceived as the reason private lenders 
were not willing to contribute to the World Cup (Hill 2014).  
It was pertinent to ask how the World Cup would be financed, as the protests centred on this 
very issue. The original plan included private donors financing the development and 
renovation of the stadiums; this was greatly diverted. In reality and according to The Wall 
Street Journal’s John Lyons and Loretta Chao, US$3.6 billion of the money from the 12 
stadiums came from taxpayers. The opening game, which was hosted in Sao Paulo, boasted a 
new stadium that cost US$550 million. The stadium was to go to the Corinthian’s soccer 
team after the Cup had finished. This came at a great expense, as the team could not generate 
enough private lenders to pay for the stadium, which eventually had to come from US$200 
million in tax breaks and government loans (Hill 2014; Mayer 2014).   
The planning for the World Cup fell to shambles as plans to improve traffic around the host 
cities led to only 3 cities having stayed within their budgets and deadlines. These failed 
outcomes fuelled anger in the public sector and spurred popular protests (De Souza Faria 
2013; Hill 2014). FIFA became a villain in the hosting of the World Cup with their 
announcement of making R$4 billion profit from Brazil’s World Cup, tax-free; this 
announcement starkly contrasted the realities on the ground. Throughout these protests, 
President Rousseff attempted to carry the torch of good faith, stating that Brazil would “host 
the best World Cup of all time”, a notion agreed with by few. It is believed that the only party 
to profit from this event was FIFA (De Souza Faria 2013). 
Brazilians believed their government’s responses to the protests to be superficial and 
insufficient. Despite this, the protests have allowed the opportunity to mobilise citizenry 
interested in strengthening communications with the government (Montenegro et al. 2013). 
Brazil’s past achievements, as witnessed in the last decade, showed considerable progress in 
bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, also known as the Gini index. It was reported 
that over 40 million citizens have risen above the extreme poverty line in a country that 
                                                 
 
 
22 Another article stated that the stadium was a 42,000-seat which cost an estimated US$319 million (Mayer 
2014). 
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houses 200 million people. In the late 2000s, Brazil’s Gini index was 54.723. In an article by 
Bermingham (2014), it was stated that according to The World Bank, 21.4 percent of the 
population lived below the poverty line, with 4.2 percent estimated to live below the extreme 
poverty line (less than US$1.25 a day). The presence of positive change is something that 
Brazilian society has already experienced, making its expectations that much more real. 
3.4 WIDESPREAD PROTESTS DURING THE FIFA CONFEDERATIONS CUP 
The most prominent characteristic of the FIFA Confederations Cup protests was that these 
took place countrywide and were not restricted to a single area. The protests that occurred 
during the Confederations Cup reached a high magnitude, with protesters threatening to 
disrupt the tournament if their demands were not met. A large-scale increase in security was 
witnessed as a result thereof, with the government investing over US$2.2 billion into World 
Cup security in 2013 (red24 2014; Ramón 2013).  
Protests took place on 6 June 2013, with students in Sao Paulo marching against a 7 percent 
increase in bus fares (Panja et al. 2013). Approximately 1,000 people broke through the 
security perimeter and protested outside the gate of Brasilia’s national stadium during the 
Confederations Cup opening game. In addition, 3,000 people tried to break into Rio de 
Janeiro’s newly renovated Maracaña stadium. The protesters comprised middle-class youths 
who rallied against the detaining and injuring of 230 people, including 100 journalists, in Rio 
de Janeiro, Brasilia and Sao Paulo (France-Presse 2013).  
These protests increased in number and consistency, eventually peaking on 20 June, when 
almost one million protesters marched throughout Brazil. These marches started peacefully 
but soon erupted in violence as the police clashed with protest mobs which attempted to 
storm government buildings. Actions quickly turned sour, as vandals looted banks and 
shopping centres. Some of the deaths recorded in June include those of an 18-year-old who 
was killed when a vehicle ran over protesters in the city of Ribeirao Preto, as well as a 54-
year-old street cleaner who died of a heart attack during the protests in Belem, a city situated 
in the north (Panja et al. 2013; Landesman 2013). 
                                                 
 
 
230 represents perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality (Montenegro et al. 2013).  
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On 18 June 2013, youths clashed with the police in central Rio de Janeiro, when 200,000 
people marched on the Confederations Cup. This was one of the most extensive nationwide 
demonstrations since the unrest began 10 days prior. This was a peaceful demonstration, 
although there were reports of acts of vandalism in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre. Other 
accounts included a protest in Rio de Janeiro, where 100,000 people marched along Rio 
Branco Avenue. In Brasilia, over 200 youths occupied the roof of the National Congress; this 
ended following negotiations with the police. Protests were not solely based on the issues of 
bus fares and lack of public services, as accounts show that some protesters called for the 
resignation of President Rousseff. In this regard, it was later estimated that 5,000 youths 
formed a human chain around the Congress building (France-Presse 2013).  
The protests during the Confederations Cup were violent in nature and took emphasis away 
from the causes of the protests. On 20 June 2013, a day of celebration was held for Brazil’s 
defeat of Spain (3-0) to win the Confederations Cup. Clashes were reported between 
protesters and the police just outside the 1km FIFA exclusion zone around the stadium. A 
week after the wave of major social protests, violence occurred at random and several 
accounts of violent clashes taking place at various stadiums in the country were reported 
(Goldblatt 2013; Landesman 2013). 
Protests were also recorded in Belo Horizonte, where an estimated 66,000 people protested 
according to Globo TV. Two protests also took place in Salvador, where the Brazilian football 
team played, attracting an estimated 5,200 people (Panja et al. 2013). Other locations 
included Sao Paulo’s international airport; furthermore, 4,000 protestors took to the streets of 
the city to demand an end to government corruption. The southern city of Santa Maria was 
similarly affected on 22 June 2013 (Panja et al. 2013). The protests also led to the departing 
of Sepp Blatter, head of FIFA, which came as a surprise to Brazilian officials, who expected 
him to remain for the two-week duration of the Confederations Cup. FIFA later stated that 
Blatter would return to Brazil on 26 June for the semi-finals (Panja et al. 2013). 
On the final day of the FIFA Confederations Cup, over 5,000 anti-government protesters 
marched near Maracaña stadium. This protest commenced half an hour before a major 
international match. What began as a minor brawl between the police and protesters escalated 
into a violent outbreak, as police unleashed tear gas canisters and stun grenades. Protesters 
retaliated with Molotov cocktails and powerful fireworks (Barchfield 2013). 
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The Confederations Cup and the World Cup led to the formation of different social 
movements. The MPL is one of the groups that had been resisting neoliberal urbanism circa 
2004 in Sao Paulo. The group’s protests against high bus fares in Salvador in the north and 
Florianópolis in the south in 2003 formed a foundation that inspired others to protest the 
same issue years later. The MPL is a group of urban activists originally made up of university 
professors, undergraduates and high school students, although this has changed as the group 
has expanded. This group has no appointed leader and follows a loose structure comprising a 
national network of affiliates in 7 cities. It is also organised according to horizontal, direct-
democracy principles which are agreed upon at national assemblies but which otherwise act 
autonomously (Landesman 2013).  
It is interesting to note that the MPL does not operate in Rio de Janeiro, which has become a 
monument of urban resistance (especially where the Black Bloc is concerned). However, 
there are talks of MPL activists organising to form a new group with Rio residents 
(Landesman 2013). In its mission statement, the MPL outlines that its organisation is not a 
means to an end, but a means to reconstruct Brazil to form another society. In the same sense, 
the fight for free transport for students is not a goal within itself. Rather, the group believes 
this to be an instrument that can be used to initiate debate about the transformation of the 
current concept of urban public transport by opposing market-based logic and beginning the 
fight for free, high-quality public transport as a right to all of society which is outside of 
private interests and under public control (workers and users) (Landesman 2013).   
The MPL is further characterised by its suspicion of corporate media; the group prioritises 
alternative media for disseminating its message, as mainstream media has previously attacked 
the group in the media. In this regard, the MPL has been labelled as disenchanted middle-
class university students lacking just cause to initiate urban disruption. In the same sense, the 
media, even when attacked by Sao Paulo’s military police, chose to focus on ‘acts of 
vandalism’ in response to violating the sanctity of private property. It was only when a 
journalist was shot in the eye by police while reporting on the protests that the media started 
supporting the protests, which were later referred to as ‘democratic’ and which condemned 
police violence. Thereafter, the media reported the many irregularities of the public transport 
system. This ultimately led to the media profiling the MPL, which subsequently became 
nationally famous (Landesman 2013).  
In the build up to the World Cup, other social movements were established, including the 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto (Homeless Workers’ Movement, or MTST) and the 
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Fronte de Resistência Urbana (Urban Resistance Front), which represented homeless citizens. 
These groups protested in May 2014 with 20,000 supporters. Thereafter, 12,000 participants 
protested in Sao Paulo on 4 June 2014, when the opening game was held (Phillips 2014). The 
aim of these protests was to demand answers regarding how the government had spent public 
funds on the World Cup (Hill 2014). 
Elaborating on these social movements is key in understanding the impact of protests in 
society as well as the manner in which citizens are mobilised, which in most cases is through 
social media, a very important element in this study. These protests show a new wave of 
politics which will be discussed in the following section.  
3.5 GLOBAL SOCIAL PROTEST TRENDS  
It is notable that protests have been rampant on a global scale, increasing in magnitude in 
2013. These protests have common features, including being viral, loosely organised with 
fractured messages, and mostly taking place in urban public locations. These protests also 
have the distinction of being able to make use of social media for mobilisations, as the 
citizenry is better educated (Beaumont 2013; Faiola & Moura 2013). The movements that 
drive these protests have few discernible (though not elected) leaders, and often have 
conflicting ideologies. In some cases, their points of reference are based less on ideologies 
and more on inspiration received from other protests. They are further characterised by 
members that are younger, better educated and wealthier members of society, although this is 
not always the case, as exhibited by Brazil’s protests. These protest movements present a 
catch-22 situation, as they require some sort of leadership, yet do not want the movement to 
be compromised by being affiliated with any political party (Beaumont 2013; The Economist 
2013:3). 
Global protests that took place in 2013 were not the first of their kind, as history reflects 
previous accounts of dissatisfaction and anger, as demonstrated in 1848 (the flow of 
European revolutions), 1968 (the global youth rejection of the established way) and 1989 (the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc). When using history to make sense of this, it is stated by the 
Washington Post’s Anthony Faiola and Paula Moura that “If the 1960s were about breaking 
cultural norms and protesting foreign wars, and the 1990s about railing against globalisation, 
then the 2010s are about a clamour for responsive government, as well as social and 
economic freedom” (Levine 2013).  
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According to Levine, this echoes the work of Samuel Huntington in the 1960s, which aimed 
to define why countries become violent and unstable. Huntington stated that this was due “in 
large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilisation of new groups into 
politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.” In other words, rulers 
fail to keep up with their population’s pace of social, educational and/or economic 
advancement (Levine 2013). Mass movements have been witnessed in Britain, France, 
Sweden and Turkey and have been inspired by causes that include the fall of living standards, 
as well as authoritarian governments and concerns over immigration. However, Brazil does 
not fall into this category, as youth unemployment stands at a record low; in addition, Brazil 
has had the biggest leap in living standards in the country’s history (Beaumont 2013). 
In Turkey, protests were held over the future of a city park in Istanbul, which later led to a 
political confrontation with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the government 
wanted to mow down a historical public park and build a shopping mall in its place. The 
unrest associated with this protest was based on concerns over the reduction of freedom of 
expression by an authoritarian state (Beaumont 2013; Faiola & Moura 2013). Like Brazil, 
Turkey has enjoyed years of swelling economic growth with an expanding middle class. 
Protests started on 28 May 2013 in Istanbul, where the destruction of the park was used as a 
platform to express resentment over the government’s growing restrictions on the media and 
personal freedoms (C.S. Monitor 2013; The Economist 2013:5). 
Bulgaria’s previous government was brought down by public outrage over high electricity 
bills. Thereafter, anger was sparked when the new administration tapped a media tycoon to 
head the national security service; this led to activist Asen Genov posting a Facebook event 
calling for a protest in the nation’s capital (Faiola & Moura 2013). In the Bosnian capital of 
Sarajevo, thousands of residents across ethnic lines went to the streets in June 2013, and 
proceeded to block lawmakers inside parliament for 14 hours in an attempt to protest 
government ineptitude during the clearing of a massive backlog of unregistered new-born 
babies. This was demonstrated by a viral Facebook post concerning a 3-month-old baby 
whose trip to Germany for a lifesaving transplant had been delayed by the backlog (Faiola & 
Moura 2013). 
In Chile, violent protests were sparked by high education costs. In Turkey, it was the 
government’s intention to raze a park in Istanbul. Chinese cities protested regularly about 
sloppy construction, pollution and corruption; furthermore, the most famous protest, the Arab 
Spring, was triggered by Tunisian vendor Mohamed Bouazizi setting himself alight after 
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continuous harassment by government officials (Levine 2013). In recent democracies, Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya, Islamists are on the defensive regarding popular sentiment in favour of 
individual liberties and governments with checks and balances on power. The Arab Spring set 
down those markers for the future of the Middle East. These global protests focus on different 
issues, including corruption, rising prices, sexual violence or the erosion of liberties. 
However, one thing remains constant: people want to fix a broken democracy (C.S. Monitor 
2013). These protests are believed to inspire one another, despite fighting for different 
reasons. For example, the protests in Brazil focused on in this chapter were inspired by the 
protests in Turkey (Faiola & Moura 2013).  
To put this into context, research was conducted for ‘World Protests 2006-2013’ which 
queried over 500 local and international news sources on the internet to analyse 843 protest 
events. These protests were not specified, and included all protests whether violent or non-
violent, organised or spontaneous. The research measured protest events between January 
2006 and July 2013 in 84 countries and over 90 percent of the world population. The aim of 
this study was to document and characterise expressions of protests from before the onset of 
the recent world economic crisis until 2013, and to examine these protests globally, 
regionally and based on country income levels in order to illustrate the main grievances and 
demands of the protesters in an all-encompassing manner, to truly understand what drives 
social unrest (Burke 2014).  
Findings illustrate that outrage and discontent in protests were increasing on a global scale, 
with the leading causes being a collection of complaints related to economic injustice against 
strict policies demanding the reformation of public services and pensions, the creation of 
good jobs, and better labour conditions. Also included were the demand to make tax 
collection and fiscal spending progressive, as well as reducing or elimination inequality, 
alleviating low-living standards, introducing land reform and ensuring affordable food, 
energy and housing. Another noteworthy and more prominent demand is for better political 
representation and, more specifically, a lack of real democracy which is believed, in this 
context, to prevent economic justice (Burke 2014).  
3.6 POST-FIFA CONFEDERATIONS CUP SITUATION 
Many citizens took to the streets to protest the 2013 Confederations Cup, but it was a 
different scenario at the World Cup kick-off. The question now is what happened to the 
demonstrations that threatened to break out when the World Cup began? According to 
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Phillips (2014), Brazilians stated that they are not in favour of the World Cup, but that it was 
not the time to protest; instead, the protests would happen in October during the elections. 
However, this could indicate that the government was effective in quashing the protests. 
Despite this, protests did occur, although these were not attended by hundreds of thousands 
but only hundreds of people. One reason for this is the violence that accompanied the 
protests, scaring off protesters (Phillips 2014).  
It is also believed that protests have dwindled as the protesters began to protest issues that 
were controversial, such as protesters who were victims of police violence in the city’s 
favelas, which alienated the middle class – the most pertinent to protesting social issues. The 
Brazilian government was also quick to disperse the wave of protests and strikes that 
occurred in the build up to the World Cup, while other strikes were suspended, as in the case 
of a subway strike two days before the opening game (Phillips 2014).  
The protests witnessed in 2014 centred around the dissatisfaction with the manner in which 
the government spent money on the World Cup, instead of using the money for social 
services. It is reported by Von et al. (2014) that the government has never spent as much on 
social welfare as in the past decade, with the highest level of expenditure in 2010 going 
towards health care (US$30 billion) and education (US$20 billion). In addition, 
unemployment has reached its lowest rates in 2014 at 5 percent, from 12.2 percent in 2002. 
Furthermore, poverty rates decreased significantly, from 35.73 percent for poverty and 15.16 
percent for extreme poverty in 2003, to a 15.96 percent poverty rate and extreme poverty rate 
of 5.3 percent in 2012. Von et el. (2015) also claim that the amount spent on the World Cup 
was relatively low compared to the total amount of social programme costs.  
According to official data, the total investment in the 2014 FIFA World Cup amounted to 
US$11.3 billion, which came from federal, state and municipal governments in addition to 
private entities, with US$1.76 billion used specifically for the construction of stadiums (Von 
et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the federal investment in stadiums (US$1.76 billion) was 
done by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and reflects only a small percentage of 
the total amount invested by the bank in 2010, which was US$260 billion. The revenue 
generated by the World Cup amounted to US$3.88 billion according to a study by the 
Institute of Economic Research Foundation (FIPE-USP). In this article, Von et al. (2014) 
conclude that the protesters’ concerns are understandable, with any spending on soccer 
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stadiums being too much within this context; however, the protests may have been less about 
the government spending and more about the opportunity this presented to draw attention to 
problems that had little to do with the tournament. In their opinion, the real source of wrath is 
a contracting economy and rising inflation, which are not dependent on the World Cup (Von 
et al. 2014). 
According to Bermingham (2014), FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are 
monopolies which place countries against one another in the drawing of bids that are 
extravagant and inappropriate. China and India faced the same situation when they hosted the 
Olympics and Commonwealth Games, as did Russia during the Winter Olympics; however, 
these nations were able to keep protests at bay with their authoritarianism. FIFA has been 
criticised for its mismanagement of the mega-event, of being corrupt, as well as for being 
responsible for the building of stadiums that are rendered useless after the games. In order to 
address these issues, countries need to decide whether the hosting of the World Cup is a good 
investment by taking into account the effects it has had on host countries in the past 
(Bermingham 2014; Mayer 2014).  
The hosting of such events begs the question of whether they hold any advantages in boosting 
the economy of the host country in terms of net gain. According to Lundy (2013), these 
mega-events are believed to have an unidentified effect on long-term economic growth. The 
economic professor of the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts wrote in the New 
York Times that if the city uses the expectation of a financial windfall as a justification for 
hosting the Olympics, it is sure to be disappointed, based on past experiences in hosting this 
event. It is believed that the assumption of these mega-events leading to a flourish in tourism 
is misleading. This was recorded in the UK in August, when many of the Games’ events were 
held amid a decrease in attendance, at 150,000 people compared to the same month the year 
before. The same phenomenon was witnessed in Beijing, where the Olympic Games were 
believed to have quashed the normal demand for both leisure and business tourism, according 
to a 2010 report from the European Tour Operators Association (Lundy 2013).  
A more positive approach to this concern argues that these mega-events have the distinct 
characteristic of allowing the host country to address much-needed infrastructure projects 
such as improvements to mass transit, as demanded by Brazilian protesters (Lundy 2013). 
In order to address the matters protested in Brazil, significant progress in reforming the 
economic situation of the country is necessary. The Economist (2013) suggests that Brazil 
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should not look to taxpayers for extra money to spend on health care, infrastructure, schools 
or transport (taxes are already taking 36 percent of GDP). Instead, the government should 
reshape public spending, especially with regard to pensions (The Economist 2013).  
Prior to the elections, it was believed that the Brazilian people would no longer face the 
prospect of a default win, as a decline in Rousseff’s popularity awarded an opportunity for 
her political rivals, including former minister Marina de Silva, who launched a new political 
party and became the primary beneficiary of the drop in Rousseff’s approval ratings 
(Montenegro et al. 2013). 
President Rousseff narrowly won re-election on 26 October 2014, with 51.6 percent of the 
vote in her runoff against centrist opposition leader, Aecio Neves, who garnered 48.4 percent 
of the votes, with more than 99 percent of votes tallied. According to Winter and Soto (2014), 
Rousseff won by convincing voters that her party’s record for reducing poverty over the last 
12 years was of greater importance than the recent economic downfall in Brazil. Suffice to 
say, the Workers’ Party has transformed Brazil since 2003, by lifting 40 million people from 
poverty, reducing unemployment to low records, and making progress against hunger in one 
of the most unequal countries in the international community (Winter & Soto 2014). 
As mentioned throughout this chapter, Rousseff has had her fair share of unpopularity, with 
ratings that declined when economic growth dramatically slowed down under her policies, 
which now begs a recall at the robust growth in the last decade. In addition, there have been 
corruption scandals, frustration over inadequate public services and high inflation. These 
concerns have led to many voters leaning towards a more pro-business agenda introduced by 
Neves; however, these changes were stymied by Rousseff, who told her supporters, 
especially the poor, that a vote for Neves would lead to the a return of a less compassionate 
and more unequal Brazil, as experienced during the 1990s (Winter & Soto 2014).  
Despite Rousseff’s win, she faces many challenges, including that she won the election by 
less than 3 percentage points, which illustrates that the country is divided in support for her; 
support is more concentrated in the poorer north and north eastern regions, while the urban 
classes found in Sao Paulo do not support Rousseff. In addition, Congress is more fractured 
and slanted to the right, which will mean having to build new alliances. Furthermore, there is 
the subject of corruption which, in the opinion of Winter and Soto (2014), is growing. This 
has been exhibited in the crisis at Petrobras, the state-run oil firm, which has been associated 
with financial kickbacks to the ruling party and its alliances. Allegations of wrongdoing by 
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Rousseff and former president Da Silva have been prevented through winning an injunction 
which prevented the marketing of the story; however, this has not halted the ongoing 
investigations. Lastly, Rousseff is challenged by the economic state of the country, with 
business confidence dwindling and slowing in China, which has decreased prices of iron and 
soy, as well as weak domestic investment and demand. Added to this was the 6 percent initial 
fall in Brazilian stocks after the election result was confirmed (Watts 2014). 
3.7 CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide contextual background on the protests which 
occurred at the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup as well as the protests that followed at the 
2014 FIFA World Cup. This was done by providing an outline of the civil unrest trend in 
Brazil post-2010. The protests were discussed by observing the run up to the FIFA 
Confederations Cup which took place in the clampdown on cities as well as the increased 
spending and economic policies. Ultimately this chapter serves as an introduction to the case 
study used in this study which is police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. It also illustrated that 
Brazil has suffered a turbulent time in terms of civil unrest and that the underlying causes of 
the protest are worth exploring. Online citizen journalists played a great role during the 
protests and served as a significant source of information in addition to the mainstream 
media. The rest of this research will now observe how online citizen journalists were able to 
provide information outside of the protests in order to understand its value.  
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Findings  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether online citizen journalism holds value in 
the field of political risk analysis, in terms of presenting itself as a source of information in 
compiling political risk reports. The issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 will 
be used as a case study. The research conducted in this study will be presented as a review of 
reports of police brutality from the mainstream media as well as online citizen journalists. 
Thereafter, analysis will be carried out by using the three characteristics of timeliness, 
relevancy and accuracy to conclude whether online citizen journalism holds potential value as 
a medium of information for political risk analysis.  
This chapter will be divided into four sections, with the purpose of establishing the potential 
value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. The first part of this chapter will 
provide insight into the new voice of citizen journalism by looking at the advantages thereof 
and the impact of MídiaNINJA in Brazil. The second part will discuss the issue of police 
brutality in Brazil’s favelas by referring to the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) and 
Amnesty International’s report on police brutality for 2014/15. This part will also elaborate 
on police brutality as a source of risk in the field of political risk analysis, in order to 
understand why citizen journalism may be a valuable medium in the assessment of political 
risk. The third part will categorise the reports on police brutality according to their sources, 
either stemming from mainstream media or online citizen journalists. These reports will be 
reviewed in the fourth part of this chapter, in order to discuss and demonstrate the potential 
value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, according to the characteristics of 
timeliness, relevance and accuracy.  
4.2. THE NEW VOICE OF ONLINE CITIZNE JOURNALISM  
The aim of this section is to provide a brief outline of online citizen journalism in the context 
of Brazil. Initially, this section will list the advantages of online citizen journalism and the 
second part hereof will elaborate on the work of MídiaNINJA, which has pioneered in the 
field through the reporting of protests that took place in Brazil at the 2013 Confederations 
Cup and the 2014 World Cup. This research will also use two other sources of online citizen 
journalism in Brazil, Global Voices, which is in partnership with MídiaNINJA, and 
RioOnWatch. 
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RioOnWatch is an online platform for community reporting launched in May 2010 as the Rio 
Olympics Neighbourhood Watch, with the aim of bringing visibility to the favela community 
in the lead up to the 2016 Olympics. It is a news site that publishes the perspectives of 
community organisers, residents and international observers. In addition, it dialogues with the 
mainstream media and alternative press to prompt a more accurate perspective of the favelas 
and their contribution to the city (RioOnWatch 2015). Global Voices was established in 2005 
and is a volunteer community with more than 800 writers, analysts, online media experts and 
translators. Its aim is to curate, verify and translate trending news and stories that might not 
get as much coverage on the internet (in independent press, social media and blogs) in 167 
countries, translated into over 35 languages (Global Voices 2015).  
4.2.1 The Advantages of Online Citizen Journalism in Political Risk Analysis  
To reiterate Chapter 2, online citizen journalism holds the potential to play a prevailing role 
within the news domain, with the advantage of having ‘eyes on the ground’. It has the ability 
to present news at the moment that it occurs through the use of easily accessible footage. 
Online citizen journalism not only adds to the term ‘breaking news’ through its immediacy 
but allows for the monitoring of democracy through the transformation of the idea of ‘truth 
seeking’ in journalism. This is due to the nature of online citizen journalism approaching the 
truth in a manner that includes involvement and participation as opposed to distance and 
detachment (Maras 2013:195). It also means having the voices of the public heard through 
journalism by moderating and monitoring the sources of information that shape and affect the 
life of the citizen (Jones & Salter 2012:10). Chapter 2 elaborated on how citizen journalism 
promotes political participation by challenging journalists to address those citizens who 
participate in public affairs. This contrasts the idea of citizens receiving the news as 
spectators and, in doing so, helps communities to act upon matters instead of being made 
aware of problems that occur within those communities (Iggers 1998:143). Lastly, Chapter 2 
touched on the idea that citizen journalists are able to offer more information than 
mainstream news and report at a faster rate, as there are no logistical challenges facing citizen 
journalists, who have the distinct characteristic of being present during the breaking of the 
news (Calcutt & Hammond 2011:116; Lewis et al. 2010). This proves significant as it 
demonstrates the extent to which online citizen journalism is timely in the dissemination of 
information; a point that will be further elaborated on in this chapter.  
According to journalist and media professor Sylvia Debossan Moretzsohn, the MídiaNINJA 
(Ninja) journalists are already introducing change in the Brazilian media landscape by filling 
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a hole, especially through their street feature, which documents reality (Krieger 2013). In 
addition, they address aspects that are not part of the traditional media’s coverage or which 
are only covered to a minimal extent, as traditional media is held hostage by official sources 
and press offices. According to Krieger (2013), sociologist Venecio de Lima believes that 
Ninja’s reach has been exaggerated. This is based on the estimate given by members of the 
group, who state that they had the participation of hundreds of thousands of people at the 
pinnacle of the protests. De Lima further states that he does not know how these calculations 
were done, but that this number should be put into the context of Brazil, which has a 
population of 203 million people (Worldometers 2015) and that it is imperative that groups 
like Ninja take a more distanced approach to reporting, as it is problematic if they are the 
protagonists of their own stories and should therefore edit their reports in order to allow 
people to understand them (Krieger 2013). 
However, online citizen journalism has created a niche which has sparked the interest of 
international news media. Citizen journalists in Brazil report on injustices in Rio de Janeiro in 
addition, international media aligning with citizen journalists, especially at the time of the 
hosting of mega-events such as the 2014 World Cup, which are perceived to impose on the 
rights of the citizens of Brazil (RioOnWatch 2014).  
4.2.2 MídiaNINJA 
MídiaNINJA is translated as ‘media independent narratives, journalism and action’ in 
Portuguese and was established in 2011 to address news that often failed to challenge the 
official story. Through the use of mobile phones and social media to live-stream events as 
they happened, MídiaNINJA was able to provide extensive reporting on the protests that 
occurred during the 2013 Confederations Cup and the 2014 World Cup. They were also able 
to report on social issues and sectors of the population that are usually ignored by the 
mainstream media. The content they reproduce comes in different formats, including live-
streaming, photography, mini-documents and articles through social media (King 2014; 
Deutsche Welle 2015; Davis 2015).  
MídiaNINJA is therefore an activist network that aims to bring together collaborators from 
Brazil and abroad through the coverage of a range of issues, from the struggles of the 
indigenous Amazonian tribes to the forced evictions of favelas in urban centres. The network 
has the distinct characteristic of mobilising a new generation of media activists and 
journalists through a platform that democratises publication of information. It partnered with 
the global news platform Oximity to present a news network that expands the limits of 
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journalism and eases sustainability for this new paradigm of journalism by making provision 
for donations to be given and received, as well as for the coverage of events, media, activism 
and the distributing of text, images and videos (MídiaNINJA 2014).  
When the police attempted to frame a protestor for throwing a Molotov cocktail, traditional 
media agencies such as O Globo reported the allegation as it was presented. However, Ninja 
sent out a call for footage of the incident, which proved that the weapon was not thrown by a 
protester by a plain-clothes police officer. Rafael Vilela, a reporter for Ninja, stated that the 
coverage of the protests exposed the failings of Brazil’s corporate media. Vilela went on to 
say that he thinks there are exceptional people in the mainstream media and that they are not 
the problem; rather, the problem lies in the structure in which they work. He further stated 
that Ninja is a response to the crisis of industrial journalism, which cannot cope with 
information that is totally free and cannot be controlled as before. He stated that, ultimately, 
the free media movement illustrates that there are alternative views in the world (King 2014). 
Vilela also stated that media is a big business in Brazil, with only 7 families owning most of 
the country’s newspapers, television channels and radio stations, which they use to attack the 
progressive social policies of the country’s left-of-centre government. This ultimately leads to 
a polarisation between conservative media and the state, creating a desperate need for less 
partisan voices to represent the perspectives of the ordinary Brazilian. Vilela asserted that the 
intention of Ninja was never to compete with mainstream media, but to fill this space through 
the empowering of people to build a form of popular communication. Ninja is not a building 
of mass media but a media of the masses and therefore is not about one source talking to the 
population but the communication of the masses through the participation of alternative 
perspectives not presented in mainstream media. This approach demonstrated the value of 
online citizen journalism during the protests as well as the potential value this could have in 
political risk analysis. Vilela mentioned that while the traditional media outlets struggled to 
cover the demonstrations, Ninja’s network of thousands of contributors relayed information 
through social media networks which could subsequently be broadcasted nationally and 
internationally (King 2014; Bainbridge 2014; Deutsche Welle 2015).  
In an attempt to bridge the gap between citizen journalism and the mainstream media, Bruno 
Garcez of the ICFJ (International Centre for Journalists) is helping Brazil’s top media outlets 
to include multimedia reports from citizen journalists on various news issues, in order to 
report from a different perspective; that of the citizen. He is partnering with ABRAJI 
(Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo), which is a leading investigative 
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journalism association, as well as the daily Folha de São Paulo to incorporate reports that 
have been written by trained citizen journalists (ICFJ 2015). 
Although this movement requires recognition, it does have a limitation in financing its 
geographically dispersed citizen journalists and the burden that comes with having to 
maintain both the financial and human resources in order to continue to exist. Ninja has 
experienced problems with fundraising and the responsibility of maintaining a nationwide 
network while competing with other news sites that use social media formats and platforms. 
Although the group consists of unpaid volunteers, it does have a board of directors 
responsible for maintaining equipment, aiding travelling costs for training, paying for data 
storage and providing legal fees for arrested members (Davis 2015).  
A seminar was hosted on 28 August 2014 in Complexo da Maréto to launch the official 
publication of the Right to Communication and Racial Justice Project. This project was aimed 
at promoting community access to media production, in order to increase the recognition of 
the relationship between institutional racism and the violence experienced by Afro-
Brazilians, especially those who reside in favelas. This project mapped 118 alternative or 
community-based media sources in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area between 2013 and 
2014, with the aim of producing a report on their ability to fight racism. This report 
comprises case studies of media outlets, academic essays on race and gender, as well as the 
sustainability of community initiatives (Ed Bentsi-Enchill 2014). 
Another objective of this project is to increase the depth of the 2011 Media in Favelas 
project, which tracks community reporting in the city. In the 2010 census, 47.7 percent of 
Brazil’s population identified themselves as white and 50.7 percent as black or brown. In the 
favela communities, only 30 percent of residents are white and 68.3 percent are black. It has 
been noted that while the homicide rates amongst white males have been declining for years, 
the opposite is observed for young black males, as rates increased from 30 to 35.9 murders 
per 100,000 people (in 2010), meaning that a black male was more than twice as likely to be 
murdered as a white male. The Favela Observatory stated that mainstream media’s lack of 
focus on violence affecting Afro-descent communities is part of a process that marginalised 
the lives of black people. In the US, the murder of Michael Brown in 2014 forced the 
government to confront race relations; however, in Brazil and according to Bentsi-Enchill 
(2014), the issue of lethal police brutality passes without consequence. As such, despite 
protests, the systems of institutional racism and media obstinacy continue.  
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The media was criticised at this seminar due to its ignorance on the issue and how this in turn 
reduces the issue’s importance for decision-makers and the general public. Furthermore, it is 
believed to indicate that violence against black people is an accepted norm, which is reflected 
in favelas through unjust and brutal policing which violates the rights of people through 
impunity. As a whole, the Right to Communication and Racial Justice Project is working to 
strengthen community voices, with the aim of producing and disseminating counter-
narratives from other points of view. The publication included MídiaNinja as a case study for 
online activism. According to the Favela Observatory, MídiaNinja represents a 
transformation of the model of authorship that has allowed for a balance in the receiving and 
sharing of large volumes of information (Bentsi-Enchill 2014). This proves valuable to the 
field of political risk analysis, as it introduces news that provides context and insight into 
issues in Brazil that may be underlying causes of political risk.  
4.3 POLICE BRUTALITY IN FAVELAS  
This section will elaborate on the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. In order to 
understand this concern, this section will present the 2014-2015 report by Amnesty 
International. It should be noted that this report covers many human rights abuses; however, 
for the purpose of this research, only the topic of police brutality will be examined. This 
section will also present research on Brazil’s Police Pacifying Unit (UPPs) from both the 
perspective of online citizen journalists and mainstream media.  
4.3.1 Police Pacification Unit (UPP) 
The inauguration of the UPP took place in 2008 and 2013. It is believed that the police had 
been insufficiently trained for the role but that, in general, they performed their duties 
professionally. However, there were a few reported counts of corruption and violence 
(Ashcroft 2014; Sorboe 2014). Despite recent criticism, there have been positive aspects of 
the UPPs, predominantly in the smaller favelas. The most noteworthy contribution was the 
reduction in the rate of lethal violence within the favelas. It has been reported that the 
homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro has almost halved since 2005 (from 42 incidents per 100,000 
inhabitants to 24) in addition to the decrease in police killings from 1,330 in 2007 to 415 in 
2012. The most significant impact of the UPP in terms of political risk was the gradual 
lowering of lethal violence and the use of guns, in order to provide an opportunity for favela 
communities to function without drug gang violence being the dominant feature of social 
control (Ashcroft 2014). 
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The implementation of the UPP also included opening spaces for public services, 
organisations, civil actors and businesses, which was not previously possible as there was no 
opportunity or infrastructure. However, despite these positive changes and objectives for the 
programme, it took one incident to turn scepticism into complete distrust; the murder of 
Amarildo dos Santos in 2013 when he was detained by the UPP in Rocinha. While there have 
been many cases of police brutality over the last 25 years, the philosophy that accompanied 
the installation of the UPPs in conjunction with resident reports through the use of social 
media meant that incidents in the favelas sparked outrage both nationally and globally 
(Ashcroft 2014).  
The increasing number of protests against the UPP has demonstrated that, as an institution, 
the police have not changed despite the fact that community policing involves 
communication with the community. The demonstrations centred on the majority of UPP 
officers’ activity in detaining and stopping suspects, accompanied by breaking down doors 
and entering houses without warning or warrant, as well as the assault of suspects (Sorboe 
2014). It is perceived that the UPPs have failed to combat the deeper social problems faced in 
the favelas. 
The programme initially intended to incorporate the UPP Social, which aimed to provide both 
social and economic integration in communities by creating forums to bolster community 
discussion and stimulate leisure and cultural activities by providing professional training 
programmes for youths in favelas. In reality, however, they have had little impact, which 
leaves the impression that it is merely a policing programme (Ashcroft 2014).  
The underlying problem with this programme is that it is based on a weakened foundational 
structure. This foundation takes form as the deep-rooted tension between the police and the 
favela communities. In theory, the UPP was meant to be a programme with the potential for 
positive impact; however, according to Ashcroft (2014), this positivity is hampered by the 
fact that the UPPs are paying for the decades of neglect that came before their 
implementation. There was also a great deal of reluctance due to the fact that the same 
institution killed 1,330 people in Rio de Janeiro in 2007. The question is now whether the 
same programme could suddenly transform its philosophy and expect acceptance from the 
people. Although it is believed to create a positive and peaceful impact, it retains the same 
war-like tactics that were developed by the police force in the last 50 years, which disregard 
human rights to such an extent that the force earned a reputation as one of the most brutal 
forces in the world (Ashcroft 2014). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 65 
 
According to Italiani and Filho (2014), the lack of attention to the calls of the population was 
the main complaint against the civil and military police. This was evident in data released on 
25 April 2014 by the Police Ombudsman of the State of São Paulo, which stated that of the 
11,080 complaints made in 2013, 22.9 percent related to policing applications in both police 
stations and military police battalions. Second to this were complaints against poor quality of 
service (16.65 percent), followed by a lack of policing drug trafficking sites (12.73 percent) 
which was predominately pointed against the Civil Police, who have the duty of investigating 
trafficking but would not go to those locations where narcotics were being sold (Italiani & 
Filho 2014). 
Misconduct is a pressing issue among the troops operating in the favelas; this has led to the 
increasing weariness of the residents. This is most pressing in Complexo do Alemão and 
Complexo da Penha, where 8 of the 39 UPPs are located. The army’s occupation in an effort 
to ‘cleanse’ the territory to be taken over by state troops amounted to nothing, as drug 
traffickers launched attacks that included the deaths of several UPP officers. However, the 
UPP managed to reduce homicide rates through retaking certain areas. This led to the 
withdrawing of traffickers. According to Barros (2014), the UPPs were a smart response on 
the part of the government, although they may have an expiration date if not accompanied by 
social investments. However, in some areas there have been new social implementations in 
the form of schools, community learning centres, clinics, and housing programmes. This begs 
the question of what went wrong with the UPPs. According to Barros (2014), the UPP was a 
good solution but it imposed a top-down approach and was laden with marketing gimmicks, 
without considering the role of democracy and permanent dialogue with citizens. 
The wave of violence in March 2014 occurred as a result of police occupation of the Vila 
Kennedy favela, which sparked international concern over the contradictions in the 
pacification programme24. According to Canofre (2014), the pacification programme is 
questioned within the police due to the murders of four agents in favelas in 2014. A 
collaborator with Global Voices, Danillo Ferreira, stated on police blog Police Approach that 
neither the police nor the communities are able to see an alignment between what the 
                                                 
 
 
24 It was reported in the daily Spanish newspaper, El País, that Rio de Janeiro found itself at a worrying 
crossroads where a choice had to be made between maintaining the security policy which was questionable or to 
re-adopt the old and failed strategy of destroying drug traffickers (Canofre 2014).   
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government claims through propaganda and the reality of what they experience. He added 
that the pressure of the World Cup25 and the Olympics will lead to the government 
maintaining the financing of the UPP policy as an emergency measure in an effort to contain 
the favelas until 2016.  
4.3.2 Report by Amnesty International on Police Brutality in Brazil  
The Amnesty International report for Brazil includes human rights abuses between 2014 and 
2015. It states that serious human rights violations are continuously reported, including the 
killings of Brazilians by police, as well as the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. In 
particular, young black residents of favelas, rural workers and indigenous peoples are at risk 
of human rights violations. Public security remained the context for widespread human rights 
violations. Official statistics indicate that 424 people were killed by police in Rio de Janeiro 
State during police operations in 2013. In the first six months of 2014, there was an increase 
in the number of these deaths, with 285 people killed by police; this is 37 percent higher than 
the same period in 2013 (Amnesty International Report 2014/15). 
Secretary General of Amnesty International, Salil Shetty, demanded an end to police 
impunity and a greater consistency in the protection of human rights in both the favelas and 
the indigenous communities of Mato Grosso do Sul, which he states are weak zones of 
human rights, terming these war zones in which human rights are suspended. Shetty stated 
that the country needs to reform the police system and requires a database with cohesive 
information, as well as a unified police force, which helps people instead of harming them, 
and proper police training and judicial reform. It is stated that police officers who distrust the 
judicial system or view it as corrupt are more likely to take matters into their own hands 
(Dias Carneiro 2014; Insight Crime 2014). 
Shetty further stated that Brazil has one of the highest rates of violent homicide in the world, 
with a significant proportion (close to 20 percent) committed by the police, meaning that the 
main issue is police impunity. It was reported that more than 11,000 people were killed 
between 2009 and 2013 by the police (Buchanan 2014; Tomlinson 2014). Shetty mentioned 
that the most significant problem with combating police impunity is that it is the police who 
conduct the investigations. Residents are scared and thus do not complain; however, when 
                                                 
 
 
25 The 2014 World Cup had already occurred at the writing of the paper.  
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they do, no investigation is undertaken. Furthermore, in the event of an investigation, no one 
is condemned (Dias Carneiro 2014).  
4.3.3 Linking Police Brutality to Political Risk Analysis  
This research has used Brazil as a case study to observe the potential value of online citizen 
journalism in political risk analysis and thus whether reporting by online citizen journalists 
proves valuable as a source of information in the writing of political risk reports. Although 
this study has provided information in regard to the benefits of online citizen journalism, it is 
essential to provide a more detailed analysis in order to succinctly examine the potential 
value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis.  
This section observes police brutality as a risk factor; within this study, risk is defined as a 
force that constitutes a negative outcome to another party and is therefore viewed as 
potentially harmful. In addition, it stems from political behaviour (McKellar 2010:3). Risk is 
considered a political risk if it stems from a branch of authority found within the structure of 
the state, thus the division of authority that has the function of protecting the state and the 
citizens therein. Political risk is also defined as actions by the government that are perceived 
to be an interference which brings forth unwanted consequences. This definition takes into 
account decisions made by the government but includes the significance of political events 
which range from a change in government to protests and riots such as those exhibited in 
Brazil (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). Risk within the realm of political risk analysis – as mentioned 
in Chapter 2 – understands the different manners in which risk acts as an obstruction between 
the possibility of a risk and the strategies and plans implemented to maintain a reasonable 
level of risk (Brink 2004:18).  
Although this chapter will observe the potential value of online citizen journalism in political 
risk analysis, it is essential to understand the context of police brutality as a case study in 
political risk analysis. In the case study of Brazil, the implementation of the UPP programme 
in favelas is not necessarily interference by the government as its function was to restore 
order and security to these communities. However, the increase in cases of police brutality in 
conjunction with a lack of action on the part of the government constitutes a political risk. 
The accumulation of information about this matter is pertinent to political risk analysis. It is 
with this understanding that the value of online citizen journalism is researched, in order to 
facilitate the political analyst.  
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In broad terms police brutality is defined as a civil rights violation that occurs when a police 
officer acts with unlawful excessive force (that being more than what is necessary) against a 
civilian or suspect, thereby violating the rights of the individual (US Legal 2015; Grobler 
2005:111). According to the US definition of police brutality, in the event that force is used 
between an officer and a civilian, only a minimum amount is required to achieve a legitimate 
purpose, despite the general broad levels of power that police officers possess (US Legal 
2015; FindLaw 2015). The state has the primary responsibility, according to civil law, to 
protect citizens from abuses by the government; this includes police misconduct. Claims 
against police officers in this regard include false arrests (or false imprisonment), malicious 
prosecution and use of excessive or unreasonable force (FindLaw 2015). These claims have 
been documented in the reports of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas.  
Police brutality is a security issue within a state that has the potential to greatly impact on the 
level of political risk. It is therefore a relevant topic that can be analysed by political risk 
analysts, as police brutality is associated with other factors that may impact on the level of a 
state’s political risk. These factors include an overall increase in the levels of crime, political 
instability and corruption. The outcome of political risk within the context of this study, is 
towards the security and sustainability of investments. When considering the weight placed 
on police brutality in the overall understanding of this outcome, it is evident that the increase 
in the level of crime, corruption and instability would be detrimental to an investment. 
However, it should be noted that the weight of this risk is subject to the type of investment 
made in the country presenting this risk factor. Thus the weight of this risk is most evident in 
an investment which will be greatly affected by the repercussions of violence as an outcome 
of police brutality, corruption and an increase in violence.  
In terms of violence, Brazil demonstrates high levels of crime and drug trafficking, which 
have been further exacerbated through the implementation of the UPP programme (Wattsin 
2013). Police brutality within this instance also presents a political risk as it is associated with 
an act by the government in the social system of the state (Kobrin 1976:4). In this instance, 
the government implemented the UPP programme with the aim of providing protection in the 
favelas by eradicating drug traffickers and introducing social programmes in order to address 
socio-economic injustices through health care and educational projects. However, the 
repercussions of the demise of the programme as an institution of security present it as a 
political risk. 
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Political instability within this study is defined as the outcome of an unexpected change 
within a state that presents an internal as well as external risk (Brink 2004:19). Despite the 
presence of political instability as a result of the government’s decision to implement the UPP 
programme in the run up to the 2014 World Cup, this action was initially meant to introduce 
positive change. However, it is now considered a risk as it is associated with negative 
repercussions on the citizens of the state, which is an internal risk. Citizens went so far as to 
state that the implementation of the UPP programme has turned the favelas into ‘war zones’ 
between the police and drug traffickers, as well as between police and civilians. Political 
instability is also witnessed in the increase in protests and demonstrations held by residents of 
favelas, which was accompanied by violence between residents and the police. The high 
levels of crime associated with police brutality also presented an external risk, as the 2014 
World Cup led to an increase in tourism in Brazil. 
Lastly, corruption is associated with police brutality as it has been reported that UPP officers 
act with impunity not only in the violation of residents’ civil rights through the use of 
violence, but through underhanded and illegal dealings with drug traffickers. The Mollen 
Commission (1994:47) states that police brutality does not always occur together with corrupt 
acts, but usually occurs to show power and force the community to respect the police venting 
frustrations and anger out of fear or hostility towards an individual or a community that the 
individual represents (Grobler 2005: 112). 
According to Syed (1997) police corruption is a term with a connotation of ‘moral 
perversion’ or ‘depravity’ and thus stems from a moral view, which leads to an inadequate 
understanding of the problem and ignorance thereof26. Police corruption within this case 
refers to any illegal conduct, or misconduct, that involves the use of occupational power for 
personal, group or organisational gain (Syed 1997). Such conduct, as demonstrated by the 
case study of Brazil27, relates to the investigation of cases and the securing of evidence 
through lying (perjury) with regard to circumstances surrounding arrests, or the tampering of 
evidence with the purpose of securing convictions. This will be further illustrated in the 
reports of police brutality by mainstream media and online citizen journalism. Kickbacks are 
another form of corruption that are evident in this case study, as witness accounts stated that 
                                                 
 
 
26 This is on account of acts of corruption being debatable, as people’s moral views differ.  
27 This will be further demonstrated in the following section.  
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UPP officers have gained the reputation of occasionally working alongside drug traffickers to 
secure additional means of income. In this case, drug traffickers are able to avoid law 
enforcement to run their operations more effectively, which has the potential to make drug 
traffickers more powerful than the state which, in turn, increases the level of instability as the 
government loses its power to enforce the law (Syed 1997; Grobler 2005:93, 96).  
Corruption not only increases the level of political risk on a tangible scale, but runs the risk of 
decreasing the morale of police officers. This has a negative impact on the organisational 
culture of the police and hampers the relationships and levels of trust between citizens and 
the police force, as the latter gains a negative reputation within communities. This in itself 
presents a political risk, as it has the potential to lead to dissatisfaction with the government, 
which implemented the programme, as well as an increase in riots and protests as witnessed 
in Brazil (Syed 1997). When taking into account the definition of politics as stated in Chapter 
2, Lasswell et al. (1950) state that its function lies within the terms of power or authority that 
are exercised within relationships in society; these relationships refer to those between 
citizens and the government or rulers. Police brutality is a violation of power in the 
relationship between the authority of the police and the citizens of the state. If this issue is not 
identified by risk analysts in order to address it, it has the potential to further erode the 
authority of the government, which has the responsibility of presiding over all sectors of the 
state.  
This brief overview indicates that police brutality presents a political risk to a state. It is also 
associated with other risks which have the ability to impact on the level of risk a state 
demonstrates. As mentioned in Chapter 2, political risk analysts accumulate a broad 
framework of information when conducting political risk reports in order to take all factors 
and political events into consideration before presenting a final analysis of political risk for a 
state. The following two sections will present news reports from both mainstream media and 
online citizen journalists in order to observe the potential value of online citizen journalism as 
a medium for information in the compiling of risk reports in political risk analysis.  
4.4 REPORTS ON POLICE BRUTALITY BY THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND 
ONLINE CITIZEN JOURNALISTS: THE RESEARCH PROCESS  
Before delving into the findings of these two sources of media, it is essential to understand 
the research process that was undertaken when collecting reports of police brutality in Brazil. 
The first step in the process included a general search of online news agencies found in Brazil 
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as well as online citizen journalism sites. This was made possible through various websites 
that listed the online news agencies in the different areas of Brazil. When visiting these sites, 
a general search was conducted with the following key words and terms: UPP violence; UPP, 
the Pacifying Police Unit, Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, police brutality favelas, police 
brutality slums, police violence, and slums. The reports were then collected. The majority of 
the mainstream media sites and some of the online citizen journalism sites were in 
Portuguese, which led to a search of these terms in the translated version of the site in 
English. These key terms were also translated into Portuguese and searched on Portuguese 
sites before the results were translated into English. In total, 39 Portuguese articles were 
translated into English through the online program Google Translate.  
The reports that were available in both categories of websites for police brutality were then 
listed according to the name of the victim. The fact that more information was provided by 
online citizen journalist sites made it possible to accumulate a list of victims. However, there 
were cases of police brutality that were reported by mainstream media and not by online 
citizen journalist during the phase of the general search, as mentioned above. The names of 
the victims found in both mainstream media and online citizen journalism were then searched 
on all the websites found. The aim of this research process was to do an extensive search to 
list reports on police brutality within the specific timeframe of 2014 and within a specific list 
of sources, in order to study the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk 
analysis.  
4.4.1 Brazil Mainstream Media: Reporting on Police Brutality in Favelas  
This section will elaborate on the reporting of police brutality in 2014 by Brazil’s mainstream 
media. In order to conclude whether online citizen journalism is valuable to the field of 
political risk analysis, it is pertinent to take into consideration whether the information differs 
from that which was reported by citizen journalists. The reports presented within this section 
have been collected from Brazil’s most prominent media sources as well as additional news 
sites. The prominent news sites used for this section include: Agência Brasil, Folha, the 
Folha Blog, O Globo, A Tarde, Rio Times Online, O Dia and Brasilpost.28 The table below 
                                                 
 
 
28Agência estadão is one of Brazil’s main news sites, but requires a paid subscription and thus could not be 
included in this study; however, a tarde is affiliated with Agência Estadão. 
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demonstrates the reports of police brutality conducted by journalists from mainstream media, 
which will be explained in greater detail later in this section.  
Date Name of Victim Fatalities and Injuries Location 
16 March  Claudia Silva Ferreira Death, shot to the chest  Morro da Congonha  
Rio De Janeiro 
22 April  Douglas Rafael da 
Silva Pereira (DG) 
Death, assaulted and shot Pavão-pavãozinho 
Rio De Janeiro 
22 April/ 23 April   Edilson da Silva Dos 
Santos 
Death, shot to the head  Pavão-pavãozinho 
Rio De Janeiro 
22 April  30 y/o unnamed man Death, shot - 
22 April  Matthew 
12 y/o or 13 y/o boy 
Death, shot to the head Pavão-pavãozinho 
Rio De Janeiro 
14 May  Jonathan de Oliveiro 
de Lima 
Death, shot to the back  Barrinha,  
São Paulo 
June  Afonso Mauricio 
Linhares 
Death, shot Manguinhos 
Rio De Janeiro 
16 July  Maria Victoria Souza 
Santos 
Death, shot Amargosa, 
Bahia 
27 July  Antônio França Death, shot to the chest Complexo do 
Alemão 
Rio De Janeiro 
27 July  Izaquel Nogueira Injured, shot; bullet 
grazed the eye 
Complexo do 
Alemão 
Rio De Janeiro 




Rio De Janeiro 
Figure 1: Reports of Police Brutality Incidents in 2014 by the Mainstream Media29(Mainstream Media 
Sources 2014).  
4.4.1.1 Claudia Silva Ferreira30 
The first case of police brutality in 2014 was the death of Claudia Silva Ferreira, who was 
shot on 16 March 2014 in Morro da Congonha. The only witness present at the time – a 
neighbour – stated that her body was abandoned in the street for over half an hour and that 
the military police were responsible for her death, having shot her from a distance of less than 
3 metres. The witness said that she was behind the police officers, who were walking quietly 
until they met Claudia and must have assumed that she was a bandit; they fired 6 shots. The 
witness further stated that she rushed home after the shots but came out 10 minutes later to 
find Claudia’s dead body. Half an hour later, the same police officers returned. Silva 
                                                 
 
 
29 The blank spaces indicate information that was not provided in the reports. 
30 Due to the volume of information, subsections will be provided according to reports that made news 
headlines. 
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Ferreira’s body was dragged for 350 metres along Avenida Intendente Magalhães, secured by 
a piece of clothing (Cruz & Cunha 2014; Heringer 2014). Reports state that the 3 policemen 
were released on 28 March 2014 by a court decision (Fernandes 2014; O Dia 2014).  
Other news reports indicate that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged by a police car for 250 
metres (Borges 2014; Savoy et al. 2014). The police officers responsible for dragging her 
body justified their actions by stating that favela residents surrounded the vehicle in a hostile 
manner (Cruz & Cunha 2014). Taís da Silva, one of Claudia’s 4 children, stated that the 
police took his mother like a dog. Images of the victim being dragged were released by the 
newspaper ‘Extra’31 and were instrumental in the arrests of the police officers on 17 March 
2014. These images illustrate that the police officers had known that the victim’s body was 
being dragged as they tried to drive over a sidewalk. The arrested police officers were Adir 
Serrano Machado, Rodney Miguel Archanjo and Sergeant Alex Sandro da Silva Alves 
(R7.com 2014). The autopsy done on Silva Ferreira’s body indicated that she had died of a 
shot to the chest, which caused heart and lung injuries. Several other injuries were identified 
as a result of her body being dragged by the police car (Savoy et al. 2014; O Dia 2014; Cruz 
& Cunha 2014; Borges 2014). 
Different accounts of the story have been presented by the community32, relatives of Silva 
Ferreira, as well as the testimonies of the police officers involved. The police officers claimed 
that they could not open the back door of the car, which led to the placement of the body in 
the trunk of the car. They further claimed to have placed the body in the car after the 
community had dispersed. Lawyer to one of the officers, Mark Espinola, stated that Silva 
Ferreira’s body was not placed in the back seat of the car as the seat was filled with weapons. 
The military police reported that the body was put in the trunk in order to leave the site 
quickly; however, residents claim that the car had been stationary for half an hour with the 
body in it. The police officers also testified that they had not seen the trunk open, although 
investigators stated that the noise caused by the trunk opening would have notified them, in 
addition to drivers on the road warning the police officers of it being open. The police 
officers stated that they had stopped to put Claudia’s body back in the trunk (Savoy et al. 
2014; Heringer 2014).  
                                                 
 
 
31 This refers to Globo Extra. 
32Which witnessed the incident. 
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Silva Ferreira’s case was sent to the Military Court. The 3 police officers were arrested under 
Article 324 of the Military Criminal Code. However, the crime had to be specified, requiring 
research to identify whether Silva Ferreira was alive at the time that her body was placed in 
the trunk of the car33. Thus, if she showed any vital signs, it would be considered a crime; had 
she been dead, no crime would have been committed. However, the officers would face 
procedural fraud for the dragging of her body (O Dia 2014; Cruz & Cunha 2014). Husband of 
Claudia Ferreira da Silva, Alexandre Fernandes da Silva, questioned the acts of the military 
police when they claimed to help his wife after she had been shot. More specifically, he asked 
why they took the Intendente Magalhães highway, as this is not the closest road leading to the 
Carlos Chagas Hospital in Marechal Hermes (O Dia 2014; Magalhaes 2014).    
On 17 March 2014 a protest was held in a favela in Rio de Janeiro over the murder of Claudia 
Silva Ferreira a day prior. Julio Cesar Silva Pereira, the victim’s brother, accused the police 
officers of her death and stated that the police had claimed she was a drug dealer and armed, 
when in reality all she had had in her possession was 3 notes of reais and a cup of coffee. At 
the time of the incident, she had gone out to buy bread (Savoy et al. 2014; O Dia 2014; 
Modena 2014). The protest took place after her burial and led to Congonha residents closing 
the Minister Edgard Romero Avenue (Magalhaes 2014; R7 2014).  
4.4.1.2 Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG) and Edilson da Silva dos Santos 
Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira’s body was found within the walls of a public school on 22 
April 2014 in Pavão-pavãozinho, a neighbourhood between Copacabana and Ipanema in Rio 
de Janeiro’s South Zone; there were signs that he had been beaten to death (Virgilio 2014; 
Iraheta 2014). According to the UPP press office, his body had no wounds caused by bullets; 
however, a report released by the Forensic Institute indicated that he had died after his lung 
had been pierced and was described as being ‘intensely haemorrhaged due to a wound in the 
chest’ (Noticias UOL; Virgilio 2014). Initially the police had stated that the death could be 
related to a fall, but a report later indicated that Douglas had been shot (Noticias UOL). His 
mother, Maria de Fatima da Silva, declared that she believed he was tortured by the police 
before he died, as residents had said they heard screams (Silveira 2014; Pragmatismo Politico 
                                                 
 
 
33This is based on the law which makes no provision for personal injury against a corpse (Cruz & Cunha 2014). 
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2014). DG’s death was honoured on Globo Television’s Esquenta by Regina Casé, where he 
used to dance (Amorim 2014; Silveira 2014).  
DG’s mother stated that his body was found with an injury to the head, a cut on the right 
eyebrow, marks on the back and a bruised nose, without any documents. He was also found 
in a position which suggested that he had been fighting. His identity document and passport 
appeared at Precinct 13 and were as wet as his body was when it was found. According to 
Maria de Fátima, 2 years previously when DG was working as a taxi driver, his vehicle was 
seized by the military police and his tank was filled by the military police with sand. Days 
later, his bike was stolen. According to a resident, it was taken in a truck by UPP officers 
(Pragmatismo Politico 2014). According to Noticias UOL (2014) the military police assaulted 
DG and tried to hide his body when he was identified as the dancer from O Globo.  
On 23 April 2014, the General Commander of the UPP, Colonel Frederico Caldas, told 
GloboNews that the dynamics of the death were not yet clear from the completion of the 
autopsy and the testimony of the police officers. He stated that the police had received a 
complaint from the area and that there was a barricade 50 metres from the location. When the 
police approached, there was an exchange of gunfire. Three police officers testified but it 
remains unclear if they were told where Pereira’s body was located or if they saw the fallen 
man on the ground. According to Caldas, the police officers waited for the director of the 
school to enter, after which they removed the body (Thaise 2014). Amnesty International 
issued a statement on Thursday 24 April 2014 requesting a full investigation into the deaths 
of DG and Edilson da Silva Dos Santos, who was killed on 22 April 201434 by a bullet to the 
head during protests over the death of DG (Platonow 2014). At a peaceful protest on 27 April 
2014 over the death of DG and Edilson da Silva dos Santos, activist Deise Carvalho stated 
that DG had been faced with threats since 2011 and that his bike was stolen and later 
recognised in the possession of the UPP. She also mentioned that DG had told her that he was 
being threatened by police officers (Amorim 2014; Silveira 2014; Kudialis 2014). 
4.4.1.3 Other Reports of Deaths by Police Brutality  
On the day of DG’s death on 22 April 2014, a protest was held by the residents of Peacock 
Pavãozinho, resulting in the shooting of 2 people. The arrival of the UPPs led to the shooting 
                                                 
 
 
34 Other reports indicate that he was killed at a protest on 23 April (Kudialis 2014). 
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of a 30-year-old man who was found dead in a soccer field in the favelas as well as a 13-year-
old boy identified as Matthew, who was shot in the head (Pragmatismo Politico 2014; 
Noticias UOL; 2014; Virgilio 2014). Platanow (2014) reported that the boy was 12 years old 
and, according to witnesses, had his hands in the air when he was shot. 
Jonathan de Oliveiro de Lima35, a 19-year-old boy from Manguinhos, was shot on 14 May 
2014 in a confrontation with UPPs (Kudialis 2014). According to Jonathan’s mother, Ana 
Paula de Oliveira, police accused him of trying to shoot them. He was killed during a police 
operation when officers were patrolling the Barrinho locale and were confronted with armed 
criminals. Jonathan’s aunt stated that he had just left home when there was confusion in the 
community, which led to the shooting. Jonathan was shot in the back (Filho 2014). In 
addition, 25-year-old Afonso Mauricio Linhares died in the Manguinhos community in June 
2014 when he was shot by police after being mistaken for a drug trafficker (Thayná 2014). 
On 16 July 2014, baby Maria Victoria Souza Santos was hit by a bullet during a police 
operation conducted by two officers in Amargosa. According to the victim’s family, the 
police arrived already shooting and raided the house searching for a suspect. Maria was taken 
to the hospital by the police despite protests by the mother; the baby was dead by the time 
they arrived. Family members stated that the police had been using narcotics, as one of their 
noses showed signs of white powder and it was a known fact that police officers use drugs 
(Rodrigues 2014). 
On 5 August 2014, 21-year-old Jorge Ruan Vianna stated at a protest on 22 August 2014 that 
he had been shot in the shoulder by UPP police in Complexo do Alemão and attributed this 
incident to racism-related violence in favelas. He added that he is a waiter and has no 
affiliation with the favela’s drug trafficking units. He declared in his interview with O Globo 
that the police mistook him for a trafficker and that the situation needs to change, as not all 
black youths in favelas sell drugs. Other residents fear that the continued police-drug traffic 
struggle will encourage future prejudice-based attacks. In an interview with The Rio Times, 
local resident Robson Miranda stated that this gives the police more leeway to kill people, as 
there is a strong prejudice against black youths and the innocent are often wrongly persecuted 
(Kudialis 2014). 
                                                 
 
 
35 Other reports record his full name as Jonathan de Oliveiro Silva.  
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Mainstream news agency O Dia (2014) reported the death of 60-year-old Antônio França on 
27 July 2014 after he was shot in the chest in Complexo do Alemão. The victim had left for 
work when the incident occurred. Freire (2014) reported in O Dia that 15-year-old Izaquel 
Nogueira was shot on 27 July 2014 in Complexo do Alemão, where it was reported that the 
bullet had grazed his eye. Such reports by mainstream media indicate that police brutality is a 
pressing concern in Brazil’s favelas. The next section will present reports of police brutality 
by online citizen journalists.  
In order to place the information provided into better perspective, the table below illustrates 
the various reports conducted by mainstream journalists which were researched in this study 
as well as the newspapers in which they were reported:  














Atarde Noticias O Dia Brasilpost O Globo R7 
Claudia Silva 
Ferreira 
          
Douglas Rafael da 
Silva Pereira 
            
Edilson da Silva 
dos Santos 
          
30 y/o unnamed 
man 
         
Matthew  
12 y/o or 13 y/o 
boy 
         
Jonathan de 
Oliveiro de Lima 
        
Afonso Mauricio 
Linhares 
        
Maria Victoria 
Souza Santos 
        
Antônio França         
Izaquel Nogueira         
Jorge Ruan 
Vianna 
        
Figure 2: Reports of police brutality according to newspaper sources (Brazil Newspaper Reports 2014).  
 
4.4.2 Online Citizen Journalism:  Reporting on police brutality in favelas  
The purpose of this section is to outline the accounts of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas as 
reported by online citizen journalists. The reports of police brutality were collected from two 
prominent online citizen journalism sites as well as additional sources. The prominent sites 
include Global Voices, which is in partnership with MídiaNINJA, and RioOnWatch. As 
demonstrated in the previous section, the table below shows the reports of police brutality 
which will be further elaborated on in this section.  
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Date Name of Victim Fatalities and Injuries Location 
16 March Claudia Silva Ferreira Death, shots to neck and back  Morro da 
Congonha, 
Rio de Janeiro 
March Matthew Casé Oliveira Killed by UPP soldier  Manguinhos, Rio de 
Janeiro 
22 April Douglas Rafael da Silva 
Pereira 
Death, assault and shot to the 
back 
Pavão-Pavãozinho,  
Rio de Janeiro 
22 April Edilson da Silva dos 
Santos 
Death, shot to the head Pavão-Pavãozinho, 
Rio de Janeiro 
22 April 12 y/o unnamed  boy Death, shot Pavão-Pavãozinho, 
Rio de Janeiro 
27 April Arlinda Bezerra das 
Chagas 
Death, shot Complexo do 
Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
28 April Luiz Alberto Cunha Death, shot Morro do 
Chapadão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
April Carlos Alberto de Souza Death,  shot to the stomach  
5 May Vitor Gomes Bento Death, shot to the head Morro dos 
Macacos, Rio de 
Janeiro 
14 May 2014 Jonathan de Oliveira Death, shot to the back Manguinhos, Rio de 
Janeiro 
May 8 y/o unnamed boy Death, shot Northern Rio de 
Janeiro 
31 May Felipe Rodrigues Injured, shot to the chest  
31 May Mateus Alves dos Santos Death, shot The hill of Sumaré, 
Rio de Janeiro 
May 2014 Caio Moraes Injured, shot to the chest Morro Fundo da 
Grota, Rio de 
Janeiro 
June Afonso Maurício Linhares Death, shot  
22 June Gabriel Ferreira Death, shot Complexo do 
Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
22 June Lucas Lima Death, shot Complexo do 
Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
27 July Antônio França Death, shot in the chest Complexo do 
Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
27 July  Izaquel Nogueira Injured, shot to the leg and 
eye 
Complexo do 
Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
27 September  Marcos Heleno Death, shot to the chest Nova Brasilia, Rio 
de Janeiro 
28 September  Wesley Rodriguez Injured, shot to the leg Complexo do 
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Alemão, Rio de 
Janeiro 
Figure 3: Reports of Police Brutality Incidents in 2014 by Online Citizen Journalists36(Online Citizen 
Journalist Reports 2014).  
 
4.4.2.1 Claudia Silva Ferreira  
On 16 March 2014, 38-year-old Claudia Silva Ferreira died when she was shot in the neck 
and back during a military police operation in the northern Morro da Congonha favela. 
Although not dead at the time (Global Voices 2014; Ninja 2014), the victim’s unconscious 
body was put in the trunk of a police car and allegedly taken to hospital. The police were 
stopped by Silva Ferreira’s neighbours and friends, who did not want them to take her body. 
The police officers responded by firing warning shots to disband the crowd. The officers then 
drove away with her but had not closed the trunk of the car, which led to her body falling 
from the trunk and being dragged along the Intendente Magalhães highway, secured by a 
piece of clothing. Her body was dragged for 250 metres before the police officers noticed 
what had happened or paid attention to the pleas of passing drivers and pedestrians (Global 
Voices 2014).  
Sub-lieutenant Adir Serrano Machado, Sub-lieutenant Rodney Miguel Archanjo, and 
Sergeant Alex Sandro da Silva Alves were arrested the following day, but were released on 
20 March 2014 by the request of prosecutor Paulo Roberto, who stated that if Silva Ferreira 
presented vital signs, there would be bodily harm; however, as she was dead when placed in 
the trunk, the police officers had not committed a crime. The officers were released on bail 
and are now awaiting judgement. This statement differs from the report which stated that she 
had been unconscious at the time the police officers put her in the trunk of the car. Thais 
Lima, daughter of Silva Ferreira, stated that the police officers had laughed while loading her 
mother’s body into the trunk of the car. Claudia Silva Ferreira’s husband, Alexandre da Silva, 
and his brother Julio Ferreira stated that Claudia was allegedly shot by the same police officer 
who had planted 4 weapons at the scene of the crime, during which she was only carrying a 
coffee and 6 Brazilian reais to buy food (Global Voices 2014). 
                                                 
 
 
36 The blank spaces indicate information that was not provided in the reports.  
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4.4.2.2 Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG) and Edilson da Silva dos Santos  
According to Parkin (2014) reporting for RioOnWatch, on Tuesday 22 April 2014, Douglas 
Rafael da Silva Pereira’s body was found inside a day-care centre in Pavão-Pavãozinho in the 
South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. He was allegedly killed by local UPP officers; there were signs 
indications that he was beaten (Ninja 2014). Evidence in the form of a photo emerged which 
showed that DG was also shot in the back. Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira was a dancer on 
Rede Globo’s popular television show Esquenta. The circumstances surrounding his death, 
together with the fact that he was well known led to protests in Copacabana which gained 
international coverage (Hilderbrand 2014).  
Although DG’s body was found with boot marks on the skin, suggesting that he had been 
kicked to death, a police report claimed that his wounds suggest and are comparable to a 
death caused by a fall. According to favela residents, DG had jumped over a wall to hide 
from a confrontation between the police and drug traffickers, while en route to Pavão-
Pavãozinho to visit his 4-year-old daughter. Favela residents further stated that they believe 
the police confused DG with a gang member, leading to the assault. The police have not 
confirmed or commented on this information (Hilderbrand 2014). It was reported that DG’s 
death occurred during a raid targeting Adauto do Nascimento Gonçalves, a top-level drug 
trafficker known as Pitbull, after reports emerged that he had returned to the community 
(Ashcroft & Hilderbrand 2015).  
Parkin (2014) also states that DG’s death might have gone undiscussed had it not been for his 
visibility on television. This was further emphasized by the Globo Corporation running a 
piece that discussed DG’s death with his family and friends, suggesting that the UPPs were 
currently in a ‘moment of crisis’. Parkin (2014) stated that the presenter, Regina Casé, 
discussed the matter in a largely sanitised manner, with little reference to the context of DG’s 
death, which in reality represented the problem with the UPPs, as well as the history of police 
violence and the criminalisation of poverty in favelas. It was reported that on the day of DG’s 
death on 22 April 2014, a protest was held in Pavão-Pavãozinho, which led to the shooting of 
Edilson da Silva dos Santos (known as Mateuzinho), who died soon after being shot in the 
head (Hilderbrand 2014; Parkin 2014).  
4.4.2.3 Other Reports of Death by Police Brutality  
The abovementioned cases were not the only cases of police brutality witnessed during the 
time of the World Cup. In March 2014, 17-year-old Matthew Casé Oliveira was killed in 
Manquinhos by UPP soldiers, as reported by Ninja (2014). On 22 April 2014, the protest that 
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was held for DG in Pavão-Pavãozinho and which led to the death of Edilson Silva dos Santos 
also resulted in the fatal shooting of an unnamed 12-year-old boy. The police claimed that the 
shootings that broke out were initiated by a local criminal gang, to which police retaliated 
with tear gas and stun grenades (Hilderbrand 2014; Parkin 2014).  
On 27 April 2014, 71-year-old Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas (known as Dona Dalva) was 
caught in a shootout and killed in the North Zone of Complexo do Alemão. The following 
day, 17-year-old Luiz Alberto Cunha was killed in a shootout in Morro do Chapadão, Costa 
Barros. The mainstream media had muted reactions to these deaths; however, they were 
exposed through the reaction of the communities, leading to 9 busses being burned in protests 
(Parkin 2014). Protests in Alemão following the death of Dona Dalva led to shop assistant, 
Carlos Alberto de Souza, being shot in the stomach. What is noteworthy about de Souza’s 
case was that police refused to answer his family’s questions about his condition. The masses, 
fuelled by the fear that Carlos was being tortured or executed, attacked the UPA (Unidades de 
Pronto Atendimento) health centre. It was reported that Carlos was left without medical 
attention for at least 2 hours after being shot. The following day, the UPA centre was visited 
by Rio de Janeiro Mayer, Eduardo Paes, and new State Governor, Luiz Fernando Pezão, who 
denounced the ‘delinquents’ that had attacked the unit and were subsequently referred to as 
criminals interfering with the pacification (Parkin 2014).  
O Globo published an article about the damage to the UPP’s reputation as well as the 
attempts to limit this damage at the protests, although the article was quickly and furtively 
taken down, followed by a statement declaring that “the Military Police requests that 
journalists do not accompany the operation in Alemão”. Parkin (2014) further states that a 
community journalist reported that journalists in Alemão were at risk, stating that 
independent journalists almost died the previous day during the protests; the next day, O 
Globo took down the article. A human rights lawyer posted an article with the comment, “the 
Military Police does not want witnesses to the violations committed by its representatives, the 
excesses in approaching [residents], and the absolute psychological lack of control in [their] 
war machine”. This indicates that mainstream media, although able to report acceptable facts, 
is not always able to delve into the true meaning of the police brutality by the UPP.  
On 5 May 2014, 8-year-old Vitor Gomes Bento was shot in the head during a shootout 
between UPP officers and drug traffickers in the North Zone of Morro dos Macacos, in Vila 
Isabel. Vitor was discharged from intensive care and transferred to the children’s ward. This 
incident occurred the same day that Rio de Janeiro’s World Cup security operation was 
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implemented, in which an additional 2,000 police officers deployed on the city’s streets in 
response to an increase in robberies and street muggings (Clarke 2014). In May 2014 Caio 
Moraes was shot in the chest by a UPP officer in Complexo do Alemão as he was working. 
Caio Moraes was a taxi driver who had just left a passenger in the area of Grota during 
protests against the shooting of another resident (Paz 2014; Voz Das Comunidades 2014). 
On 14 May 2014, 19-year-old Jonathan de Oliveira was shot in the back after dropping off a 
dessert at his grandmother’s house. When walking back, he was met with commotion in 
which military policemen were shooting into a crowd (Froio 2014). Also in May, 
MídiaNINJA reported the death of an unnamed 8-year-old boy in northern Rio de Janeiro 
during a shootout between the police and drug traffickers. According to their report, 3 favela 
residents were killed by the UPP in the city in the previous two weeks (Ninja 2014).  
Becerra (2014) interviewed 21-year-old Felipe Rodrigues, a skate instructor and painter who 
considers himself a survivor of the Rio de Janeiro police. His run in with the police occurred 
on 31 May 2014. He stated that he was on his way back from his girlfriend’s birthday party at 
Copacabana beach. He was shot twice, with one bullet grazing and the other hitting him in 
the chest. The police thought that Felipe was dead and placed a bag of cocaine inside his 
underwear. Witnesses in the community said that the police had taken Felipe to the woods. 
His girlfriend found him there alive; he had been losing blood for 2 hours (Becerra 2014). On 
the same day, 14-year-old Mateus Alves dos Santos was killed by the police after being 
arrested in the city along with a friend who was suspected of theft. The two boys were put 
into a car, in which they passed the police station; the car stopped at the hill of Sumaré, where 
the boys were to be executed. Mateus’ friend survived gunshot wounds to the leg and back 
and pretended to be dead. His family waited several days before making a complaint, out of 
fear.  
On 22 June 2014 preceding a protest in difference parts of Complexo do Alemão, 17-year-old 
Gabriel Ferreira and 15-year-old Lucas Lima died in a shootout. In the previous week, 25-
year-old Afonso Maurício Linhares was shot and killed by UPP police in Manguinhos while 
refereeing a soccer match outside his home (Sorboe 2014).  
On 27 July 2014 in Complexo do Alemão, 60-year-old resident Antônio França died when he 
was shot in the chest by a UPP officer. On the same day, 15-year-old Izaquel Nogueira was 
shot by Special Operations Battalion (BOPE) officers in the leg and the eye, resulting in his 
loss of vision. In addition to the shooting, a resident from Complexo do Alemão stated that 
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the behaviour of the police officers was inappropriate and included stopping and searching 
residents for no particular reason, the invasion of houses without a search warrant, as well as 
disrespectful behaviour towards residents who has done nothing wrong. The resident added 
that he has witnessed the physical and verbal abuse of young residents by UPP officers (Paz 
2014).  
The resident further stated that the majority of those shot by UPP officers have been young 
people between the ages of 14 and 25. This includes Marcos Heleno, a 17-year-old boy who 
was shot on 27 September 2014 in Nova Brasilia. He was shot in the chest and died in 
hospital after being left on the sidewalk for an hour before the ambulance arrived (Voz Das 
Comunidades 2014). Reports by Froio (2014) state that the police would not allow anyone to 
help Heleno; this led to him bleeding on the street. A witness declared that the police used 
pepper spray on anyone who attempted to help the youth. The following day, 28 September 
2014, Wesley Rodriguez was shot in the leg but survived (Paz 2014; Froio 2014; Voz Das 
Comunidades 2014). 
In order to better understand the sources of online citizen journalism, the table below will 
provide the incident as well as the online platform which reported the story.  
Online Citizen Journalist Reports  

















Claudia Silva Ferreira       
Matthew Casé Oliveira      
Douglas Rafael da Silva 
Pereira 
     
 
Edilson da Silva dos Santos      
12 y/o unnamed  boy      
ArlindaBezerra das Chagas      
Luiz Alberto Cunha      
Carlos Alberto de Souza      
Vitor Gomes Bento      
Jonathan de Oliveira      
8 y/o unnamed boy       
Felipe Rodrigues      
Mateus Alves dos Santos      
Caio Moraes       
Afonso Maurício Linhares      
Gabriel Ferreira      
Lucas Lima      
Antônio França      
Izaquel Nogueira      
Marcos Heleno      
Wesley Rodriguez       
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Figure 4: Reports of police brutality according to online citizen journalist sources (Online Citizen Journalist 
Reports 2014).   
4.5 POLITICAL RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THE STUDY  
The purpose of this section is to understand the impact of police brutality on the level of 
political risk in Brazil. The table below includes the most significant political risk indicators 
identified across mainstream media reports and those produced by online citizen journalists 
and international news agencies, as indicated in Chapter 3. As per the table it has been 
witnessed that there was an increase in protests became evident as cases of police brutality 
increased in Brazil’s favelas. In addition to this was also the witnessing of police impunity as 
police brutality displays acts that are unethical and above the law; this in turn has also led to 
acts corruption has the police are able to get away with unethical behaviour. This in turn 
leads to the risk of citizens distrusting the police. The dissatisfaction that comes with the 
inability to trust the police in conjunction with the violent behaviour by the police and 
citizens has displayed an increase in crime as the drug traffickers in the favelas rebelled 
against the police which also led to an increase in violence during these protests.  
Political risk indicators relating to police brutality  
Increase in protests (against police brutality) 
Police impunity 
Distrust in the police  
Increase in crime  
Increase in violence (especially at protests) 
Increase in corruption  
Figure 5: Political risk indicators identified as a result of police brutality (Mainstream Newspapers 2014; 
Online Citizen Journalist Reports 2014).  
There has been a surge in protests against UPP units. Chapter 3 exhibited the various protests 
that took place in 2013 and 2014. Although these were discussed in the previous chapter, 
there was an increase in protests in 2014 against the violence incited by UPPs, which led to 
the deaths of several favela residents (as described throughout this chapter). These protests 
occurred near the sites of the various incidents of police brutality depicted in this chapter. 
Protests were particularly prominent after the deaths of DG and Claudia Ferreira da Silva. 
These protests also led to increased levels of violence, as witnessed at the protest against the 
death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 27 April 2014, which led to the burning of 9 busses 
(Parkin 2014).  
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According to Wattsin (2013), residents have complained about the excessive use of violence 
by UPPs, as evidenced throughout this chapter. Allegations of corruption and the violent use 
of force against residents were also reported by the Brazilian Institute of Public Security, 
illustrating that the number of deaths in conflicts with police across the country rose by 69 
percent between 2013 and 2014, as was illustrated in Chapter 3 (Froio 2014). Other reports 
by residents include complaints of UPP officers not patrolling the streets at night, which does 
not aid the reduction of crime, but allows for an opportunity for crime to occur (Froio 2014). 
The perception of the UPPs by favela residents has been identified as a political risk factor, as 
it demonstrates a lack of trust in UPPs. It is believed that UPPs have more of a public-
relations function than a security function. Residents claim that UPPs serve the purpose of 
hiding the high levels of crime, especially from tourists, by driving away drug gangs from 
places that are popular during major events (Froio 2014). Another political risk factor that 
was observed in this study was an increase in violence with regard to police impunity. This 
was witnessed in a survey conducted in 21 countries, the result of which illustrated that Brazil 
was found to be the one country where citizens felt most unsafe as a result of the authorities 
(Froio 2014). Distrust was further exhibited through Rocinha Without Borders, which has 
attempted but failed several times to establish dialogue between residents and UPP officers. 
Perceptions of distrust have also been levelled against the government, as residents claimed 
that the government used the 2014 FIFA World Cup to destroy their homes in order for 
property developers to develop the land into attractive areas for tourists (France-Presse 2013).  
Distrust was also instigated by the deployment of federal troops in favelas, which was met 
with mixed feelings and scepticism, as residents felt overwhelmed by the number of armed 
soldiers patrolling the favelas, despite their being stationed therein for the purpose of safety 
(Lisboa 2014). The federal armed forces were deployed due to a loss of control that led to a 
wave of shootings and human rights abuses committed by police. Although the UPP 
programme was initially praised, it is currently faced with scepticism over the future of its 
long-term agenda. The state and residents agree that the current solution in attempts to 
combat crime is not functional; however, the state’s deploy more armed forces further 
frustrates residents, who are calling for dialogue, participation in society and steps leading 
toward social justice (Kaiser 2014).  
Violence was also witnessed in the occupation of militias who were dubbed ‘Rio de Janeiro’s 
mafia’, as they were perceived to be more sophisticated than other organised drug traffickers. 
The term ‘militias’ in this context refers to groups of armed, off-duty state agents that abuse 
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their official access to arms in order to control vulnerable low-income areas of the city. This 
occupation began in 2006 in the form of a ‘neighbourhood watch’. Family members of Maria 
Victoria Souza Santos, the infant girl who was killed in a police shootout, stated that police 
officers showed evidence of using narcotics by residue on their noses. They subsequently 
declared that it was a known fact that police officers used drugs in the favelas (Rodrigues 
2014).  
According to the research paper Hidden: The Evolution of Militias in Rio de Janeiro (2008- 
2011), militias are defined by 5 criteria: micro-territorial control; the motive of profit; 
coercive force against residents and business owners; a narrative of liberation from drug 
trafficking gangs; and the participation of public armed agents of the state (which includes 
retired or active policemen, correctional officers, firemen, military trained state agents as well 
as private security personnel). The militias were initially accepted and supported by many 
political leaders across Rio de Janeiro. However, it was later discovered that in some places, 
these militias were frequently centralised and run by gang leaders, from outside the 
communities, who engaged in extortion and intimidation. Despite the threat of violence that 
accompanies such groups, the state has done nothing to combat the illicit activities across Rio 
de Janeiro, as armed forces are concentrated on combating the drug trafficking gangs and the 
militias largely comprise off-duty police (Froio 2014).   
According to RioTimes, a Brazilian news site for English-speaking foreigners and residents, 
the military police in Rio de Janeiro were placed under investigation in February 2014 by the 
civil police for the suspected execution-style killings of 6 men on 4 February 2014 in the 
North Zone. The enquiry followed the publication of photographs on an unofficial military 
police social network page depicting 6 corpses in a pool of blood in Morro do Juramento, 
surrounded by police officers. The withdrawn photographs included captions stating that the 
operation was a reaction to the killing of military policewoman, Alda Rafael Castilho, on 2 
February 2014. It has been reported that the military police’s counter-attack is ongoing and 
includes the deployment of helicopters and armoured vehicles (Rinaldi 2014).  
Platonow reported on Amnesty International Brazil (AIB), clarifying the deaths in the Pavão-
Pavãozinho community with full accountability lying with the perpetrators. According to the 
report, homicide levels were described as ‘alarming’. The report included the deaths of 
Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira and Edilson Silva dos Santos, and highlighted the issue of 
impunity in the police force (Nitahara 2015). Furthermore, it urged prompt recognition that 
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changes are necessary in how police are organised; this includes demilitarisation, greater 
transparency and effective external control of police activities (Platonow 2014).  
According to Abdala (2014), the escalating violence has presented public security challenges, 
especially in the reduction of homicide. The Ministry of Health reported that the number of 
people killed in 2012 was 56,300, with over half of victims (53 percent) between the ages of 
15 and 29. Sociologist and organiser of the Violence Map37, Julio Jacob Waiselfisz, stated 
that the country needs a national police aimed at fighting violence. He further mentioned that 
there is a different policy in each state and that areas formerly affected were metropolitan 
regions such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Recife; however, the countryside and other 
regions are currently also affected. According to Waiselfisz, Brazil needs a national plan 
aimed at lowering the number of homicides. He is underway with the proposal of a document 
entitled Priority Agenda for Public Security, drawn up by NGOs and security experts from 
different states (Abdala 2014; Martins 2014). Violence and more specifically, violence 
against black citizens, is a serious concern in Brazil. This is demonstrated in the Map of 
Violence 2014, which indicates that the number of black victims is much higher than that of 
white victims. The report further indicated that 146.5 percent more blacks died in Brazil in 
2012 than whites, during homicides, traffic accidents and suicides (Kudialis 2014). 
On 23 December 2014 the law, as set forth by Law 13.060/14, stated that non-lethal weapons 
in the form of tear gas, rubber bullets and batons, pepper spray and tasers were to be 
prioritised in police operations across Brazil.38 This law was approved after 9 years of 
deliberation in Congress. The law also bans the use of guns in those instances in which the 
police are trying to approach an unarmed person attempting to escape or an evading vehicle, 
with the provision of the use of a weapon of lower calibre which does not pose a risk to the 
lives of the officers or the suspects. Added to this is the facilitation of injured parties by 
public security agents, with the provision of the appropriate medical assistance and the 
notification of any next of kin. This law was put into effect due to the violence often 
witnessed during police operations, which resulted in an alarming increase in the death toll 
among young people. This law aims to lower the number of severe cases which have arisen 
as a result of the abuse of power by public agents (Melo 2014). 
                                                 
 
 
37 Published on an annual basis, with information regarding violent crime throughout Brazil (Abdala 2014).  
38 As long as the lives of policemen were not at risk (Melo 2014). 
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4.6 THE VALUE OF ONLINE CITIZEN JOURNALISM IN POLITICAL RISK 
ANALYSIS  
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the potential advantages of citizen 
journalism can be linked to the field of political risk analysis. In order for this to be 
established, this section will compare the case studies of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas, 
through news reports by mainstream media and online citizen journalists. In addition to 
comparing the content of these reports, this section will provide a general discussion of the 
value of citizen journalism in the context of political risk analysis, and will take into 
consideration the characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy. 
Timeliness refers to the potential value of online citizen journalists having the ability to 
disseminate news in a shorter period of time. Accuracy will indicate value by establishing 
whether the news reported by online citizen journalists is more accurate than information 
obtained by mainstream media. This takes into consideration the value of the information as 
well as the source from which the information stems. Relevance observes the type of 
information reported and whether it is relevant to the field of political risk analysis.  
As mentioned previously, the amplification of risk has been introduced through the use of 
technology, specifically global communications and international media. This highlights the 
fact that the international community is understood as an environment where the actions of 
one party have the ability to affect the interests of another, with political risk viewed as a 
useful method of anticipating how these changes can affect an investment or state (Jarvis & 
Griffiths 2007: 9-10). It is through this understanding that online citizen journalism can be 
viewed as potentially valuable to the field of political risk analysis, as it uses technological 
means such as social media to uncover occurrences within the state that are not necessarily 
reported by mainstream media. The case study of police brutality in Brazil took place during 
the 2014 World Cup, which meant that there were various stakes in terms of international 
investment. The reporting of news that is alternative to mainstream media has the potential to 
be more informative, as it allows political risk analysts to analyse risk through an alternative 
form of media that allows for greater insight into the cause and effect of the risk in question 
(in this case, police brutality).  
In terms of the case study, the issue of police brutality breaches the civil rights of citizens. 
Citizen journalists in this study are seen as a response to this concern, by reporting on the 
matter to demand that change occur; this is done by making the government and the 
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international community aware of the matter. The action of reporting through social media or 
online platforms is viewed as a form of political participation, defined as the actions by 
ordinary citizens that are directed towards the influencing of political outcomes (Brady 
1999:737; Gustafsson 2012:1112). To reiterate Chapter 2, the public sphere according to 
Jürgen Habermas (2000) was believed to be an environment that harnessed the value of 
political debate through newspapers and journals, in order to bridge the gap between the 
private concerns of individuals and the area of the state in which power is exercised; thus it is 
a sphere that takes into consideration the needs of the citizen at the hands of those who are in 
power (Kellner 2000:3-4; Bolton 2005). 
Media in this case plays a significant role, as Habermas believed that the function of the 
media should be to foster rational public discourse and debate in order to limit the agenda 
setting of media corporations, which he felt restricted the citizen from engaging in public 
debate, forcing them to become a media spectator (Kellner 2000:6). Citizen journalism 
provides the opportunity for citizens to speak out about their concern for police brutality in a 
manner that not only reports news but indicates the reality of the situation without the 
censorship of media corporations. This proves valuable to the political analyst, as it broadens 
the scope of information by providing a wider angle which supplements data, as well as 
alternative and additional views and opinions in order to understand and take into 
consideration factors that might not have been reported by mainstream media. This will be 
elaborated later in this section.  
The next 3 sections will elaborate on the potential value of online citizen journalism by 
observing the characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy in regard to the case 
study. It should be noted that, in the event of a difference in reporting between the facts 
presented by citizen journalists and mainstream media, information by the international 
media was used as an informal method of fact checking. It was discovered that there were 
discrepancies in some facts in reports presented by the mainstream media and online citizen 
journalism. This allowed for a broader scope of the differences in facts, as international 
media makes use of international correspondent journalists to report on news.  
4.6.1 Timeliness  
An advantage of online citizen journalism is that news reporting can be done in a timelier 
manner; however, this is only true to a certain extent. Citizen journalists have the advantage 
of deploying more journalists, as they are part of large networks loosely made up of citizens 
reporting on political events within their communities or cities. These networks are not solely 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 90 
 
made up of professional journalists; rather, they are coalitions of citizens who write about 
news and events. This type of reporting also increases the ability to cover the news from a 
wider scope, as all citizens with a phone are able to submit their experiences, including 
through photos and videos, which have the advantage of increasing the legitimacy and 
credibility of citizen journalists. They also make use of social media platforms to disseminate 
information, which is characteristically swift as it occurs in real time39 (Falkow 2014). 
Although mainstream media makes use of social media, the point of having a larger network 
of citizen reporters is that news has the potential to be delivered in an even timelier manner.  
When using the case study of police brutality as a point of reference to illustrate the value of 
online citizen journalism, the value of timeliness is indicated by the observation that more 
reports of police brutality in favelas were recorded in the span of a year (2014)40 by online 
citizen journalists than by the mainstream media41. There were 11 cases of police brutality 
reported by the mainstream media and 21 cases reported by citizen journalists.  
Month Name of Victim Month  Name of Victim 
March Matthew Casé Oliveira June Gabriel Ferreira 
April Carlos Alberto de Souza  Lucas Lima 
 Luiz Alberto Cunha July  Antônio França 
May Vitor Gomes Bento September  Marcos Heleno 
 Felipe Rodrigues October  Caio Moraes 
 Mateus Alves dos 
Santos 
  
Figure 6: Deaths that were exclusively reported by online citizen journalists for 2014 (Online Citizen 
Journalist Reports 2014).  
However, online citizen journalism did not exhibit timeliness in terms of reporting events in a 
shorter amount of time. This is due to the fact that cases of police brutality were sporadic in 
terms of where these occurred. This starkly contrasted the protests that occurred in 2013 and 
2014, when citizen journalists were better able to mobilise and keep in contact in order to 
quickly document the protests. The table below illustrates the first date on which the 
                                                 
 
 
39Although mainstream media also makes use of social media, it is more significant in online citizen as all their 
reporting is done electronically.   
40 This study selected 2014, as more cases of police brutality in the favelas occurred. In addition, the 2013 
Confederations Cup took precedence over the reporting of specific social issues in 2013.  
41However, it should be noted that there were exceptions, with 2 incidents only reported by only the mainstream 
media. The first was the death of Maria Victoria Souze Santos on 16 July 2014 during a police operation in 
Amargosa. This story was only reported by one publication, called A Tarde. The story was not featured in 
international news reports. The second exception was the interview O Globo conducted with Jorge Ruan 
Vianna, which is also only featured on their site. 
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mainstream media mentioned within this study reported the case, as opposed to online citizen 
journalists. 
Case Mainstream Media Online Citizen Journalists 
Claudia Silva Ferreira 16 March  30 March 
Douglas Rafael da Silva 
Pereira (DG) 
23 April  26 April  
Edilson da Silva Dos Santos 26 April  26 April  
Matthew 
12 y/o or 13 y/o boy 
23 April 26 April 
Jonathan de Oliveiro de Lima 15 May  18 September 
Afonso Mauricio Linhares 19 June  25 July  
Antônio França 28 July  27 October  
Izaquel Nogueira 28 July  27 October  
Figure 7: Dates of first reports on cases of police brutality in 2014 by mainstream media and online citizen 
journalists (Mainstream media reports 2014; Online citizen journalist reports 2014). 
It has been noted in this study that citizen journalists take on a retrospective stance by 
reporting incidents in more depth after they have occurred. It has also been found that citizen 
journalists do more intensive interviewing in terms of investigative journalism, whereas 
mainstream media displays the function of getting the facts in a short amount of time in order 
to inform citizens of political events. This was especially prominent in those cases of police 
brutality that made headline news, such as the deaths of DG and Claudia Ferreira da Silva.  
This does not take away from the fact that mainstream media also conducted interviews. This 
was portrayed with the statement given by DG’s mother, in which she spoke out about the 
fact that she felt that her son had been tortured by the police before he died (Amorim 2014).  
4.6.2 Relevance 
According to Chapter 2, political risk analysis is based on rational choice theory, which 
consists of three elements: instrumentalism, individualism and subjectivism. Instrumentalism 
is understood in this instance as the various socio-political relations and institutions that are 
dependable variables clarified by the actions of the individual self. Individualism is portrayed 
as an independent variable that forms the actions of the individual as rational through 
motivational theory (thus actions based on the motivations of the rational self in the context 
of making decisions). Lastly, subjectivism is the collective perception of the first two 
concepts by understanding that individuals make decisions according to their preferences and 
the value instilled in these preferences (Patrick 1988:637-638). 
The practice of analysing risk is understood as measuring and observing risk through human 
judgement, with political risk models allowing for a sense of balance in order to avoid 
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subjectivity. The function of information is pertinent for this purpose, in order to allow for a 
more objective point of view when estimating risk (Brink 2004:2-3). It is therefore pertinent 
that analysts use a wide spectrum of information in order to understand the various 
underlying causes of risk, which makes online citizen journalism a key source, as it reports 
information from the stance of the ordinary citizen and not necessarily from the view of a 
specific agenda.   
The volume of information accumulated by the analyst can take the form of either 
quantitative or qualitative information. This study makes use of qualitative information 
through a case study. Online citizen journalism makes use of both qualitative and quantitative 
data; however, the key to its value in political risk analysis leans more towards qualitative 
data through interviews, conversations, photographs, field notes and recordings (Snape & 
Spencer 2003:3). To reiterate Chapter 2, qualitative data allows for an understanding of 
meanings that are attached to phenomena within the social world, such as beliefs, values, 
decisions and actions (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:3) which are portrayed when reporting events. 
This is evident in the information presented by Brazil’s online citizen journalists that was 
accumulated through interviewing residents of the favelas. Not only does this allow for more 
understanding of the complexities of the details found within the context of the information 
collected, but it provides an avenue of information that came from the source; the citizens 
who experienced police brutality (Snape & Spencer 2003:4).  
This research takes into consideration that mainstream media also conducts interviews when 
reporting cases of police brutality; however, when comparing the amount of cases identified 
by citizen journalists, it is clear that citizen journalists were better able to grasp a multiplicity 
of perspectives grounded within the context of police brutality (Lewis 2003:52). According to 
Neuman (2006), this allows the researcher, or political risk analyst, to observe the social 
context of police brutality as risk through the use of reports by citizen journalists, by studying 
aspects that were present before the event or which surround the focus thereof. This is 
believed to provide greater understanding that police brutality as an event – through protests 
against it – and its effects can have different meanings, as these evolve over a period of time, 
by studying the different process that have occurred as well as the causal relationships found 
therein (2006:158).  
However, this does not detract from the fact that mainstream media conducted interviews 
which proved valuable. This was evident when 7 months after the death of DG, his mother 
complained about the interview conducted with host of Esquenta, Regina Casé. She called 
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the host a ‘liar’ and a ‘farce’, claiming that the rest of the family had been mistreated by the 
production of the show and that the host had no interest in helping them. More specifically, 
she reported that the media had limited what she could say at the memorial edition for DG by 
stating that she could only answer what they asked her. Behind the scenes, the family was 
placed in a room which was locked until the show started (A Tarde 2014). 
Debates concerning the militarised policing of UPPs were also incited in favelas by residents 
who questioned that they were expected to accept the pacification programme despite the 
deaths of residents as a result. Some residents went as far as stating that the programme 
entered the favelas prepared for war and fighting (against drug gangs) but incited more war 
(Parkin 2014). 
The death of DG manifested in protests aimed at amplifying the issue of police brutality that 
had been simmering for the past year, but also served to highlight that this issue was ignored 
by public officials and a complacent media. However, this does not mean that the matter can 
simply be ignored; it has led to an increasing need to expose the militarised state presence of 
in favelas and the consequent oppression taking place therein despite the effort of marketing 
the pacification as a method of introducing security to these communities, as was indicated 
and debated by mainstream media. According to Parkin (2014), it is only through 
communication from the favelas on the subject of the UPPs’ presence that the pattern of 
violence can be expressed and ultimately addressed.  
When applying this understanding to the context of reports of police brutality, interviews 
found in mainstream media and citizen journalism have given reasons for the occurrence of 
police brutality42, identification of the victims43, as well as the social context within the 
relationship between UPP officers and drug traffickers as well as UPPs and favela residents. 
What differs in these understandings is the information presented by these two sources and 
the extent to which research into the matter can better provide information that is useful to the 
political risk analyst. In addition to interviews, online citizen journalists were able to be at the 
exact location of the protests that took place after the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 
27 April 2014. It was later reported that mainstream journalists were not given jurisdiction by 
                                                 
 
 
42 Based on the information provided in this chapter as a whole, it concludes that the reasons for police brutality 
are institutional racism, corrupt police and improper training.  
43 Black individuals and individuals between the ages of 14 and 25.  
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the military police to report these protests. This made the information that online citizen 
journalists reported more relevant.  
The core theory of this study involves not only political risk and the analysis thereof, but 
political participation in the public sphere; hence, the act of citizen journalists politically 
participating through the reporting of political issues and events. This study established the 
role of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere in Chapter 2 by illustrating this as an 
environment with the purpose of mediating between the private concerns of the people in 
their personal space and their concerns and demands in their social and public life (Kellner 
2000:4). This theory establishes the importance of the public sphere, providing citizens with 
the required civil and political rights through democratic institutions to shape both their 
private and public lives with an opportunity of self-expression within society (Welzel & 
Inglehart 2008:30).  
In the context of political risk analysis, the analyst uses subjectivism to track the decision of 
political actors or, in this case, uses information presented by citizen journalists to analyse 
and identify indicators of risk (Riker 1995:37). Within this context, the purpose of rational 
choice theory is for the rational agent to reduce political risk to an acceptable level, through 
the collection of information regarding potential risks. Online citizen journalism facilitates 
this process by providing a broader base of information from which to analyse potential 
political risk.    
Within the context of the case study, online citizen journalism presented relevance in terms of 
providing information for the political risk analyst in compiling a risk assessment. When 
analysing the data collected by citizen journalists, it was established that the majority of their 
sources stemmed from interviews with favela residents. In this manner, they were able to 
provide more incidents of police brutality as well as more witness accounts. They also 
conducted more in-depth interviews with residents who had experienced police brutality, 
which allowed for a greater understanding for the causes and effects thereof. The mainstream 
media reported 11 cases of police brutality, whereas online citizen journalism reported 21 
cases.  
4.6.3 Accuracy 
The value of accuracy is self-explanatory in that it observes the extent to which online citizen 
journalism provides value in its ability to present accurate news. Online citizen journalism 
through the use of social media has been perceived to be a new method of surveillance, 
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identity construction and social relationships are connected to political activities. It involves 
the posting of information for the purpose of reporting news and bolstering political 
participation through debate and opinion expression, which is stated to contribute to 
behaviour that stems from political activity through discussion, such as protest activity 
(Bimber et al. 2005). 
To reiterate Shirky (2011:6), the significance of social media lies in its ability to access 
conversations more than the accessing information. In a practical sense, online citizen 
journalism provides an opportunity for citizens to relay their dissatisfaction with the day-to-
day governance rather than abstract ideals, which allows for real-world actions as opposed to 
a replacement thereof. Thus, it allows citizens to speak out about issues such as police 
brutality in favelas. Through this viewpoint, online citizen journalism presents itself as a form 
of identifying issues that requires a great amount of accuracy, as it bolsters political 
participation which, in itself, requires a great level of accuracy in its reporting.  
In terms of accuracy, online citizen journalists showed value when police attempted to frame 
a protestor for throwing a Molotov cocktail during a protest in 2013, as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. Although this is not part of the case study of police brutality, it should be taken 
into consideration. The report by mainstream media agency O Globo concluded that the 
demonstrator had thrown the Molotov cocktail; however, citizen journalists were able to 
quash this allegation through the use of footage that proved that the demonstrator was 
innocent. This incident proved the inaccuracy of the mainstream media agency. This 
illustrates the potential of social media as a source of surveillance in fact checking when 
reporting news.  
It is evident in the reporting of police brutality that the mainstream media mostly accounted 
for those deaths that caused a big stir in Brazil and in the international community. The two 
instances of police brutality that received the most attention were the deaths of Douglas 
Rafael da Silva Pereira (as he was a famous dancer on the O Globo production of Esquenta) 
and the death of Claudia Silva Ferreira, as the incident of her body being dragged by a police 
car was filmed by witnesses on the road.  
There are differences in the details of these two incidents by both citizen journalists and the 
mainstream media. These include the distance at which Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged –
with online citizen journalists reporting 250 metres and mainstream media documenting 
several accounts varying from 250 metres to 350 metres. Amnesty International stated in 
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Brazil’s 2014/15 report that the distance was 350 metres. When taking into account the facts 
reported by international media, BBC.com (2014) and Emily Thomas from The Huffington 
Post (2014) reported that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged nearly 1,000ft, which is more 
than 300 metres. Brazil correspondent, Janet Tappin Coelho, reported that Silva Ferreira was 
dragged for 250 metres. The accuracy of online citizen journalism within this case is thus 
debatable; however, when comparing these facts to those presented by the mainstream media, 
reports indicate that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged for both 250 and 350 metres, in 
addition to the differing reports by international media. Further reports indicate that her body 
was dragged for either 350 or more than 300 metres. However, it should be noted that the 
distance her body was dragged was reported by witnesses who estimated the distance.   
Another example of reports that differ in detail include Global Voices and Ninja reporting 
that Silva Ferreira had been unconscious and not dead at the time that her body was placed in 
the trunk of the car. However, according to mainstream news and witnesses in the favela, she 
was dead at the time. When taking into consideration the impact in the different accounts of 
this detail, it is unfortunate to report that this did not make a significant enough impact; 
according to Amnesty International’s 2014/2015 report, in Claudia’s case, 6 officers were 
under investigation but remained at liberty. With regards to the deaths of DG and Edilson, no 
one had been charged with the deaths by the end of 2014.  
Mainstream media reported that DG was mistaken for a drug trafficker in a confrontation 
between police and traffickers, leading to his death. However, citizen journalists reported that 
it was not a confrontation but a raid, as top-level drug trafficker, Adauto do Mascimento 
Gonçalves, had reportedly returned to the community. Mainstream media also reported an 
interview with activist Deise Carvalho, who stated that DG told her that he had been 
threatened by police since 2011. Despite the differences in the reports, the facts surrounding 
the cause of DG’s death and details regarding the perpetrators are congruent.  
As mentioned previously, although there are extraordinary journalists in the mainstream 
media, it is not their journalistic skills that cause a limitation, but the structural framework in 
which they function. This was demonstrated in the protest against the death of Arlinda 
Bezerra das Chagas, which led to the shooting of Carlos Alberto de Souza and the attacking 
of the UPA health centre by protesters. According to Parkin (2014), a journalist for 
community reporting website RioOnWatch, the day after the protests O Globo published an 
article about the damage of the protest to the reputation of the UPP units as well as their 
attempts to limit the effects thereof. The article was removed from the site and replaced with 
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a statement by the Military Police that journalists were not to accompany the operation in 
Alemão. This illustrates that mainstream journalists are restricted by the structures in which 
they work and can therefore not always report news, as this may not be in the interest of the 
parties involved in the event.  
An aspect observed during the research for this study that falls beyond the three 
characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy is the restriction on information by 
mainstream media websites. When searching for articles on Brazil’s mainstream news agency 
websites, there were two restrictions. The first was that one of Brazil’s most prominent news 
agencies, Agência Estadão, required a paid subscription in order to read the articles. The 
second restriction was presented by the O Globo news site, on which visitors could only view 
10 articles before a paid subscription was required. This meant that it could not be established 
whether online citizen journalists reported the protest that led to the removal of O Globo’l 
article before the mainstream media agency.  
In general, this presents a limitation on researching information for writing political risk 
reports, where open source media is commonly used, as the researcher is limited in the 
accumulation of information unless the company is willing to pay subscription fees. This was 
especially pertinent in the research for this study, as O Globo was the only online mainstream 
news agency that reported the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 27 April 2014; 
however, the information could not be relayed due to the restriction on the number of article 
viewings. This provides an opportunity for online citizen journalism to become a valuable 
source of information, as it is open sourced and freely available online. Sources are not 
restricted to articles and present different forms of media through photography, videos and 
live-streaming. This presents legitimate information through evidence of photography and 
videos and without the restriction of subscriptions. 
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated the value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk 
analysis by using the case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 to demonstrate 
effectiveness of online citizen journalism as a medium of information. It has been 
demonstrated that online citizen journalism is most effective at presenting information that is 
relevant in terms of taking into account the opinions of citizens, or in this instance, favela 
residents. Its ability to conduct in-depth interviews allows for greater context into the cause 
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of the matter. This provides greater insight for use in political risk reports, as the analyst will 
gain better understanding of the underlying causes and effects of risk factors.  
Online citizen journalism is also timely, as more cases of police brutality were reported in 
2014 than in mainstream media. In terms of accuracy, it was found that there were 
incongruous facts between mainstream media and online citizen journalists regarding details 
in the case of Claudia Silva Ferreira. When using international media as an informal method 
of fact-checking, there were differing accounts of the details in question. There were also 
differences in the smaller details in the case of Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira. However, the 
most important facts regarding his death were congruent between mainstream media and 
online citizen journalists.  
It can be concluded that online citizen journalism has the potential to be a valuable source of 
information in political risk analysis, as it exhibits the values of relevancy and timeliness. In 
terms of accuracy, it is on par with mainstream media, as witnessed in 2014 reports of police 
brutality in Brazil’s favelas. It should be noted that this study does not detract from the fact 
that traditional media will always be a valuable source of information. The aim of this study 
is to illustrate that value can also be gained by observing alternative stories and sources of 
information, for the purpose of structuring well-rounded and objective political risk analysis.  
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Chapter 5: Findings and Recommendations  
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to reiterate the findings of this study as presented in Chapter 4.   
The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of the argument by presenting the 
research questions as stated in the first chapter, as well as the study as a whole. This will be 
followed by an evaluation of the research, while the last section of this chapter will discuss 
recommendations for future research into the value of online citizen journalism in political 
risk analysis. The final section will be followed by a brief conclusion.  
5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT AND PROCESS OF THE RESEARCH 
STUDY  
The first chapter introduced the study by recognising the prominence of online citizen 
journalism. It is recognised as a force that has altered the relationship between news 
organisations and their audiences, through online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and blogs. It is also known for its ability to readily disseminate information and 
encourage political participation (Bruns 2010:1; DeMers 2013). Online citizen journalism is 
also characterised by the fact that it introduces a new method in which information can be 
broadcasted in a shorter duration of time by citizens as it occurs, which proves valuable in the 
field of political risk analysis. This is especially pertinent as online citizen journalists are able 
to play an active role in the public sphere, by providing crisis-related information that can be 
utilised by response organisations in analysing potential sources of political risk (Watson et 
al. 2014:294). 
The first chapter outlined the research problem, which takes into perspective that the efficacy 
of social media in analysing political risk is a relatively new field. The most pressing concern 
outlined in this study is the credibility of the information relayed by citizen journalists, as 
they are not reporting in a professional capacity. This chapter also included the research aim, 
which is to research and determine the potential value of online citizen journalism in the field 
of political risk analysis. This chapter specified that this process would be undertaken by 
analysing the role of citizen journalists in reporting police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 
2014.  
The rationale and significance of this study is based on the understanding that society 
operates within the domain of a disruptive nature, characterised by a constant overflow of 
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information. This overflow has both positive effects in the form of access to more 
information, as well as negative effects recognised in the manipulation by those 
disseminating the information (Shirky 2011:6). The most significant point of the distribution 
of information in this study is that it has equipped citizens with a greater informational 
foundation on which to base their decisions. This study also presents a research gap in terms 
of bettering the field of political risk analysis through the use of technology in order to 
advance its applicability. In addition, this study seeks to improve data gathering, by 
introducing a new avenue of information that is easy to access.  
The first chapter also provided the theoretical base of this study, which identified two 
branches of definitions: political risk analysis and political participation with each branch 
consisting of its respective theoretical base. The theoretical foundation of political risk 
analysis is identified as rational choice theory and problem solving theory. Online citizen 
journalism within the framework of this study is identified as a form of political participation 
which is based on Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. 
In terms of the research methodology, the research design of this study includes a descriptive 
analysis consisting of a main methodological research question and a supplementary 
descriptive question. The study makes use of qualitative data that uses a single case study in 
order to answer both the main and supplementary research questions.  
The main research question asked what value online citizen journalism has in the field of 
political risk analysis. The supplementary question asked what the influence of online citizen 
journalism has been in reporting police brutality in Brazil 2014. The purpose of the 
supplementary question was to provide contextual background for greater insight into the 
impact of online citizen journalism during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests.  
This study indicated in chapter 2 that political risk as a discipline has not been defined 
according to a universal definition. According to Fitzpatrick (1983), Kobrin (1979) and 
Simon (1982), there is dormancy in the theory. Instead, political risk has adopted several 
understandings, depending on the environment in which it is applied, be it a business or 
political environment. However, this study acknowledges that political risk has intensified as 
a result of globalisation and is demonstrated through communications and the international 
media (Jarvis & Griffiths 2007). This particular understanding of the dynamics of political 
risk has provided a framework for this study. It acknowledges that political risk and the 
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ability to anticipate and analyse potential areas of political risk have changed according to the 
dynamics of technology.  
Chapter 2 illustrated that political events and risk are no longer regarded as isolated events, 
but have the ability to affect the international community in terms of trade and interests 
across state lines or continents. As such, the manifestation of risk in one country has the 
ability to affect another country. The use of technology in the analysis of risk is now more 
than ever a crucial factor. This study seeks to understand how information that stems from 
unconventional sources is able to assist the process of compiling political risk assessments. 
This study understands that political risk analysis is a dynamic field in that it is always in 
flux. It is therefore essential to research ways of improving the study and application thereof.  
It is understood that political risk analysis greatly relies on the ability to gather information in 
order to identify and understand potential risk factors, to provide contingency plans to 
address the potential implications of those factors. As mentioned in this study, it is necessary 
to gather a broad spectrum of information. This study has researched online citizen 
journalism as an additional source of information that has the potential to improve political 
risk analysis by providing an unconventional but efficient method, to a certain extent, that 
takes into consideration the impact of technology in the mitigation of risk. The aim of this 
study was to determine the extent to which online citizen journalists could be of value to the 
field of political risk analysis.  
Chapter 3 had the purpose of providing contextual background for the case study used in this 
research. The case study used was the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the subsequent 
events that followed it, including the 2014 FIFA World Cup which is significant within this 
study as it coincided with the implementation of the pacification programme. This chapter 
provided various sections that elaborated on the various reasons for the protests. The case 
study used elaborates on the socio-economic issue of police brutality. The dissatisfaction with 
the government on the part of citizens over the lack of intervention was prevalent for more 
than one reason. The inability to address these concerns was emphasised during the 2013 
FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as citizens believed that the 
government spent funds that could have been better spent elsewhere.  
Chapter 3 emphasised the various reasons for the 2013/2014 protests. One of the reasons 
mentioned in this study was the financial burden of these mega-events on the state’s 
economy. Brazil had bidden for the World Cup during a time of strong financial performance 
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in its economy in 2009, following the discovery of oil at the coast of Rio de Janeiro 
(Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014). In addition, 2013 saw a reduction in poverty and 
inequality, from a high starting point. This meant that the growth spurt of the middle class led 
to an increase in purchasing power and a greater demand for access to quality services (Levy 
2013; Montenegro et al. 2013; Garffer 2013). 
The protests peaked in the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup, coinciding with the 
tournament from 15 to 30 June 2013. Citizens were dissatisfied with the government in terms 
of inadequate public services in education and health care. Citizens were also dissatisfied 
with President Dilma Rousseff, as she continued to defend spending for the hosting of the 
World Cup, stating that this would improve public infrastructure and stimulate economic 
growth (Panja et al. 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Strikes and protests varied in intensity; 
some were peaceful while others ended in violence between protestors and police forces.  
This chapter also outlined the most prominent reasons for the protests, including the 
clampdown on cities through the Favela Pacification Programme which started in 2008. What 
began as an attempt to improve public security turned into protests against the police for the 
excessive use of force as well as the unfair removal of citizens from their homes. As 
mentioned before, citizens protested the increased spending for the World Cup as well as 
economic changes and the increase of bus fares. This study selected one of these reasons and 
used it as a case study to research the value of online citizen journalism in political risk 
analysis, due to the fact that online citizen journalists played a great role in reporting widely 
on these protests.  
In terms of the value of online citizen journalism, it was found in Chapter 3 that citizen 
journalists were able to play a significant role, as they consisted of large networks of citizens 
who were able to quickly mobilise and gather information to report what was happening at 
the protests as well as engage in the protests.  
The contextualisation of Chapter 3 elaborated on the various reasons citizens were protesting 
against the government. These included the clampdown on cities through the favela 
pacification programme, the increase in the spending to host the 2013 Confederations Cup 
and 2014 World Cup, as well as the general dissatisfaction against the government and 
President Rousseff. This chapter illustrated the protests as a manifestation of the 
dissatisfaction against the Brazilian government, presenting a political risk when protests 
reached a violent apex, during which protestors and the police clashed.  
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Due to the vastness of the information provided in Chapter 3, this study isolated one of the 
prominent causes for the protests in order to research the potential value of online citizen 
journalism. It was identified in Chapter 3 that police brutality was a concern during the clamp 
down on Brazil’s favelas. This was due to the police pacification units implemented in 2008, 
specifically in terms of the violent measures they used to patrol the favelas. The purpose of 
Chapter 4 was to introduce and research the case study of police brutality in Brazil in 2014 by 
using two branches of resources: newspaper reports from mainstream media and reports by 
online citizen journalism platforms. It should be noted that Chapter 3 was a compilation of 
international media sources, to provide a broad framework that could be further investigated.  
Chapter 4 aimed to understand the extent to which online citizen journalism could be used as 
a medium of information in the compiling of political risk reports, according to its ability to 
provide information that adhered to certain criteria. These criteria included value through its 
ability to provide information that was timely, accurate and relevant. In terms of timeliness, 
online citizen journalism presented timely information; however, this was true only to a 
certain extent. It was able to provide more cases of online citizen journalism in terms of the 
amount of incidents of police brutality. However, it also did not present information that was 
timely as mainstream media was able to report on police brutality cases before citizen 
journalists. By observing the findings in this study, it can be stated that the reason for this is 
based on the fact that online citizen journalists do not always possess the logistical means to 
be present at the scene of political events in order to report on them. This starkly contrasted 
the third chapter, which better demonstrated the timeliness of online citizen journalism. 
However, online citizen journalists are better able to mobilise in order to report on political 
events, although in the case study of police brutality, the incidents were sporadic and 
occurred at different times. Mainstream media was able to better cover these incidents as 
soon they occurred in addition to covering incidents after they had occurred in terms of the 
repercussions and court cases surrounding the incidents. From the context of these findings it 
can be deduced that online citizen journalism is most beneficial as a source of information to 
those who occupy the area or neighbourhood reported on. It thus would not necessarily be 
valuable as a source of informational within the international context or to report on more 
technical or complex issues.  
Relevance was also identified as a criterion to research the potential value of online citizen 
journalism. The relevance of information provided by online citizen journalists was 
demonstrated by the fact that they did extensive interviews with family members as well as 
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victims of police brutality. By conducting extensive interviews, they were able to gain greater 
insight into the occurrences of police brutality as well as the number of cases thereof through 
researching these incidents within the favelas, by communicating with those who were 
affected. The information provided through interviews was also relevant in terms of 
providing eye witness reports, as well as providing detailed information concerning the 
locations and events of instances of police brutality. In addition, online citizen journalists 
have the advantage of reporting cases in which mainstream journalists do not have 
jurisdiction, to report information from the perspective of the citizen.  
Lastly, online citizen journalists were able to show value in reporting information that was 
accurate. The most significant factor here is that online citizen journalists greatly rely on 
technology in the form of cell phones and video devices to present the points of view of 
citizens, using the platform on which they publish their reports. This allows for more 
credibility and accuracy in that they are not bound by professional codes and ethics when 
reporting.  
5.3 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
As per the conclusion in Chapter 4, it can be deduced that online citizen journalism presents 
value to the field of political risk analysis, but only to a certain extent. It is most effective at 
presenting relevant information through interviews, to gather the opinions of resident, as in 
the case study presented in this study. To reiterate, this is due to conducting in-depth 
interviews which, in this case, provided more information and insight which could be 
presented in political risk reports. When studying the criterion of accuracy, it was discovered 
that facts and some details were incongruous in two of the reports of police brutality; 
however, there was congruence in terms of the most relevant facts in these two cases. Online 
citizen journalism is accurate in general terms and is on par with mainstream media. Again, 
this study does not detract from the fact that traditional or mainstream media will always be 
considered a valuable source of information to political risk analysis. 
The protests highlighted the underlying concerns of Brazilian citizens and brought these 
under scrutiny from the international community. This meant that the intensity of these 
concerns did not dwindle after these protests; the most prominent concern was the issue of 
police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. The protests and the case study as a whole presented a 
new method of surveillance in the form of online citizen journalism. This was demonstrated 
by the fact that more cases of police brutality were compiled by citizen journalists than 
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mainstream media. It was also evident that this issue was more concerning in that it was not a 
simple request that could be addressed but indicated a deeper concern in a culture of impunity 
and violence. The advantage of online citizen journalists in this case study exhibited that they 
are able to do longitudinal studies on the issue of police brutality which better aids in the 
understanding of its causes and effects. They are thus not constrained by deadlines as in the 
case of traditional journalists, allowing for more in-depth reporting.  
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This study concludes that reports by online citizen journalists in the case studies observed are 
potentially valuable to political risk analysis, as they report information from a standpoint 
that provides an alternative perspective that is written with a greater scope of freedom. 
Although this is a double-edged sword, it does prove valuable when used in addition to 
mainstream journalism, in order to provide more ‘on the ground’ information from those who 
are more familiar with the scope and background of the story reported (Calcutt & Hammond 
2011:116).  
Research has pointed to the potential for online citizen journalism within mainstream media. 
This is due to more people migrating online to find news that is immediate and interactive. 
This points toward mixed news media, or the partnership of citizen journalists with 
professional journalists (Ward 2015). Further research in the study of layered journalism, or 
integrating different forms of journalism and different kinds of journalists, as well as how this 
affects news is another study that can be conducted to further this study, in order to gain 
understanding of how this solution has contributed to a better information base when 
compiling political risk reports, by contrasting this with news agencies which only use 
professional journalists (Ward 2015). This study has also witnessed that many online citizen 
journalists are not employed in a professional capacity; in other words, they do not always get 
paid. This points towards a sense of credibility, to a certain extent, as their efforts are not 
measured in a monetary sense (Lawal 2014).  
In terms of new findings in the field of online citizen journalism, Stephan Khan (2015) points 
to a different outcome for citizen journalists. He believes that the term citizen journalist has a 
short lifespan. In his opinion, it is not so much the emphasis of online citizen journalism but 
the impact of technology in reporting news, such as citizens submitting footage or 
information to journalists who then have the opportunity to follow up on this information. 
This alludes to a deeper relationship between the media and the public, which is now 
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equipped to provide information even though these sources of information have to be 
verified. This in itself presents a new avenue of research and should be mentioned. However, 
it does not detract from the significance of this research, as citizen journalists provide a 
different style of reporting, which has proved valuable in this study, in the form of in-depth 
interviews that would not necessarily have been conducted by professional journalists.  
This study takes into consideration the potential value of online citizen journalism in political 
risk analysis through the demonstration of a single case study. This study by no means aims 
to portray a generalised view of the value of online citizen journalism but is cognizant of the 
fact that there is potential for it within Brazil. For future study on this research topic it would 
be worthwhile to research it within other countries.  
5.5 CONCLUSION  
The aim of this chapter was to answer the research question put forth in the first chapter of 
this study. This chapter coincides with the previous chapter by reiterating the findings, with 
the exception of providing an avenue for additional recommendations to broaden the scope of 
this study. This study concludes that there is value in using online citizen journalism as a 
medium of information in the compilation of political risk assessments. This study has 
established that online citizen journalism proves valuable as an additional source of 
information, alongside reports conducted by mainstream media. This is due to the fact that 
traditional journalists are better equipped to provide legitimate information, based on the 
protocols they are expected to follow and that they are expected to report from a neutral 
perspective. According to this study, online citizen journalism is timely; however, the 
advantage of timeliness is limited to the scope of information reported rather than the span of 
time it took to report the information. In terms of relevance and accuracy, online citizen 
journalism proved valuable. There is potential in using citizen journalists alongside 
mainstream journalists, in order to research information from both a traditional and 
alternative angle while compiling political risk reports. 
This chapter has outlined the research process and findings of this novel study. In conclusion 
there is much value to be researched in the harnessing of online citizen journalism as an 
additional source of information in the compiling of political risk reports. The advancement 
of technology in conjunction with political participation as portrayed in this study through 
online citizen journalism demonstrates a shift in the gathering of information. This shift holds 
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the potential for more ground and scope to be covered in order to facilitate the field of 
political risk analysis through the dynamic use of technology.  
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